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Within the field of comparative religion, the methodological problem of comparing 
traditions that differ in their histories, theologies, and linguistic constructs persists.   Rather 
than immediately establishing a cognitive bridge between two differing traditions, this study 
adopts the approach that a typology, specifically a typology of negativity, allows for a 
nuanced analysis into the comparative possibilities in Buddhism and Christianity. Within the 
larger scope of a typology of negativity, the teaching of emptiness, or śūnyatā, is examined in 
various traditions to have a better understanding of how it informs Buddhism; in a similar 
way, apophatic theology is examined in Christianity in order to show how it informs 
Christian thought.  What binds these two traditions together herein is not a generalized or 
anecdotal connection, but rather a commitment to negativity, to examining how negation 
works in the language of these two traditions.  The typology of negativity allows for a very 
specific “route” with which to establish a context of comparison.  However, neither the 
typology nor the examination of negativity through emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism 
in Christianity are enough to support a full comparison.  An analytical bridge fills out the 
typology of negativity to help bring the concepts together and, more importantly, to find new 
comparative routes within the traditions themselves.  This is attempted with Derridean 
deconstruction, specifically through différance in Buddhist emptiness and khôra in Christian 
apophaticism.  Derridean différance and khôra provide a fluid language whereby problems of 
binary oppositions are bracketed and examined within the specific structures of sacred texts 
within the traditions. Furthermore, Derridean deconstruction provides the crux of the 
analytical argument because a deconstructed language of negativity, as it applies to a specific 
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Introduction: Typology, Methodology, and Review of Literature 
 The prospect of comparing two world religions is both exciting and daunting as an 
academic pursuit: it is exciting because of the possibility of dialogue across multiple times, 
societies, languages, and belief systems; for this same reason it is daunting.  At best, a 
comparison might offer up a specific context and then analyze components within that 
context in hopes of finding some commonality for further examination.  However, even this 
endeavor is limiting, not only in contexts, but also in how far a methodology might be 
employed to show similarities, philosophical nuances, and points of comparison.  In some 
sense, a new methodology must be set forth in each comparison to match the context; an 
overall, “universal” methodology of comparison, while certainly worthwhile and potentially 
viable, is probably, in the final analysis, not very beneficial.  The problem here is with not 
what is gained by a comparison, but what is lost.   
 Beyond the generalities and anecdotal evidence of commonalities in two religious 
traditions, the real potential for deep and meaningful comparison is certainly possible.
1
  
However, the potential for a compromise or loss of data in order to articulate that comparison 
is also something to consider.  The problem, framed in terms of religious study, is that when 
one asserts a specific voice, such as an “authoritative” religious worldview or theological 
position, it is to silence other (heterodox, for example) voices.  Historically, though, a 
                                                             
1 Texts approaching the topic of comparative religion often make fairly sweeping generalities about the 
possibilities; for example, Kenneth Kramer frames his project this way: “Each culture tells stories of the highest 
and deepest truths known to humankind in its scriptures…Comparing sacred traditions, we see that they share 
similar development from sacred events to sacred stories to sacred texts which then serve as conduits for sacred 
teachings.” Kenneth Kramer, World Scriptures: An Introduction to Comparative Religions (Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1986), 10.  While this certainly may be true, the operative methodology with which Kramer utilizes is to 
select certain key elements in various sacred texts for comparison.  While there is nothing inherently wrong with 
that approach, it must be asked if this is holistic enough to match the claims.  Others, like Kedar Nath Tiwari 
take up a “scientific” way of viewing comparative religion, albeit in a way that is “detached.”  Again, while 
there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach, like all scientific approaches, one asks what is gained and, 
more importantly, lost, in such an approach.  If two religions are compared “scientifically,” what critical 
remarks remain unexamined between the two?  For if the scientific approach takes its own method seriously, 
certain aspects of the analysis go untreated.  See Kedar Nath Tiwari, Comparative Religion (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1987), 1ff.   
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religious tradition, especially one that spans the millennia of human history, is made up of 
multiple competing voices; the goal of any viable religious description is one that tries to 
mitigate those competing voices into something of an organic, living, breathing tradition.  
This is no easy task; the problem is compounded when working with two traditions.  The 
attempt to find common ground, something that goes beyond the anecdotal, general, or 
happenstance, could be exceedingly difficult.  To refine the question of what is gained versus 
what is lost, it might be said that the act of comparing means picking and choosing sources 
whereby something is always lost.   
 There is a need for a methodology that takes these criticisms seriously with a very 
specific context, whilst remaining open to competing voices, traditions, and worldviews 
within a tradition.  Even then, however, the question must be posed as to whether two 
religious traditions might dialogue without a bridge, a separate point of connectivity, a voice 
that has no affiliation either way.  Is there room for conducting religious comparison with a 
separate analytical point with which to bridge the conversation?  
 This project tries to take the above criticisms seriously, applying a methodology to a 
specific context, and then using a separate analytical point to attempt to bridge the dialogue.  
The two religious traditions examined herein are amongst the world’s most ancient and 
influential traditions, Buddhism and Christianity.  To frame a more specific context, the 
Buddhist teaching of emptiness, or śūnyatā, is examined in various traditions to gain a better 
understanding of how it informs the larger tradition.  Likewise, apophaticism, or negative 
theology, is examined in Christianity in order to show how it informs Christian thought.  
What binds these two traditions together here is not a generalized or anecdotal connection, 
but rather a commitment to negativity,
2
 to examining how negation works in the language of 
                                                             
2 While possible nuances of “negativity” are addressed below, the working definition here is that which is 
expressed through negative language.  The larger point is to examine negative language in religious traditions to 
see how it functions on/in teachings of emptiness and apophaticism.  
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these two traditions.  This commitment to negativity, as such, is formed with a typology of 
negativity; this allows for a very specific “route” with which to establish a context of 
comparison.  However, neither the typology nor the examination of negativity through 
emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism in Christianity are enough to make a full 
comparison.  An analytical bridge is needed to help bring the concepts together and, more 
importantly, to find new “routes” within the traditions themselves.  This is attempted with 
Derridean deconstruction, specifically through différance in Buddhist emptiness and khôra in 
Christian apophaticism.  From here, a deconstructed language of negativity as it applies to a 
specific context within Buddhism and Christianity opens new avenues of analysis and 
potential comparison.   
 This chapter begins with an outline of a typology of negativity; this typology helps 
establish the parameters of analysis with which negativity is examined in the language of 
Buddhism and Christianity.  Then, once the typology is in place, a methodology helps work 
out some of the technical components of the typology.  The survey of literature helps situate 
this project within the frame of reference to previous research.  The approach is multi-
pronged insofar as it must address previous research in several different fields, but it also 
helps show the lack of research in this particular context.   
 Chapters Two and Three are an analysis of Buddhist emptiness and Christian 
apophaticism, respectively.  One of the foundational ideas of this project is that religious 
traditions must be examined independently of each other, with their own unique vocabularies, 
in order to understand how a comparison might be possible.  Thus, the examinations are kept 
separate purposely.  Chapter Four then takes the Derridean idea of différance and applies it to 
Buddhist emptiness; this helps further examine the dynamics of emptiness in ways that open 
it to possible comparison.  Chapter Five applies the Derridean reading of Plato’s khôra in a 
way to understanding Christian apophaticism in ways that might be comparable to Buddhism.  
13 
 
However, as a similar methodological tool in chapters Two and Three, of separate analyses 
for the expressed intent of preserving unique voices, Chapters Four and Five retain the 
separateness of religious traditions, too.  Only in the concluding chapter do potential 
comparisons of Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism emerge.   
 It is hoped that this project would fulfill several goals: to contribute to the dialogue of 
Buddhist and Christian communities who share different religious traditions, yet might come 
together for the betterment of humanity, to examine how Derridean deconstruction might 
contribute to religious language and inquiry, and to add to the body of literature that exists in 
this particular paradigm.  
 While the form and structure of this comparison may not reflect other comparative 
studies of Buddhism and Christianity, the intent is admittedly different with Derridean 
deconstruction.  One of the more intriguing and difficult aspects of deconstruction is that it 
does not offer a third point with which to analyze, but rather it provides a means with which 
to bring together Buddhism and Christianity in alignment.  This alignment means that what is 
unique in the traditions is preserved, but it also allows for deeper analysis.  The hope here is 
to foster understanding of how studying two religions in alignment is beneficial and 
productive in a comparative way.  
 From here, it is now prudent to establish a typology of negativity, as this will provide 
a framework with which to begin a comparison of emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism 
in Christianity.  
A Typology of Negativity: Linguistic Contexts and Considerations 
I. The Purpose of a Typology 
 Various fields use the term “typology” to refer to a classification system, a method by 
which language structures are broken down for further analysis.  The intent here is not to 
establish a field-specific typology (such as an anthropological, biblical, or grammatical 
14 
 
typology), but rather to establish a way in which negative language, expressed in types of 
negativity, might be analyzed in religious traditions.  The problem of languages utilized in 
this analysis of Buddhism and Christianity, including Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese, Japanese, 
Middle High German, mediaeval Latin, and French, the language of Derridean 
deconstruction, coupled with the complexities of writing this typology in English, all 
contribute to the astounding difficulty of such an analytical task.  The purpose here is not to 
invent a typology that can adequately correspond to the specific linguistic needs, but rather to 
find commonality in the negative types in these religious traditions.   Thus, this typology is 
specifically geared toward negativity in these traditions; it recognizes the distinct contexts, 
languages, and nuances of each of these traditions, but in this recognition, it is able to sort 
through the deeper differences, and even similarities, of the examined traditions. 





 and how negativity can be a critique of authoritative sources.  The 
purpose of setting up a typology of negativity is to identify the tension between what is 
speakable and unspeakable.  This is fundamentally paradoxical because the recognition that 
the unspeakable must remain unspoken is readily acknowledged; however, a typology of 
negativity might contribute to defining what is fundamentally unspoken.  Furthermore, the 
generalized question of whether or not it is possible to express negativity is bracketed 
because within each tradition, negation has a paradoxical relationship with language, with 
theological and philosophical categories, and with the experiential.   
 
                                                             
3 While this is discussed below, it is important to note here that “communication” indicates that which language 
seeks to make known. The larger point here is how negativity, that which is non-communicable, might be 
expressed with paradoxical language. 
4 Using a phrase like “signification of negativity” encapsulates something of the slipperiness of language: what 
does it mean to signify that which negates?  As it is used here, the signification employed is that of negation, 
that which negates language and meaning, and that which cannot be “signified” as such. So, while a bit of a 




II. The Functionality of Negation 
 What makes the task of writing on or about negativity difficult is its function within 
language. Negation does not seem to stand alone in meaning, but rather as that which 
functions on other words.  The negative component of a sentence, whether in noun, verb(al), 
or gerund form seems to “tear down” other words’ meaning.  This is exactly the analytical 
value. Negative words function in an almost parasitic way: they do not signify, as such, on 
their own, but rather they need the presence of other words to change signification.   
 The point of this project is to assess, contextualize, and situate how negation works 
in/on/through religious language to allow for a comparison of Buddhist emptiness and 
Christian apophaticism.  This takes into consideration the fact that negativity may function at 
many levels of signification within meaning, but that it also acts as a parasite of sorts.  This is 
the fascinating component of the functionality of negativity in religious inquiry: how does 
meaning shift with the “presence” of “absence” in language? This allows for a less 
constrictive analytical process by which to examine the types of negativity and how they 
might be applied to comparative religion.   
III. A Typology of Negativity for Comparative Religious Studies 
 The difficulty with comparing two different world religions was briefly outlined; the 
major point to emerge from that discussion is the identification of not what is gained by 
comparison, but what is lost.  This certainly applies to a comparison of Buddhist emptiness 
and Christian apophaticism because while the terms may share some commonality, especially 
in linguistic functionality upon the internal logic of the tradition, they are not equivalent.  
How much is compromised by analytically engaging both traditions in the language of 
emptiness and apophaticism?  The idea here is a typology of negativity will establish types of 




A. Types of Negativity 
 One of the central goals of this project is an examination of language, specifically 
negative language, in Buddhism and Christianity.  In order to do that, three types of 
negativity are established to not only draw particular analytical parameters, but also to tease 
out a method by which negative language is examined in light of its function in the tradition.  
The problems of this analysis have been highlighted somewhat already: expressions of 
negativity appear self-defeating and contradictory because whatever is being expressed is 
also being un-expressed in favor of something else, or “other.”  Thus, the first problem, 
herein defined as a type of negativity, is with communication of how negativity is expressed.   
Another problem has to do with signification because the full spectrum of emptiness and 
apophaticism means quite different things across religions that span over two-thousand year 
histories; hence a type of negativity must take into consideration the problem of meaning, of 
what exactly is being signified.  Thirdly, negativity may function as a qualifier of language 
that is meant to express religious authority.  This means that religious language assumes a 
certain privilege of authority over other competing voices; negativity functions as a type of 
skepticism of that authority, a question to a particular authoritative privilege.   
i. The Communication of Negativity 
 The point and purpose of language is communication; the communication of 
negativity presents something of a challenge simply because it is a negation of its own object.  
In a contextual frame, this begs the question of the limits of language: How do words 
function within a particular grammar or within a particular context of meaning?  Secondly, 
can these questions be explored in finite space and time?  Operating at the limits of language, 
Derridean deconstruction helps with the problem of communication of negativity.  What 
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might be referred to as “parasitic language,”5 the function of negativity in language is 
undertaken with special reference to Derridean deconstruction, namely in the examination of 
difference/différance and khôra.  
 Within the subtext of communication, the problem of experience also presents some 
special considerations.  Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism are often described, 
in both primary and secondary literature, in terms of experience of adherents; thus, there are 
experiential aspects of this context which must be identified.  Specifically, within a type of 
negativity, experience of emptiness or apophaticism might be summed as a stripping away of 
assumptions or idolatries, as the exposure of a reality beyond reality. However, again, 
deconstruction helps clarify this context through the critique of hyperessentiality, or of a 
presence beyond presence; this brings together how the communication of emptiness and 
apophaticism is met with the experience of adherents.     
ii. Signification and Negativity 
 In over two-thousand years of religious history, Buddhist emptiness and Christian 
apophaticism have taken on many different meanings; thus, when applying negativity to 
signification, the total picture of what is meant is not entirely clear.  In other words, if 
negativity is a method by which emptiness and apophaticism are examined, signification 
becomes a problem because it cannot encapsulate the entire tradition and the possibilities of 
what it could mean.   Additionally, to go a bit deeper with this problem, when a negative 
qualifier is put to a signified word (un/non/no), does this change the designation of meaning 
for the object, or does it offer an entirely new meaning?  While this problem may appear 
grammatically pedantic, the problem magnified to the level of religious comparison could 
spell trouble.  For example, if emptiness in Buddhism means the non-substantiality of all 
                                                             
5 An explanation of these terms is filled out more below, but what is called “parasitic” here is that which alters 
and shifts language; this has a certain methodological significance because it alters the function of language.  In 
this case, deconstruction helps show the function of negativity.  
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things, does this mean that no-thing/nothing has substance or that all substances have no-
thing(s)/nothing?   
 The problem of signification, when applied to negativity, helps sharpen the horizon of 
what is being discussed because it requires articulate language to convey how negativity 
affects, or is affected by, emptiness or apophaticism.  This is also where Derridean 
deconstruction will help with the analysis because difference/différance and khôra address 
the problem of signification and emptiness.   
iii. Negativity as Critique of Authority 
 Religious writing, herein clarified as writing that constitutes sacred scriptures for a 
religious tradition, assumes a particular authority, a place of privilege in conveying meaning.  
This is necessary for the development and proliferation of a world religion, but textual 
analysis begs the question of a priori authority over meaning.  As Derridean deconstruction 
will demonstrate, this assumed authority of religious texts is such because other competing 
voices have been silenced through the ages; they, too, make-up the character, tenor, and voice 
of a religion, if even as heterodox voices.  However, negativity helps open up the discussion, 
the plethora of voices, the competing constructs of religious conversation.  This is not a 
critique of authority, as such, but a breaking-open of the normal textual boundaries meant to 
preserve an authoritative privilege.   
Thus, this approach to a typology is important to develop as a textual undertone to this 
project because it “allows” negativity to break open the bounds of textual authority in 
emptiness and apophaticism.   
B. A Typology of Negativity 
 To sum up so far, the thrust of this project is to establish how types of negativity 
might allow for an examination of emptiness in the Buddhist tradition and apophaticism in 
the Christian tradition.  The three-pronged approach to negativity, namely in delineating out 
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how negation is communicated, how negativity is signified, and how negativity calls 
authoritative sources into question, is underscored by an examination of Derridean 
deconstruction, namely that of difference/différance and khôra.  The threefold approach, 
while not specifically delineated as such in the work below, is addressed in various forms in 
the major chapters below.  This approach is specific because the intent is to create an ebb and 
flow, of sorts, in order to build a specific context of negativity.  However, while the typology 
is essential to the framework of this project, it does not answer methodological questions or 
address how this is carried out.  A methodology that addresses how the two traditions can be 
examined while preserving their individual voices is necessary.   
Methodology 
I. Setting the Context 
 The purpose of this project is to examine emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism in 
Christianity through the lens of different types of negativity.  These types have been 
identified as the communication of negativity, the signification of negativity, and the question 
of authority when negativity is employed.  Now the question remains of how this will be 
undertaken; first, though, certain considerations have to be made prior to the establishment of 
a clear methodology.  These considerations must be examined thoroughly prior to the 
development of a methodology because they shape and form how the analysis will progress. 
A. General Problems with Comparing Religious Traditions 
 The comparison of two or more religions is highly problematic due to social, 
philosophical, anthropological, and theological difficulties in methodology, evidence, and 
interpretation.  Thus, care must be instituted, not only in these particular issues, but also in 
how the subject is approached, in order to establish something more precise and meaningful 
than cursory comparison.  Specifically, as it applies to this study, it is not inherently logical to 
compare two traditions that developed and flourished independently of one another; even 
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more, the differences that separate Buddhism and Christianity span geographical, 
philosophical, and theological differences.  It must be stated from the outset that comparison 
between these two traditions must bear in mind these difficulties.  Hajime Nakamura notes 
the difficulty in comparing Christianity and Buddhism: 
In my opinion comparison of Buddhism as a whole with Christianity is not 
easy.  The attempt may not lead us to conclusions which are convincing to 
everybody.  Both religions have long histories.  They have spread across vast 





While conclusions may not have to be “convincing to everybody,” they should be able to 
argue for meaningful dialogue between the two traditions.  Nakamura goes on to argue that a 
thoroughgoing historical analysis may contribute to the dialogue of comparison because 
“[t]he development of religious faiths, and the special characteristics they reveal during 
different ages, stem from the fact that conditions do not remain strictly the same.”7 While this 
is certainly relevant, and Nakamura goes on to explain how this is relevant, other paradigms 
may be present to explore certain characteristics of both religions.   
 Malcolm David Eckel proposes that both “traditions reinforce each other, in other 
ways they fundamentally conflict.  But from the sense of incongruity, of close kinship against 
a background of radical discontinuity, comes the chance of new insights.”8 The tension Eckel 
highlights is important, at least to general remarks about the task of comparison: the 
possibility of comparison is important, but the identification of points of tension between the 
traditions may even yield more interesting results.    
The central problem is that any comparison risks overgeneralization at best and 
irrelevance at worst.  This is the reason why a typology of negativity is useful: it allows for a 
                                                             
6 Hajime Nakamura, “Paradigm Shifts: Buddhism and Christianity Compared,” Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 
6 (1986): 5.   
7 Ibid. 6.  
8 Malcolm David Eckel, “Emptiness and the Historical Process: A Historian’s Response to the Image of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Works of John Cobb and George Rupp,” Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 3 (1983): 
7.   
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particular framework and engages the discussion within particular points of engagement.  
Inasmuch as a comparison might be fruitful and interesting, it does not give substantive 
reason why it is useful; the reason given here for consideration is that of inter-religious 
dialogue.   
B. Religious Dialogue as a Reason for Comparison 
 In a world that becomes ever-increasingly aware of various cultures, societies, and 
religions, the importance of dialogue becomes more and more vital. David Chappell remarks 
that Buddhist-Christian dialogue is a relatively-new endeavor that has vast consequences: 
“…what is new during the past century is the promotion of interreligious dialogue as a 
necessary spiritual task to nurture social harmony and the well being of the global 
community.”9  Winston King comments on this new phenomenon of peaceful dialogue 
between religious traditions: 
In the ages-long history of interreligious contacts, ‘dialogue’ – as a friendly 
interchange of views on some other topic or other – has been almost unknown.  





Religious dialogue as such may provide for common characteristics, informed discussion, 
and increased sensitivity to differences. Robert A. Segal outlines these general thoughts as a 
comparative method: 
                                                             
9 David Chappell, “Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Community,” in The Sound of 
Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogue in Honor of Frederick J. Streng, ed. Sallie B. King and Paul O. 
Ingraham (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1999), 9. 
10 Winston L. King, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in The Sound of Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogue 
in Honor of Frederick J. Streng, ed. Sallie B. King and Paul O. Ingraham (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 
1999), 41. King goes on to outline a method of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, offering the following criteria: 
“…dialogue implies much more than a ‘friendly’ and tolerant exchange of religious views by the adherents of 
two or more religious faiths who haven’t the slightest intention of changing their pre-dialogue faith stance a 
hairsbreadth.  There must be at least some readiness to accept change, perhaps that of a fundamental sort.” Ibid. 
47-48.  In a separate article, King explains why dialogue has met with resistance in the Christian tradition until 
recently: “Christianity, with its well-defined doctrinal base and rigid organization, has usually viewed proposed 
concessions as destructive of the True Faith.”  Winston L. King, “Response to David Chappell,” in The Sound of 
Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogue in Honor of Frederick J. Streng, ed. Sallie B. King and Paul O. 
Ingraham (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1999), 36.  
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Indeed, to compare phenomena is necessarily to find differences as well as 
similarities.  Even if one were seeking only similarities, one could know that 
one had found them all only at the point at which no further differences could 
be converted into similarities.  Consequently, one can as readily use the 




Furthermore, though religious dialogue may point out similarities between religious 
traditions, a deeper appreciation for differences may also drive a discussion.   
 It is expressly the point of this analysis to engage the Christian and Buddhist 
traditions in a dialogue because “[c]onceptual clarification of religious perspectives is 
important for both traditions.”12  The goal is to allow each tradition to speak in its own 
lexicon, with its own varying theologies and philosophies.  Thus, comparative remarks are 
only attempted after both religions are expressed with independent analysis.
13
 From the 
outset, the comparative method contained in this analysis seeks to take seriously the problem 
of “differentiat[ing] religions” without “level[ing] them.”14 In this strain of thought, Alice 
Keefe offers particular insight into the implications of establishing a comparative method: 
“…the tension between interreligious dialogue and the academic study of religion is rooted in 
the conflict between normative and descriptive approaches to the study of religion…”15 She 
also offers a generalization of the comparative method that is a driving force behind this 
analysis: “[comparison between Buddhism and Christianity] opens a space to dive deep into 
questions about what it means to be human on the most profound level.”16  
                                                             
11 Robert A. Segal, “In Defense of the Comparative Method,” Numen, vol. 48., no. 3 (2001): 348-349.  Italics 
original.  
12 Leo D. Lefebure, The Buddha and the Christ: Explorations in Buddhist and Christian Dialogue (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 1997), 194.   
13 This method of analysis is utilized in direct contrast to some thinkers who compare Christianity and 
Buddhism.  For example, Hajime Nakamura attempts to write a historical comparison about the development of 
Buddhism and Christianity.  Both religions are expressed in a parallel way that almost blurs the differentiation 
between the two.  Simply put, Christianity and Buddhism have fundamentally different histories; comparisons 
of the two seem to hold them together, philosophically and theologically, at particular junctures of time.  This 
method is rife with potential errors and oversimplifications.  Nakamura, “Paradigm,” 5-22.  
14 Segal, “Defense,” 342.  
15 Alice A. Keefe, “Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, Interreligious Dialogue, and the Academic Study of Religion,” 
Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 18 (1998): 123.   
16 Ibid.  
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 Religious dialogue, kept within the particular methods of comparison in which 
similarities and differences are both honored for their value, can have important implications 
for not only academic study, but for cultural understanding in an ever-connected world. 
Xinzhong Yao argues similarly: 
To reduce hostility and misunderstanding, we have to initiate dialogue 
between different faiths.  To initiate dialogue, we have to undertake 
comparative studies of the theories and practices of different religions, so that 




José Pereira argues, “…both religions [Christianity and Buddhism]…admit, explicitly or 
implicitly, that such truth exists at least in a fragmentary state outside their institutional 
organisms.  In other words, they combine the claim to absoluteness with a concern for 
ecumenicity.”18 The purpose of comparing Buddhism and Christianity is thoroughly 
dialogue-based because the “plurality of religious worlds” in a “fragmented modern world” 
calls for meaningful discussion of particular doctrines in both traditions.
19
   
C. A Comparative Framework: The Integrity of Individual Analyses 
 The integrity of a comparison between Buddhism and Christianity must be held 
together with the method of presenting each religion as a unique, individual tradition of not 
only an ancient culture and people, but also as a living tradition of modern adherents.  As 
such, it is necessary to build a comparison that examines one specific component of the 
religion. 
 After emptiness is examined in Buddhism and apophaticism in Christianity, particular 
types of negativity are used to examine the similarities and differences in both traditions.  
This allows for the identification of anecdotal commonalities while balancing the potential 
for dialogue between traditions that have unique voices within their given philosophical and 
                                                             
17 Xinzhong Yao, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Jen and Agape (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 1996), 3.  
18 José Pereira, “Resonances of Buddhism and Christianity,” Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 16 (1996): 115.   
19 Keefe, “Dialogue,”127.  
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theological presuppositions.  Additionally, this addresses the problem of clearly seeing 
similarities and differences amongst both religions.  As Yao offers,  
The similarities between two religious traditions must be placed against the 
background of their differences.  In one sense, their differences are more 
important for a comparative study than their similarities, because it is these 




The comparative framework, established with the usage of a typology of negativity, allows 
for the integrity of both traditions to remain intact insofar as their fundamental teachings are 
not altered by the analysis. 
D. Types of Comparisons: A Presence of Origins 
 Though this is not exhaustive of the types of comparisons, it is important to note an 
error that has preceded many comparative studies of Buddhism and Christianity.  In many 
previous literatures, analysts seek to trace particular philosophical, linguistic, and historical 
elements of the religion back as far as possible with the implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
intent of finding some sort of point of origin.  This point of origin, as the internal logic goes, 
would allow for an analysis that would self-justify the point of comparison.  The error here is 
that this pre-supposes what Derrida calls a “presence of origins”21 because it assumes some 
sort of common ground that can be “found” if one traces an element or various elements far 
enough back.  An additional error of logic here is such studies are logically self-fulfilling in 
their conclusions; if some overall general point of comparison is made, it is cited as 
justification for the comparison in the same way that the comparison justifies the point of 
origin.  The critique here is that the justification for comparison should be made outside of 
the possibility of a point of origin.
22
  
                                                             
20 Yao, Confucianism and Christianity, 12. Italics original.  
21 Jacques Derrida, “Ellipsis,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), 295. 
22 In this project, the justification given is the possibility of inter-religious dialogue as means for better 




 This project does not pre-suppose the presence of origins, of some point where 
Buddhism and Christianity meet on demonstrably common ground.  As the need for 
independent analysis between the traditions has already been argued at length, here it is met 
with the understanding that a point of origin is not presupposed; no matter how Buddhist 
emptiness and Christian apophaticism may be traced, it is not held that there is some point 
whereby the analysis might end or conclude with some evidence.  Rather, the point is that the 
analysis is ongoing, even beyond the limitations of space and time in this project.  To that 
end, this comparison, as it is met in this space and time, is readily acknowledged to be limited 
in scope, possibility, and suggestion; however, it is hoped that such limitations allow for 
fruitful dialogue in this space and time.  
II. A Methodology of Comparison  
A. Independent Religious Traditions and a Convergent Typology 
 As previously argued, it is important for any comparison to begin with specifically 
outlining the parameters of each position.  In this case, an examination of Buddhist 
emptiness, as understood through a more precise understanding of negativity (and its 
relational qualities) must be presented completely differently than an examination of 
Christian apophaticism, as understood through its own understanding of negativity (and its 
relational qualities).  The two traditions, if they stand a chance of meaningful comparison at 
some point, must be presented independently of one another in order to establish and 
maintain credible arguments.  Furthermore, because both traditions resist definitions of 
emptiness and apophaticism as part of their own internal logic, it is important to acknowledge 
the difficulty of describing a quality that is important to paradigmatic understanding (and thus 
circumspect in nature).  
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 The emphasis on this point cannot be overstated.  Independence within the two 
traditions must be preserved in order to maintain an objective coherence within the study.  As 
Keefe argues, 
Scholarship is always a matter of interpretation, and interpretation is always 
conditioned by particular interests and orientations; thus credibility in cross-
cultural study depends not upon freedom from any interest, but upon the 
capacity to be as conscious as possible of one’s particular standpoint…23 
 
Thus, objectivity demands recognition of “interests and orientations,” not just on the personal 
level, but also on the institutional level. This objectivity is achieved in the methodology 
through independent examination of “interests and orientations” of each religion in its 
relation with emptiness and apophaticism.   
 This particular approach addresses not only institutional concerns, but also individual 
(personal) interactions with these religions.  Chappell comments on the unifying purpose of 
conducting the comparisons: “…differences between religious people are real…there is a 
higher truth that all religions refer to, and it is in this truth that all religions are united.”24 This 
unification of religious dialogue is made possible through independent viewpoints.   
Independent examination takes seriously the purpose of studying religions, and 
furthermore, the purpose in offering suggestions as to particular comparisons.  As Stephen 
Morris comments, 
Religion is generally thought of as a social phenomenon.  In fact, it is usually 
even defined as such, referring to the acts and symbols shared by a group.  Yet 
some feel that in its purest form religion should be understood as an individual 
matter, and if it entails anything at all, what it sets on foot is an intense, 




                                                             
23 Keefe, “Dialogue,” 125.    
24 Chappell, “Dialogue,” 14.  




This “intense search for the deepest meaning in life” drives the reason for comparison, as 
well as the greater goal of inter-religious dialogue.
26
  Thus, the need for independent 
evaluations of the two religions is not only for institutional purposes, but also to address the 
personal nature of the tradition.   
B. Typological Comparisons: Convergence of Traditions 
 Bringing together the Buddhist and Christian traditions requires the elements listed 
above, beginning namely with independent examination.  However, to progress to a 
meaningful comparison, a pre-existing framework, in this case a typology of negativity, must 
exist in order to bring the traditions together in one particular element.  The purpose of using 
a typology for comparison is, hopefully, to create a framework of examination of emptiness 
insofar as the typology may suggest ways forward in Buddhist-Christian dialogue.  
Furthermore, the more precise reasons behind using a typology for these types of suggestions 
are to address “many a metaphysical question [that] still haunts academic comparisons and 
the approach of a history or phenomenology of religions.  What, after all, is to be made of the 
insistence of the ‘truth’ of the respective teachings?”27  
 What is presented with the typology is not a “convergence” in the sense of blurring 
together religious traditions.  Rather, the typology of negativity allows for a discussion of 
independent elements, coupled with discussion of how these elements bear meaning in 
similar philosophical and theological terms.  The problem of language remains, however.  
Leo Lefebure suggests the problem of language in relation to Buddhist-Christian dialogue:  
Both traditions are aware…that human language cannot express the full 
meaning of these perspectives.  For both traditions, religious language must in 
                                                             
26 Yao makes an interesting point here; this sums up well the problem with individual “objective” comparisons 
of religion: “A qualified comparison between religions must be based on the principle of 
impartiality...Hermeneutical theory has moved beyond the liberal or enlightenment idea of objectivity and come 
to the realization that there is no value-free interpretation.” Yao, Confucianism and Christianity, 4.  
27 John C. Maraldo, “The Hermeneutics of Practice in Dōgen and Francis of Assisi,” Buddhist-Christian 
Dialogue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation, ed. Paul O. Ingraham and Frederick J. Streng (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 54.   
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Lefebure’s point suggests a systematic problem with any comparison between the two 
traditions.  In order for the typology to meaningfully address a point of comparison of 
emptiness through negativity requires an independent philosophical tool that has the 
capability of understanding each religion on its own terms, enables a comparison to develop 
its own language free of particular baggage, and uses this own language to suggest ways 
forward.  In this project, Derridean deconstruction allows for such a bridge.    
C. Jacques Derrida: Re-Creating the Language of Comparison in a Typology 
 The problem with any comparison, especially a comparison between vastly differing 
religions, is with language.
29
  What stereotypes, generalizations, and oversimplifications 
come about when a comparison is conducted?  As Yao summarizes, “...we must acknowledge 
that it is dangerous to identify religious expressions in one religion with apparently similar 
expressions in another, without careful comparison and proper criticism.”30 
 The problem of language is central to any comparison; it takes on its own unique 
problems when religions are compared.  Addressing this problem from the outset means 
using a typology to compare elements in their own terms with a further clarification.  In this 
case, the problems with comparing emptiness in the Buddhist and Christian traditions is 
recognized, thus a typology of negativity is used to further explore any possible comparisons.  
However, even within the typology, there are problems of language.   
                                                             
28 Lefebure, The Buddha and The Christ, xxi.   
29 The even larger problems with language might be called categorical issues.  Language is more specific, but 
even categorical problems are certainly possible.  As John Cobb comments, “Christian theology is deeply 
affected by the encounter with Buddhism, and the comparative study of these two traditions is deeply informed 
by theological categories and concerns.” John B. Cobb, Jr., “Epilogue,” in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual 
Renewal and Transformation, ed. Paul O. Ingraham and Frederick J. Streng (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1986), 231.  
30 Yao, Confucianism and Christianity, 12.  
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 The work of Derrida has importance to the problems outlined above in the sense that 
it suggests ways forward in a comparison of the two traditions.  Granted, Derrida’s work was 
not in Buddhist-Christian dialogue, but the methodology of deconstruction is invaluable for a 
meaningful comparison.  Introductory remarks are made below to illuminate the general idea 
of how Derrida’s thought is utilized as a cognitive bridge between the Christian and Buddhist 
traditions. 
i. Derridean Deconstruction 
 While it might seem unusual to apply deconstruction to a discussion of religious 
comparison, Derridean différance and khôra contribute significantly to a dialogue of how 
negativity functions in religious language.  G. Douglas Atkins offers a cogent working 
definition of deconstruction: “Unlike most other ways of reading, which tend to spatialize 
texts, deconstruction too traces a temporal movement, exposing the text’s instability, the 
temporal impossibility of signifier and signified, of literal and figurative, of performative and 
constative ever to catch up with one another and to coincide.”31 The structure of negation 
within religious language often has profound meanings upon the texts, and even further 
meaning for the tradition as a whole.  What deconstruction “does” is allow an analysis to sort 
through the construction of negativity within the text; in this way, the religious text is no 
different than any other text. For example, différance in Buddhist emptiness shows how the 
non-substantiation of all things is foundational to other Buddhist teachings; in the same way, 
khôra in Christian apophaticism shows how the space of negation is central to discussion of 
how Christians speak of God.   
Deconstruction is helpful because it helps address a central goal of the typology: the 
authority of the religious text is held in question because it no longer possesses a presumed 
                                                             
31 G. Douglas Atkins, Reading Deconstruction / Deconstructive Reading (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1983), 10. 
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authoritative “voice” of a “sacred” text.  Deconstruction is, in other words, an equalizer 
amongst texts, religious texts included.   
As the possibility of comparing Buddhism and Christianity at some preconceived 
origins has been eliminated from the field of possibility, it is important to note which 
“elements” of deconstruction are used.  While there are a plethora of possibilities which 
might yield interesting analyses, the two selected, différance in Buddhist emptiness and khôra 
in Christian apophaticism, represent how various contexts within negativity in these two 
traditions might be approached.  
ii. Negativity in/on the Texts: Derrida as a Neutral Voice 
 An important aspect to the comparison here is a sense of detached neutrality that acts 
as a bridge between the two traditions.  Derrida does not demonstrate any particular 
favoritism for a particular religious tradition; rather, he seems to be far more concerned with 
the language of religion, or that which is pre-supposed to have “presence” where there is but 
absence.  While Derrida’s concerns might be thoroughly metaphysical, they are still neutral 
insofar as examining Christian apophaticism and Buddhist emptiness.   
 This neutrality is important as deconstruction acts as a foil of sorts for how negativity 
works within the typology.  The deconstruction of emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism 
in Christianity yields an important connection that can only be made after such an analysis, 
termed “negative transcendence,” though this is accomplished through using deconstruction 
as a foil to set up how negativity acts in religious language.  Thus, methodologically, 
neutrality in the bridge between the traditions is necessary to show a connection.   
III. A Typological Inquiry: What are the Outcomes? 
 Any comparison of such diverse and different traditions as Christianity and Buddhism 
must rest with suggestions of how they may be compared, what may be similar in the 
traditions, and how the traditions fundamentally differ.  The outcomes of any comparison, 
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therefore, are suggestions to further dialogue, critique, and refinement.  This study is no 
different.  By setting out the task of comparing apophaticism in Christianity and emptiness in 
Buddhism with a typology of negativity, further brought together with Derridean 
deconstruction, a comparison of the two traditions may suggest further paths in dialogue.  
The outcomes of such a task are measured in the logic of the comparison, the strength of the 
typology as it is used as a comparative tool, and whether particular comparisons can be 
argued cogently.  However, the reality of such an undertaking is kept within the context of 
certain problems: “Dialogue is important for both traditions’ self-understandings in the global 
community, but genuine understanding is difficult because of the very different assumptions 
that Buddhists and Christians bring to their religious practices.”32 
Three proposals are listed below that act as internal measures of that argument; they 
are not conclusions, but rather general outcomes that will be carried through as the logical 
extension of the methodology. 
A. Emptiness May Act as a Tool to Bring Together Differing Traditions 
 It is all too easy to make overgeneralizations when it comes to comparisons; that may 
occur in a comparison of terminology, concepts, or dogma within the traditions.  Thus, a 
further comparative tool is needed to bring the traditions together constructively, on their own 
terms.  The methodology of this project centers around the idea that emptiness and 
apophaticism may serve as a constructive tool to bring together Buddhism and Christianity.  
However, in order to actively avoid overgeneralization, this comparison is extended to 
include a typology of negativity within its range of comparison. 
 Part of the reason for using emptiness and apophaticism in this comparison is to 
propose that the analysis may open up other ways of comparison in inter-religious dialogue.  
                                                             
32 Lefebure, The Buddha and The Christ, xix.  
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These suggestions help frame the way a comparison is conducted as a primary reason to 
further the dialogue of these two religions. 
B. Particular Negative Types within a Comparison: The Outcome 
 The purpose of using a typology in a comparison of two religious traditions is to 
maintain an internal logic that focuses on how particular types, concepts, and ideas may 
function to bring together further concepts.  The typology focuses specifically on three 
guiding principles which act as an internal framework to conduct the analysis.  The outcome 
of using the typology is a demonstration of how a framework may be used to show 
comparisons; further, the use of Derridean deconstruction helps bridge together the nuances 
of the language used within the typology.   
 The outcome of using a specific typology of negativity is a fleshed-out framework of 
how Christianity and Buddhism may be compared in terms of emptiness.  Furthermore, the 
outcome of using a typology is a logically-demonstrated framework of how further dialogues 
may occur.  This works within the larger framework of how King describes the realities of 
religious inquiry: “In religion one deals with the value and the meaning of human life; in it 
are found the deepest, highest, and most personal hopes, fears, and aspirations embodied in 
its beliefs, actions, and institutions.”33 
C. Mutual (Trans)Formation 
 The main purpose of using a typology of negativity is to meaningfully express how 
negative categories may be used in a comparison.  It allows for meaningful analysis, 
specifically in the thread of deconstruction because of the possibility of further dialogue; is 
there possibility of external change through this dialogue?  That might be, but perhaps the 
answer is more relevant to the internal changes.  If there is value to be found in comparing 
two religious traditions, it is found in elucidating the possibility of mutual change, of greater 
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understanding, of articulation of the ultimate and sublime: “Neither Buddhism nor 
Christianity is interested in simply describing realities external to us.  Both are movements of 
transformation that seek to overcome suffering and to liberate us from the prisons in which 
we find ourselves.”34  
IV. How the Typology and Methodology Work Together 
 To this point, there are many constituent pieces that loosely fit together to form the 
framework of this project: emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism in Christianity are 
examined through the roles of negativity in the given traditions; this is accomplished through 
a typology that identifies three specific types of negativity.  The methodology acts as the 
backdrop to each of these components because it is “driven” by Derridean deconstruction; in 
sum, Derridean deconstruction acts a foil whereby types of negativity can be examined in 
religious language.   
 Both the typology of negativity and the methodology are necessary to 1. preserve the 
voice of each tradition as unique, 2. examine three different types of negativity as contextual 
components and 3. bring together Derridean deconstruction in a way that acts as a foil to an 
examination of negative language in the two religions.  In some sense, the typology is part of 
the methodology (as a pre-cursor of sorts), but it is also important to note that the 
methodology is informed by the framework of the typology.   Both are necessary components 
of this project, mainly to hold the comparison together in a coherent way. 
 At this point, the typology and the methodology are set-up, but a study of the current 
and previous research in this particular field is needed.  This survey of literature is meant 
both to fill in some analytical gaps of the methodology and typology through a 
contextualization of the sources, as well as critically examine how research up to this point 
does not fully engage Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism in a comparative sense. 
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Review of Literature 
I. Context for a Review of Literature 
 With a typology of negativity and a methodology of comparison in place, a survey of 
literature that spans the boundaries of comparison of Buddhist emptiness and Christian 
apophaticism, coupled with that of Derridean deconstruction, is necessary to fill out the 
framework of comparison.
35
 This survey is meant to contextualize how these sources may 
engage with one another in a comparative sense.  The organization of the survey is purposely 
open in order to cover the broadest amount of materials.  Spanning primary and secondary 
extant literature, the survey is comprised of several major headings that are meant to 
generally contextualize.   
 The survey begins first with a discussion of the major work that has been done in 
Buddhist-Christian studies.  This broad overview helps situate this project in and apart from 
those literatures.  
II. Comparative Literature: Dialogue of Buddhism and Christianity 
 In the field of Buddhist-Christian comparative analysis, the emphasis on the primacy 
of mutual understanding through dialogue is apparent in most bodies of literature.  The below 
discussion of these literatures seeks to highlight certain reoccurring themes, including the 
problems of language, God, and ultimacy with special regard to emptiness and apophaticism. 
These themes serve as a guiding framework to examine the past, recent, and perhaps future 
work of Buddhist-Christian comparison and dialogue. 
A. The Possibility of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue 
 Perhaps there are a multitude of reasons to conduct meaningful dialogue between 
religious traditions; the question at hand, though, is why should there be dialogue between 
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Buddhism and Christianity? Though the traditions have had some historical contact, dialogue 
as a means of mutual understanding and sharing is a rather uniquely twentieth-century 
exercise.   
 To further the question, Paul Ingram and Frederick Streng outline the general 
understanding of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, insofar as it developed in the twentieth 
century.  In sum, they arrive at an interesting analysis of the dialogue: “There are Buddhists 
and Christians who recognize that human life is at a new horizon of ethical, religious, and 
experiential possibilities, and that to make use of those possibilities the interchange between 
them must go beyond conflict, competition, or mere tolerance.”36 They go on to provide a 
loose framework of possibility for the future of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, including one 
major, on-going goal: “...to explore both the difficulties and the possibilities of religious 
renewal and creative transformation which arise from the serious engagement with another 
ultimate claim.”37  
 The value of Ingram and Streng’s analysis is found not only in a summation of the 
field up to the point of its publication, but also a vision via comparative framework of how 
future work could emerge in the field.  They stress a common theme in the essays of “mutual 
transformation.”  This is an important note in their study because it presents an attitude or 
mode of how they perceive comparative frameworks work best in a way that is sensitive to 
objective comparison, yet offers deeper insight into how traditions may inform one another. 
 David Chappell offers a brief history of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, noting rather 
dryly, “...except for a few rare cases, traditional Buddhism was like other religions in not 
holding the idea of the equality of other religions until this [twentieth] century.”38 He goes on 
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to summarily detail the interreligious movement between the traditions, highlighting 
especially the use of emptiness with both traditions “tr[ying] to push beyond both traditions 
to seek what is common to human existence.”39 Furthermore, in similar ways as other 
analysts, Chappell suggests that emptiness frames a comparison in a way that lends “mutual 
transformation.”40  
 Chappell’s essay is a generalized history and engagement with the interreligious 
movement; his analysis serves the point of saying that “global community” is only possible 
through understanding. While he touches on emptiness as a possible connection between the 
traditions, he does not take this analysis very far.  Rather, his point of interconnectedness 
amongst the two traditions serves as the impetus to stress the importance of the “global 
community.” 
 Winston King’s response to Chappell in many ways reflects the ultimate goal of 
Chappell’s appeal to productive dialogue within the two traditions.  At times, King diverges 
from some of the particular nuances of Chappell, but the general appeal to working toward 
peaceful understanding of traditions is echoed clearly.  In regards to emptiness as means of 
comparison, King tells of a conversation with D.T. Suzuki that, in many ways, reflects the 
traditional views of Buddhism in regards to being conversant with other traditions: “Suzuki 
once said in a conversation with me that the Western cross symbolized the need for the 
vertical Western ego to be flattened; the East, having no such sense of self (no-self, śūnyatā, 
of Buddhism) needed no cross.”41 King takes issue with this point of view, and goes on to 
discuss how a framework of mutual understanding can be quite beneficial to both traditions.  
 These sources tend to ground interreligious dialogue in a sense of ethics insofar as 
they impress upon the reader the convergence of twentieth-century communication 
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technologies with that of the possibility of cross-religious discussion manifesting itself in the 
reality of some sense of diplomacy.  This is an important feature of the dialogue, but it does 
not go far enough: discussions that tend to take implicitly diplomatic ethical tangents seem to 
lose philosophical rigor; the internal logic, while centering on a human ideal, seems to escape 
the real work of comparisons.  The importance of interreligious dialogue is not downplayed 
here, rather the intent is an appeal for a more specific context within the dialogue. 
B. Emptiness as a Dialogue Partner 
 The task of interreligious dialogue is immensely complex; for this reason, the task is 
approached by academic specialists and practitioners carefully. Twentieth-century dialogue 
did well to establish points of departure within an ethical framework that stressed the value of 
diplomacy; while the dialogue, within the parameters of using topical analysis, was met with 
mixed success, the goal of identifying commonalities between human religious experiences 
was certainly progressed.   
 One of the points of juncture for Buddhist-Christian dialogue may be found in the 
concept of emptiness. Winston L. King, for example, explores the connection of emptiness 
and salvation in the Buddhist and Christian traditions; he takes seriously charges of Buddhist 
philosophy against Christianity:  
Universal (Buddha) Mind swallows up individual, personal mind completely.  
Consequently the best counsel of both the Theravada and Mahāyāna Buddhist 
to the Christian world is that its illusory belief in selfhood, both human and 





For King, though, emptiness offers a unique connection between the traditions through a 
proper understanding of transcendence.
43
 In King’s proposal, it is transcendence that allows 
“...the mind to transcend itself – but not self – that both Buddhism and Christianity seek to 
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maximize and transform. They both seek a religious, that is, a total self-transcendence.”44 
King wants to go as far as to connect a path of transcendence with a proper understanding of 
emptiness in both traditions, but he instead offers the proposal of “personal” and 
“impersonal” understandings of emptiness.45 The importance of King’s essay rests with his 
insightful way of bringing Christianity and Buddhism together with the method of emptiness 
and the ability of transformation through transcendence.  Additionally, King holds a 
remarkable view of Christian selfhood against the charge of egoism by Buddhism: 
...the hopefully asserted divine sonship of mankind occasionally enables the 
Western self to escape from its prison of static, closely confined individualism 
into the immensities of the unlimited and unlimiting love of God and persons; 
to lose its narrowness and tightness by being crucified with Christ and raised 




 M. David Eckel begins his discussion of how Buddhist-Christian dialogue may be 
conducted with emptiness as its emphasis by summarizing the position of John Cobb: “...the 
realization of Emptiness allows one to become fully immersed in the historical process, to 
respond to it creatively, and to be fully appreciative of it at every moment.”47 He goes on to 
describe how Cobb sees emptiness as a model of comparison because of the very difference 
in how a Christian approaches the notion of God where a Buddhist approaches the 
absoluteness of emptiness: “The Christian concept of God, in contrast, requires a person to 
conceive of the process as having a directional [d]uality or moral purpose not fully embodied 
in every moment.”48 
 Eckel’s intention is to hold the differences between George Rupp and Cobb together 
in tension to show how a framework of dialogue emerges.  For example, Eckel says, “It is 
more convincing...to see the pattern of balance between the negative and positive aspects of 
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the Emptiness concept in the structure of systematic treatises rather than in individual verses 
extracted from a larger text.”49 The tension present in their analyses centers on the dynamic 
power of emptiness; Eckel focuses on the transformative power of emptiness insofar as “[t]he 
understanding of Emptiness is embedded in a system oriented toward the service of others 
and it drives forward toward completion.”50 Furthermore, Eckel draws out Rupp’s and 
Cobb’s conclusion that emptiness serves as a point of dialogue between the traditions: “It is 
because all things are eternally empty that they can change, and it is because they can change 
that they are eternally empty.”51 
 A question rising from these discourses is whether these analyses go far enough; each 
speaks of potentialities within the study of emptiness, but they do not seem to venture into the 
possible outcomes of such study.  While these works are more generalized and suggestive of 
future work, they lack in detailed analysis of how the dialogue may engage fully with 
Christianity and Buddhism.  A notable exception to this occurred several decades ago; its 
well-documented exchange is worth noting in detail.   
 One of the most influential “movements” in the area of Buddhist-Christian dialogue 
occurred between 1980 and 1993 between the scholars Masao Abe and John Cobb, Jr.
52
  This 
dialogue established a documented connection between Buddhism and Christianity with the 
concept of emptiness.  The reaction to this dialogue was mostly positive, though recent work 
by Charles Jones has cast doubt on the legitimacy of this dialogue for the reason that Abe 
used emptiness as emblematic of Buddhism (as a whole).  However, despite recent criticism, 
the Abe-Cobb dialogue was certainly influential in the field.     
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 An important aspect of this dialogue is the emphasis that Masao Abe placed on 
śūnyatā, or emptiness.  His understanding of the term comes from the Zen tradition, though 
he draws on multiple traditions of Buddhism to fully flesh out the term.  Abe’s emphasis on 
emptiness is best summarized in his own words: “...the future task of Buddhism is to break 
through the static view of śūnyatā and is to realize how this self-emptying Emptiness 
concentrates itself into a single centre in the boundless openness...”53 Abe framed emptiness 
in a way that allowed it to be compared with other religious traditions; in his search for a 
hermeneutical link, he briefly discusses what śūnyatā means in the Buddhist tradition:  
Śūnyatā as the ultimate reality in Buddhism literally means ‘emptiness’ or 
‘voidness’ and can imply ‘absolute nothingness.’  This is because śūnyatā is 
entirely unobjectifiable, unconceptualizable, and unattainable by reason and 
will.  It also indicates the absence of enduring self-being and the non-





An interesting note in this dialogue is Abe’s dependence upon conceptualizing emptiness so 
that it may be used as a hermeneutical tool in comparison.
55
  This may be an unfair critique, 
but Abe’s definition and usage seem, at times, to conflict. This question is recently addressed 
with a connection between Abe’s appeal to God who empties himself in Jesus and Buddhist 
emptiness: “Is there a genuine convergence between Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian 
God? Abe believes so, but for the Christian theologian the question remains: Can Emptiness 
‘will’ and ‘love’?”56   To that end, however, Abe is careful to frame his discussion as his 
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discussion of Buddhist emptiness itself remains intact; it is only in his comparative work that 
emptiness takes on meaning that contradicts his definition.
57
   
 John Cobb’s approach to dialogue with Abe is fundamentally through the belief that 
“all religions are involved in an on-going process of change throughout history, and that 
those win and survive in this competition who adjust to new situations, assimilating 
appropriately from others.”58 Thus, Cobb’s engagement with Abe is grounded in the idea of 
“mutual transformation” because dialogue may have a profound effect on participants, and 
therefore entire traditions.
59
 Cobb wants to push this far enough that it may be called post-
dialogue because of the transformative effect of both traditions.
60
  In his Beyond Dialogue, 
Cobb challenges usual notions of emptiness and seeks to open the discussion further.
61
 He 
proposes that emptiness is deeply rooted at the foundational level of Buddhism; as such, he 
refers to emptiness in very specific terms like “supreme reality” and “Emptiness-as-such.”62 
 Charles Jones takes issue with one of the fundamental aspects of the Abe-Cobb 
dialogue: “the adoption of Nāgārjuna as the standard-bearer for Buddhist thought, and Abe’s 
idea of ‘dynamic śūnyatā’ as a natural outgrowth of the history of East Asian Buddhist 
thought.”63  He summarizes the goal of the dialogue:  
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The agenda, following Cobb’s suggestion and vocabulary, was to allow each 
side to ‘cross over’ into the other; in other words, to study and internalize the 
worldview of the other in as much depth as possible without converting or 





Jones goes on to argue that Abe presented a concept that, on the surface, seemed to coalesce 
well with Christianity, but further investigation shows this concept, while presented as an 
over-arching idea in Buddhism, is but a piece of the entire doctrine of emptiness.
65
 Jones’ 
convincing article argues vigorously for a renewed investigation into the nuances of using 
emptiness as a comparative tool.  While his article is an attempt to show how Abe mistakenly 
simplified emptiness (and further propagated it as the sole teaching of Buddhist emptiness), 
and how Christian interpreters accepted this rather uncritically, in the final analysis it must be 
questioned whether Jones fully understands the nuanced views of their dialogue.  While it is 
forthrightly admitted that the Abe-Cobb dialogue may have been hasty in places, the overall 
criticism of the dialogue seems a bit overreaching insofar as it is carefully and articulately 
nuanced.   
 The value in Jones’ argument is found at the end where he presents a new way 
forward in Christian-Buddhist dialogue: 
If anything, this small detail in the landscape of interreligious dialogue should 
caution today’s participants against essentializing any religious tradition by 
identifying it in toto with one significant figure or text. While such a strategy 
is tempting...it is in fact untrue to the tradition and raises the likelihood of 
misapprehension of the dialogue partner’s particular context and status.66 
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This is a helpful warning to heed; the simplification and generalization of any one tradition 
with all of its various complexities should be avoided.  Rather, specific language is necessary 
to not only comprehend, but to further the method of dialogue.  
 The importance of the Abe-Cobb dialogue of the 1980’s and early 1990’s cannot be 
overstated in the field; the recent criticism of particular methodological specifics serves the 
greater purpose of clarifying the terminology employed.  To this end, the use of emptiness as 
a methodological tool should not be dispensed; rather, reshaping and reforming terminology 
to better reflect the traditions as individual movements will authentically take the 
aforementioned criticisms seriously while building upon revised and critically-relevant 
theoretical constructs.   
C. Christian God and Buddhist Ultimacy in Emptiness: Dividing Point or Bridge?  
 In terms of dialogue, it is tempting to connect two traditions’ concepts of the ultimate 
together in a way that explores a commonality.  Durwood Foster explores this possibility in 
the Christian ultimate, or God, and Buddhist Ultimacy, or emptiness.  Foster begins his 
analysis of Buddhist-Christian dialogue by stating that a “dialogue of salvation” is “a sign of 
the rising awareness of common humanity that is an encouraging feature of our global scene 
today.”67 Foster’s analysis of the reason to dialogue, as well as the reason to communicate 
differences and similarities across traditions, cuts deeper than other analyses.  He indicates a 
pull to something deeper, something more meaningful: “Even where historical contact 
[between Christianity and Buddhism] was originally minimal, there are striking structural 
parallels among religions that unmistakably suggest homogeneity of underlying experience or 
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archetypal mentality.”68 Foster’s approach into comparative analysis via dialogue is shaped 
by this search for deeper meaning, for an “underlying experience;” however, his methodology 
of searching for “archetypal mentality” is not fully worked out.  This begs the question of 
whether or not one could have epistemological evidence of commonality once particular 
nuances are brought out. 
 In his approach to emptiness, Foster focuses on the comparative value demonstrating, 
“...the Ultimate was beyond existence and non-existence, or beyond being and non-
being...this was what is called an apophatic intuition of the Ultimate – an experience and 
conviction of the utter ineffability of the Ultimate.”69 He goes on to explore the idea that 
Buddhist emptiness and the Christian apophatic tradition share some underlying meanings 
that are rich in comparative value.
70
 He goes further than this, however, by suggesting, “...in 
addition to the via negativa, there is the via analogica or symbolica.”71 This is an important 
distinction because it provides more room to discover the possible connection between the 
Christian apophatic tradition and the Buddhist tradition insofar as symbols and analogies of 
emptiness may play a more emphatic role.  His methods, though, may be questioned because 
the search for analogy and symbolism is, at its root, grounded in Christian medieval 
scholasticism.  Does this communicate in the same language as Buddhist emptiness?  
 Foster moves his analysis into direct connections with emptiness by focusing on the 
direct tension between Christianity’s understanding of “God” and Buddhism’s understanding 
of “emptiness”: “...in a manner similar to that in which the Christ principle or Logos was read 
back or posited by Christian theology as belonging to very God of very God, Mahāyāna 
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Buddhists read the Buddha principle into the ultimate emptiness.”72 Foster’s attention to these 
“two poles in the envisagement of Ultimacy” provide the backdrop necessary to tease out 
meaning in the comparison between “Ultimates” in both traditions.73 He goes on: “...many 
would stop short of any merger, and say that Emptiness (śūnyatā) and God are two ultimate 
paradigms, conceptually incompatible, both of which we must respect and may affirm...”74  
This is precisely the value in Foster’s insight: the tension of Ultimates in both traditions, held 
together, spell out an interesting framework of comparison; specifically in the tension of the 
two (God and emptiness) is this paradox examined.  However, Foster’s argument does not 
dismantle the linguistic assumptions that affirm his appeal to “ultimates” in both traditions; 
does the signification he asserts as the ultimate concern take seriously the linguistic problems 
of the limitations of language? Or, is it possible to assert an ultimate with language?  
 In the same strain of thought, John and Denise Carmody examine the idea that the 
inexpressible nature of God in Christianity lends itself nicely to Buddhist emptiness: “...no 
matter what we say about God, God is more unlike than like our saying...A Christian 
theological sensibility is likely to love emptiness as akin to the via negativa that protects the 
mystery of God...”75 The function of emptiness as a comparison between Christianity and 
Buddhism, namely the expressed notion of ultimacy, leads to a natural discussion of language 
insofar as its limitations are logically shown in this comparison.  How does language form 
notions of God and emptiness?  
D.  The Language of Emptiness 
 The value of precise language simply cannot be understated for an authentic and 
meaningful Buddhist-Christian dialogue.  Language plays a vital role in how concepts are 
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examined, differentiated, and with special care, compared.  Language is both a starting point 
and an ending point of dialogue simply because meanings are rooted in the role of linguistic 
communication.   
 Shohei Ichimura argues for religious dialogue that is grounded in linguistic study of 
Christianity and Buddhism, specifically in the linguistic understanding of śūnyatā, which best 
does “justice to the paradoxes of religious experience.”76 He lucidly examines how śūnyatā 
may act as a conceptual bridge between Christianity and Buddhism because the “dialectic 
demonstrates that categories and systems are neither absolute nor ultimate precisely because 
they have neither self-identity nor any referential foundation.”77 Ichimura’s essay is an 
important contribution to Christian-Buddhist dialogue because it connects how śūnyatā is a 
“definitive insight”78 into Buddhist philosophy; moreover, he also points to how “...the 
concept of śūnyatā can allow us to analyze not only theistic and nontheistic religious systems, 
but also humanist and Marxist systems of teleology as well.”79 The importance of śūnyatā is 
highlighted in Ichimura’s essay because it serves as the linguistic connection in how 
Christianity and Buddhism may be compared. While he presents a detailed and engaging 
logic syllogism for emptiness, he does not go far enough in his comparison with Christianity.  
While the point of his essay is clearly demonstrated in his framework, the question of how his 
particular nuances are held together begs many questions.   
 Leo Lefebure presents a model of comparison that takes seriously the role of 
dialogue: “Dialogue is important for both traditions’ self-understandings in the global 
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community, but genuine understanding is difficult because of the very different assumptions 
that Buddhists and Christians bring to their religious practices.”80 Lefebure’s analysis seeks 
to fully grasp the specific difficulties he mentions; he begins with an important qualifier that 
is vital to productive dialogue: “Neither Buddhism nor Christianity is interested in simply 
describing realities external to us.  Both are movements of transformation that seek to 
overcome suffering and to liberate us from the prisons in which we find ourselves.”81 
 Most critically to this analysis, Lefebure touches on the importance of understanding 
how language affects any comparison of Buddhism and Christianity: “Both traditions are 
aware...that human language cannot express the full meaning of these perspectives.  For both 
traditions, religious language must in some way be negated in order to fulfill its purpose and 
communicate the truth of ultimate reality.”82 
 While Lefebure does not directly address emptiness in his analysis, he goes on to 
affirm a framework of comparison that may be applied to how emptiness may be examined in 
both traditions: “For both the Christian and Buddhist traditions, the absolute, which is beyond 
all human images and concepts and comprehension, graciously responds to the human 
dilemma by making itself salvifically present in the world.”83 If this applies to the two 
traditions, what Lefebure calls the “absolute” may be called paradoxical emptiness in both 
because they operate with an assumption of salvific power. 
 
                                                             
80 Lefebure, The Buddha and The Christ, xix.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid. xxi.  Lefebure goes on: “While contemporary Christians can affirm that the reality that Christians name 
God is truly and redemptively present in the Buddhist tradition, it is nonetheless extremely important to 
remember that the ways in which Buddhists experience this incomprehensible reality are indeed very different 
from Christian experiences of God.” Ibid. xxii.  This is an important observation because a central tenet of 
Christianity is grounded in the doctrine of God; Lefebure here tries to establish common ground between the 
traditions in order to continue dialogue where it may prematurely end.   
83 Ibid. 55.  Lefebure continues: “While the creation of the universe through Christ is not the same as dependent 
co-arising of all realities, the two traditions do nonetheless offer a vision of a dynamic transformation of human 
life, a transformation which extends to the entire cosmos.” Ibid. 56. While presenting a framework of 
comparison, Lefebure rightly acknowledges the continued (and preserved) differences between the tradition.   
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E. Recent Work in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue with Respect to Emptiness 
 There is much recent literature that draws upon earlier work in Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue.  Recent literature tends to take a more specific approach to comparison and 
dialogue, as much of the older work focuses on the call to dialogue, approaches to dialogue, 
and common vocabulary.  Recent work uses emptiness as a very specific hermeneutical 
dialogue piece, drawing upon the contextual foundation set in earlier work.  
 Joseph O’Leary explores the possibility of Buddhist-Christian dialogue that 
transcends the Christian attitude “of having secure possession of absolute truth.”84 His use of 
emptiness to bridge the gap with modern dialogue is done with numerous reservations:  
An active and interventionist God is correlated with the breakthrough of 
ultimacy.  Conversely, Buddhist emptiness acquires the associations of a 
powerful breakthrough, almost a theophany.  This way of talking might be 
seen as falsifying both Buddhism and the Bible, by making emptiness an 




O’Leary discusses the temptations to draw a reductionist comparison of emptiness in the two 
traditions; rather, his approach to dialogue advocates “...conventions pointing beyond 
themselves as they indicate their own emptiness.”86  
 In his specific analysis, O’Leary wants to find the bridge between what he draws 
together as Christian ultimate, or God, and Buddhist ultimate, or emptiness.  He takes a 
similar interpretation as other Christian thinkers toward emptiness. Namely, without using the 
term “dynamic emptiness,” he goes along similar lines: “In Madhyamika emptiness always 
has a conventional basis; it emerges in the analysis of this basis, and the emptiness itself is 
further analyzed so that it too is not allowed to congeal.  Emptiness is always emptiness-
                                                             
84 Joseph S. O’Leary, “Emptiness and Dogma,” Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 22 (2002): 164.     
85 Ibid. 170.  
86 Ibid. O’Leary draws this together more closely: “How can emptiness be power? Perhaps the secret is that 
emptiness is the way things really are, so that to find it (or rather not find it) is to be put in energizing contact 
with the real.  Emptiness is a way of living in the conventional world...” Ibid. 171.  
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of.”87 He draws this together with the Christian ultimate: “...when we talk of the emptiness of 
God we mean that he is empty of the substantialist self-sufficiency we are so prone to ascribe 
to him.”88 This is very similar language and logic to the Masao Abe and John Cobb dialogue 
previously discussed above.  While it appears that O’Leary adopts a more open and nuanced 
view of emptiness as a comparative tool, the language and logic employed are markedly 
similar to the earlier dialogue.   
 The value in O’Leary’s analysis is found in his basic questions concerning the logic of 
the dialogue.  It is worth quoting at length: 
...one must think through one’s notions of God until they transform into traces 
of emptiness.  Reification short-circuits the imaginative functioning of 
religious language and weighs it down with objects of clinging and 
defensiveness.  When these are dissolved, religion becomes a style of 
discourse and practice that consistently heals, opens, and frees the mind...The 
reification of God is reflected in the processes of reification and fetishism that 




O’Leary, though he demonstrates a thoroughgoing knowledge of Buddhism, seems to reflect 
the interpretations of others in his analysis.
90
 He does offer, however, an insightful Christian 
critique that is useful in the overall goal of dialogue: “...we can no longer construct the 
concept of God along the lines of mythical narrative or ontotheological metaphysics...Today 
‘God’ is a flexible pointer, used as a skillful means for indicated the empty realm of Spirit.”91  
F. Future Work in Emptiness between Christianity and Buddhism  
Common to the themes discussed, the general theme of emptiness serves as a point of 
departure for both traditions because it is highly nuanced, arguably compatible with certain 
key aspects of both traditions, and seeks “truth” through the analytical method of negation.  
While much work has been done in this field, there is much left to do.  Recent, and somewhat 
                                                             
87 Ibid. 172.  
88 Ibid. 172-173.  
89 Ibid. 173-174.  
90 See especially page 175ff.   
91 Ibid. 177.  
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widespread, criticisms of the methodologies behind the Abe-Cobb dialogue, as well as the 
greater discussion that ensued regarding emptiness, must be acknowledged.  This is not say, 
however, that emptiness may be dispensed as a hermeneutical and methodological tool of 
comparison.  Rather, further precision of vocabulary, revision of the Abe-Cobb dialogue, and 
a framework that is true to the teachings of both traditions are needed to continue the 
dialogue.  However, as Cobb proposes in his Beyond Dialogue, both traditions must be open 
to “mutual transformation.”  This is an excellent suggestion from a diplomatic and dialogue-
driven framework, but the philosophical backdrop is a bit more complicated.  More 
specifically, linguistic concerns suggest that something is lost in the identity of the religions 
if such “mutual transformation” occurs.  To that end, an examination of emptiness in each 
tradition’s own vocabulary is necessary to preserve each religion’s unique identity.   
III. Buddhist Literature: Emptiness as an Internal Logic 
 
 The literature of the Buddhist tradition is voluminous; that which comprises the idea 
of emptiness is also vast.  The intent here is to contextualize how that literature might be 
examined with specific points.  Some of the general classifications include how primary and 
secondary literatures are treated in this project.   
A. Buddhism at a Glance – Introductory Material 
 One of the most paradoxical components of the study of Buddhism is that, while there 
are many studies of the foundations of the tradition, most of the secondary literature seems to 
be introductory in depth and scope.  What is included in this brief survey is a look at some 
foundational pieces and how they relate directly (and in some cases indirectly) to the teaching 
of emptiness.  Emptiness allows for a more precise discussion, a more in-depth look at other 
aspects of Buddhism, and a method by which introductory material may point to something 
more meaningful.  
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 A very good introduction to the development of Buddhism in its earliest phases, 
extending to the Zen tradition, is found in William de Bary’s The Buddhist Tradition in India, 
China, and Japan.  De Bary’s analysis takes seriously the teaching of emptiness and how it 
was used as a common thread through the highly nuanced and different development of 
Buddhism.  To de Bary’s credit, he presents emptiness in the Mādhyamika school of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism with clarity, yet with the technical nuance to reflect the paradoxical 
nature of emptiness: 
...Emptiness or Void (Śūnyatā) is all that truly exists...But the phenomenal 
world is true pragmatically, and therefore has qualified reality for practical 
purposes...Emptiness, on the other hand, never changes.  It is absolute truth 
and absolute being – in fact is the same as Nirvāna and the Body of Essence of 
the Buddha...Thus all beings were already participants of the Emptiness which 
was Nirvāna, they were already Buddha if only they would realize it.92 
 
De Bary goes on to trace how emptiness played a vital role in the development of Buddhism 
in China.  Specifically, he details how the T’ien-t’ai teaching of the “Perfectly Harmonious 
Threefold Truth” is dependent upon a correct understanding of emptiness insofar as 
emptiness shapes how the three (teachings) are one (absolute) and the one (absolute) is three 
(teachings).
93
 This extends to in de Bary’s analysis through Japanese Buddhism; he does well 
to explain how Mādhyamika deeply influenced the teaching of emptiness in Japanese 
Buddhism.
94
 His summation of the Japanese import of emptiness is worth quoting at length: 
The Way of Emptiness insisted on the need to free oneself from anything 
external, including such concepts as Heaven, in order to seek the ultimate, 
undifferentiated reality within.  Externals are so changeable that they can only 
deceive.  They must therefore be negated exhaustively until all the distinctions 
and concepts which arise from incomplete knowledge are destroyed and 
ultimate truth is intuitively realized.
95
 
                                                             
92 William Theodore de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China, and Japan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1969), 77-78. De Bary sites his primary source for this understanding from Lalitavistara 13.175-77: “All 
things conditioned are conditioned by ignorance, And on the final analysis they do not exist, For they and the 
conditioning ignorance alike are Emptiness, In their essential nature, without power of action...” Ibid. 96.  
93 Ibid. 156.  
94 He traces the teaching of emptiness with the idea that emptiness is instrinsically related to the absolute: 
“Things are empty of any enduring selfhood or identity, because they are transitory and subject to change.  Only 
Emptiness endures, is final and absolute.” Ibid. 262.  




The value of de Bary’s analysis rests with his special attention to tracing emptiness as a 
foundational catalyst by which Buddhism developed.   
 Also important in the tracing of Buddhist studies in terms of emptiness are Paul 
Williams’ Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition and his 
Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.  In the former text, Williams contributes 
significantly to the field by offering specific connections of emptiness with the Madhyamaka 
view that emptiness cannot be equated with nihilism while stating that emptiness is central to 
understanding other key positions like dependent origination.
96
  Williams’ Mahāyāna 
Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations lends insight into how the function of emptiness 
shapes Mahāyāna Buddhism through the key concept, “Emptiness is the ultimate truth…[it] 
is hence a property (expressed in English by the ‘-ness’ ending), a property possessed by 
everything.  Everything has the property of being empty of intrinsic existence.”97 Other 
introductory works that are beneficial in the discussion of emptiness in Buddhism include 
Peter Harvey’s An Introduction to Buddhism98 and Eugène Burnouf’s Introduction to the 
History of Indian Buddhism.
99
  
 Concerning primary texts, one can hardly read a serious study of primary texts in the 
English language without touching upon the work of Edward Conze.  His early work in 
English translation of key Buddhist texts is an important step in introducing the western 
world to Buddhism.  Conze’s Buddhist Texts through the Ages presents a satisfactory 
introduction into some of these texts.  More specifically, Conze’s choice of primary Buddhist 
texts reflects the centrality of emptiness as an operative piece of development.  As an 
                                                             
96 Paul Williams and Anthony Tribe, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 147-152.  
97 Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 70. 
98 Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
99 Eugène Burnouf, Introduction to the History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Katia Buffetrille and Donald S. Lopez 
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introduction into Buddhism, Conze focuses his translations of emptiness around the teaching 
that dharmas are essentially and necessarily empty.
100
 Moreover, Conze’s translation of the 
Prajnāpāramitā Hrdaya is especially useful because it draws attention to a very nuanced 
understanding of emptiness.
101
 Conze’s translation and compilation of primary texts is useful 
because it begins to highlight the common thread of emptiness in early Buddhist thought.
102
 
 Quite helpful as a critical literary engagement with modern European and American 
reception of Buddhism is Andrew Tuck’s Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of 
Scholarship.
103
 Tuck alludes to his thesis, and further demonstrates the full force of it, 
throughout his argument; in the afterward of his work, he spells out the major point:  
…the focus of the work is not an attempt to critically understand one of the 
central works of Buddhist thought, but rather an examination of the role that 
modern, Western philosophy plays in the interpretation of non-Western classic 




The value of Tuck’s thesis is his examination of Nāgārjuna scholarship through the prism of 
isogesis, or “…a ‘reading into’ the text that often reveals as much about the interpreter as it 
does about the text being interpreted.”105 Tuck maintains this hermeneutical stance 
throughout his text, showing quite cogently the mischaracterizations and misappropriations of 
Nāgārjuna scholarship in modern analysis.  This is of especial help when bearing in mind the 
plethora of different interpretations ascribed to Nāgārjuna; where it is of limited import, 
however, is Tuck’s limited engagement with specific texts.  He spends much time “standing 
above” the fray of argument, but does little to engage.  It may be argued that this is his point, 
                                                             
100 Edward Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts through the Ages (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1954), 127.   
101 Ibid. 152-153. Specifically, what is beneficial to a nuanced understanding of emptiness is the teaching that 
“...form is emptiness and the very emptiness is form...all dharmas are marked with emptiness, they are neither 
produced nor stopped...” Ibid. 152.  
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importance of his texts in the English-reading world.  While his translations, like all translations, are subject to 
criticism and clarification, it is important to note this early pioneer of English translation.   
103 Andrew P. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation 
of Nāgārjuna (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
104 Ibid. 94. 
105 Ibid. 9-10.  
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but it may be questioned if he commits “isogesis” himself by criticizing others’ positions 
without offering up his own.  
B. A Sample of Primary Sources on Buddhist Emptiness 
1. Discussion and Limitations 
 As briefly outlined above, it is simply impossible to outline and discuss every ancient 
reference to emptiness in the Buddhist tradition.  The vastness of the literature indicates the 
importance of the doctrine in its own right, but the academic study of emptiness is limited to 
particular points.  As such, the discussion herein is purposely limited to representative texts 
that illustrate the whole of the themes of Buddhist literature.  This is necessary for space and 
time, as well for summation purposes.  The texts discussed below are meant to serve as 
pointers to the greater implications of emptiness in Buddhism. 
2. The Prajnāpāramitā Hridaya Sūtra (The Heart Sūtra) 
 The Prajnāpāramitā Hridaya Sūtra, or Heart Sūtra, is an extremely short, yet 
pregnant piece of literature that serves as foundational thinking to the Mahāyanā tradition.  
There are numerous commentaries on the Heart Sūtra because of its value within the 
tradition; amongst them are Garma Chang’s translation and discussion in The Buddhist 
Teaching of Totality. Chang argues, “The importance of this remarkable Buddhist classic and 
its wide influence on Buddhist thought cannot be overstressed.”106 Chang goes on to provide 
an excellent commentary to the centrality of emptiness for this passage.  Another translation 
and commentary that is valuable to the field is Red Pine’s The Heart Sutra.  Pine provides a 
line-by-line commentary that argues a similar point to Chang’s.107  
                                                             
106 Garma C.C. Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism (University 
Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1991), 64. 
107 Red Pine, The Heart Sutra (Berkeley: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2004).  
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 The Heart Sūtra focuses on emptiness as “not arising, not ceasing, not defiled, not 
pure, not increasing, [and] not decreasing.”108 Other descriptions of emptiness include various 
negations, utilizing a model of negating terms of existence.
109
 Some commentators, including 
Chang, argue that the Heart Sūtra contains the “essence of the entire Mahāyāna teaching 
[and] is contained therein.”110 
3. The Majjhima Nikāya and the Cūlasunnata Sutta 
 Central to the Theravāda tradition and spanning some of the earliest Buddhist texts, 
the Majjhima Nikāya and the Cūlasunnata Sutta both present compelling evidence for the 
primacy of emptiness in the tradition.  Originally compiled in the Pāli language, Bhikkhu 
Bodhi’s translation into English is generally recognized as the authoritative modern source, 
though some earlier translations were undertaken by the Pāli Text Society.111 Helpful modern 
commentaries on these works include Winston L. King’s article, “The Existential Nature of 




 The main themes of the Cūlasunnata Sutta’s treatment of emptiness rests in the 
immensely complex dialectic that later informs many Buddhist thinkers’ conceptions of 
emptiness, including Nāgārjuna.113 Furthermore, negation is central to the Cūlasunnata Sutta 
insofar as it outlines the dichotomy and tension between affirmation and negation.
114
 This 
                                                             
108 Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality, 65. 
109 See ibid. 65ff.  
110 Ibid. 64.  
111 Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Cūlasunnata Sutta 
121: The Shorter Discourse on Voidness, trans. and revised Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 
1995).  
112 See Winston L. King, “The Existential Nature of Buddhist Ultimates," Philosophy East and West, vol. 33, 
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negation plays a central role in the illusiveness of emptiness because it calls into question 
what it means to “have” being or non-being.115 
 In the Majjhima Nikāya, the influence of emptiness is focused much more on the 
tension between interiority and exteriority as emptiness is shown to be a path towards 
“emancipation.”116 Here the movement is from the theory of emptiness in the Cūlasunnata 
Sutta to the projection of “emancipation” from the cycle of being.  This is an important 
theoretical shift because the doctrine of emptiness is shaped from a philosophy into a 
religious teaching insofar as the “path” to “cessation” is realized.117  
4. Emptiness in Nāgārjuna 
 As Charles Jones demonstrates, Nāgārjuna received considerable attention, especially 
in the west, after Masao Abe popularized many of his ideas in the well-documented dialogue 
with John Cobb, Jr. in the late twentieth century.
118
  Jones questions the influence of 
Nāgārjuna until that point, especially within the Mahāyāna tradition.119 While Jones presents 
convincing evidence for this point, he does not fully elucidate how the real influence of 
Nāgārjuna is realized in his revision (and in his own eyes, reformation of the original 
teaching) of Buddhist emptiness.  Whereas Jones recognizes his importance in the scope of 
ancient Buddhism, the full impact of Nāgārjuna’s ideas are simply more foundational that the 
credit Jones gives.
120
 This impact is painstakingly undertaken by a number of modern 
interpreters, including the commentary to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by Jay Garfield.121   
 The two texts of Nāgārjuna examined here are his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and his 
Vigrahavyāvartanī.  Most of the study of Nāgārjuna comes from the former text, but it is 
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important to remember that the latter text “is a foundational text of Madhyamka 
dialectics.”122 In the Vigrahavyāvartanī, Nāgārjuna aptly demonstrates how he does not take 
a position on emptiness, therefore his conclusions cannot be (logically) invalidated. This is 
important to the dialectics of emptiness because he is able to show how all things are empty 
of independent substance, even his own argument.  
Other recent commentators that stress the overall importance of Nāgārjuna’s ideas 
include David Kalupahana
123
 and Kenneth Inada.
124
 Perhaps most helpful in recent Nāgārjuna 
reception is Paul Williams’ patient and detailed clarification of the internal logic of 
emptiness. Williams offers keen insight into analyzing linguistic nuances of emptiness in two 
articles, “Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka” and “On the 
Interpretation of Madhyamaka Thought.”125  Also quite helpful is D. Seyfort Ruegg’s article 
“The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of 
Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism.”126 These articles specifically delve into the deeper nuance 
of logic present in emptiness.  
 Modern interpreters and expositors of Nāgārjuna’s ideas often focus on the centrality 
of emptiness as the key to understanding Nāgārjuna’s critique.  Michael Barnhart succinctly 
contextualizes Nāgārjuna’s ideas: “that existence presupposes relations, and relations resist a 
substantialist account.  There is no absolute, nonrelational, independent ‘presence’ that is 
unconditioned.”127 Roger Corless argues a similar point when he summarizes Nāgārjuna’s 
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127 Michael G. Barnhart, “Śūnyatā, Textualism, and Incommensurability” Philosophy East and West, vol. 44 
(October 1994): 652.  
58 
 
emphasis on the foundational quality of emptiness: “Nāgārjuna maintains that conceived 
reality is an impenetrably closed logical system about which nothing can be truly said, 
although one may function within it.”128 Malcolm David Eckel’s influential monograph, To 
See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness, provides an excellent 
insight into Nāgārjuna’s conclusion because he argues for a differing point-of-view where 
Nāgārjuna’s conclusions essentially amount to a paradigm shift: "none of the normal 
distinctions between things applies.  But Emptiness itself is a distinct position, too, and when 
it is analyzed from the point of view of Emptiness, it also has to be empty."
129
 However, as 
previously discussed, Andrew Tuck’s Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of 
Scholarship stands as a central text in Nāgārjuna reception because he clarifies many of the 
existing positions as views worked out by interpreters who saw Nāgārjuna by their chosen 
hermeneutic.   
This sampling demonstrates how Nāgārjuna’s conclusion, the emptiness of emptiness, 
is a position that requires a detailed analysis with various hermeneutical provisions and 
considerations.    
5. Zen Sources of Emptiness 
 The task of examining primary sources in the Zen tradition is inherently illogical 
within its own “system” of thought.  The crux of the Zen tradition is based upon the practice 
of meditation, not texts, words, ideas, or constructs.  Thus, what is present in the tradition is, 
at the very best, series of koans, sayings, and recorded teachings of Zen masters (and even 
those are very limited because Zen students did not venerate their teachers like in other 
traditions).   
                                                             
128 Roger J. Corless, “Speaking of the Unspeakable: Negation as the Way in Nicholas of Cusa and Nāgārjuna” 
Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 2 (1982): 111.  
129 Malcolm David Eckel, To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 43. 
59 
 
 Paul Reps’ compilation of Zen stories and koans is helpful because it presents the 
essence of Zen, and furthermore the essence of emptiness and how it informs Zen practice.  
For example, in a short story, a student describes his understanding of emptiness: “The mind, 
Buddha, and sentient beings, after all, do not exist.  The true nature of phenomena is 
emptiness.  There is no realization, no delusion, no sage, no mediocrity.  There is no giving 
and nothing to be received.”130 The purpose of the Zen story, however, is in his master’s 
response to the student: he “whacked” his student, thereby making him quite “angry.”131  The 
master asks the student, “If nothing exists...where did this anger come from?”132 The essence 
of emptiness in this story comes from the student’s reification of emptiness; the master’s 
response illustrates Zen’s response to emptiness: even emptiness itself is empty.  Other short 
stories support this general conclusion, including how emptiness eludes any statement 
because it is unreified.
133
 
 One of the more important elements of Reps’ compilation is found in the collection of 
the “ten bulls.” Originally these were wood carvings meant to illustrate the “sequent steps in 
the realization of one’s true nature...The bull is the eternal principle of life, truth in action.”134 
Especially notable is the eighth bull where the image is empty, where “both bull and self 
transcended.”135 This is meant to represent the clarity of mind found in enlightenment, the 
emptiness of reality where “Whip, rope, person, and bull – all merge in No-Thing.”136 
 Modern Zen writers expand upon the teachings of emptiness as being a catalyst of 
sorts to understanding the “nature” of Zen (or meditation) itself.  This material can be found 
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in works by D.T. Suzuki, including An Introduction to Zen Buddhism,
137
 three volumes of 
Essays in Zen Buddhism,
138
 and Manual of Zen Buddhism.
139
  Other notable commentaries 
include Chen-Chi Chang’s “The Nature of Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism,”140 Dale Riepe’s “The 
Significance of the Attack upon Rationality by Zen Buddhism,”141 T.P. Kasulis’s Zen Action / 
Zen Person,
142
 Merv Fowler’s Zen Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices,143 and Heinrich 
Dumoulin’s A History of Zen Buddhism.144  
C. Buddhist Teachings of Emptiness 
 The quantity of primary literature in Buddhism that deals with emptiness in particular 
vastly outnumbers what is possible to study with any kind of depth. For this project, it is 
necessary to take a sampling of some ancient primary sources, examine the commentary of 
both ancient and modern thinkers, and contextualize it with the essence of overall Buddhist 
emptiness.  The literatures examined here have the several similar characteristic of treating 
emptiness as a crux in understanding Buddhism as a whole. Firstly, ancient and modern 
sources tend to emphasize the mistake of trying to reify emptiness; they stress the importance 
of leaving a proper understanding of emptiness open because it cannot and should not be 
substantiated.  Secondly, Buddhist interpretations of emptiness seem to center around the 
emptiness of even emptiness itself.  Though this is made explicit in some traditions (like the 
Mahāyāna tradition), it is more implicit in others (like Zen for example). Thirdly, emptiness 
as a teaching of non-substantiality is relied upon for further illumination of other teachings 
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like nirvāna and samsāra.  For these reasons, it is argued that the teaching of emptiness is an 
essential contextual tool that holds the internal logic of Buddhism together.  The combined 
survey of primary and secondary literature is meant to contextualize how emptiness serves 
this function in the internal logic of Buddhism.   
IV. Christian Apophaticism: The Language of Negation 
 
A. Apophatic Thought 
 Though “apophaticism” is not limited to a particular tradition per se, the focus here is 
generally associated with medieval Christian theology in a general way and with the thought 
of Meister Eckhart in a more specific sense.  
 Perhaps one of the foundational contemporary texts dealing with medieval Christian 
apophaticism is Denys Turner’s The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism.   
Turner’s treatment of apophaticism centers on the “interplay of negation and affirmation, 
embracing ontology, dialectics and metaphor.”145 One of Turner’s theses deals with “the 
double nature of negation - a sense that negation operates in two roles or at two mutually 
interacting levels: at a first-order level of experience and at a second-order level of the 
critique of experience.”146 This is important to understand how medieval mysticism fits 
within the whole of Christian theology; Turner’s text provides this very contextualization 
because he centers it squarely in the “theological tradition which consciously organized a 
strategy of disarrangement as a way of life, as being that in which alone God is to be 
found.”147 Turner’s work is a first-rate engagement with Christian mysticism, indeed as a 
“retrieval of the mediaeval tradition of apophatic, or ‘negative’ mysticism,”148 and his 
scholarship is of immense value; however, inasmuch as Turner wants to straddle the 
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62 
 
seemingly disparate poles of experience and spirituality within mysticism, his categories of 
analysis do not seem to separate these out adequately.  The greater theme here is negativity, 
moreover the function of negativity within the language of mysticism, which seems to take 
precedent over the concerns of what constitutes experience and/or spirituality. 
 Other texts that offer insight into Christian apophaticism include Silence and the 
Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation edited by Oliver Davies and Denys Turner.  This 
collection of essays on apophaticism helps contextualize the very relevant incorporation of 
negative theology with modern Christian thought.
149
 Within this collection, Bernard McGinn 
offers a comparison (discussing Eckhart in relation to Luther) while also offering a succinct 
discussion of Eckhart’s understanding of emptiness.150 Another seminal text within this 
tradition is Oliver Davies’ God Within: The Mystical Tradition of Northern Europe; Davies 
examines the major currents of apophatic thought and how they are relevant to current 
theological discourse.
151
 Davies offers an excellent introduction to medieval thinking because 
he contextualizes the major themes between the church and the university.  Another text that 
deserves mention for its lucidity is John Macquarrie’s treatment of Christian mysticism in 




 In a more general discussion, older studies like Louis Bouyer’s A History of Christian 
Spirituality,
153
 Bernard McGinn’s The Presence of God: A History of Western Mysticism,154 
                                                             
149 Oliver Davies and Denys Turner, eds., Silence and the Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  See especially Davies’ and Turner’s introduction.   
150 See Bernard McGinn, “Vere tu es Deus absconditus: the hidden God in Luther and some mystics” in Silence 
and the Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation, ed. Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 103-104.  
151 Oliver Davies, God Within: The Mystical Tradition of Northern Europe (New York: New City Press, 2006).  
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Press, 2004).  
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and Simon Tugwell’s Ways of Imperfection: An Exploration of Christian Spirituality,155 all 
play important roles in an understanding of the development of medieval Christian theology.  
The aforementioned texts are but a small sampling of the literature available treating 
apophaticism; in order to connect at a more specific level, the thought of Meister Eckhart is 
considered.   
B. Meister Eckhart: Primary Sources and Translations 
 One of the most notable attributes of Meister Eckhart’s writing is his usage of the 
(officially accepted) Church Latin as well as his vernacular, Middle High German.  Writing 
in the latter part of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, Eckhart’s original (extant) 
texts remain something of their own specialty.
156
  However, there are a number of exceptional 
translations that do proper justice to Eckhart’s vocabulary, usage, and difficult constructions.  
In the English-speaking world, the first translation of Eckhart’s works appeared in Claud 
Field’s Meister Eckhart’s Sermons, published in 1900.157  This was followed by N. Leeson’s 
1917 translation, After Supper in the Refectory.
158
 A major work for Eckhart reception was C. 
de B. Evans’ 1924 Meister Eckhart by Franz Pfeiffer, an updated translation with omissions 
and additions from Pfeiffer’s 1857 German work.159  Later editions and translations include 
Blakney’s 1941 edition of Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation,160 Bernard McGinn and 
Edmund Colledge’s 1981 Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, 
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 McGinn and Frank Tobin’s 1987 Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher,162 
Oliver Davies’ 1994 Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings,163  and McGinn and Maurice 
Walshe’s 2009 The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart.164   
C. Meister Eckhart: Secondary Literature 
 The sheer breadth of secondary literature that deals with Eckhart’s biography, 
influence, and interpretation of his writings is voluminous.  What appears here is a sampling 
of the secondary literature as it applies to the major themes of nothingness in his writing.
165
  
In what follows, the term “nothingness” is used to frame the negative language of 
apophaticism because it more closely aligns with Eckhart’s usage.  
 David Tracy discusses Eckhart’s appeal to emptiness as an apophatic “tool” in his 
Dialogue with the Other.
166
  He goes so far as to connect Eckhart’s theology of nothingness 
with Buddhism, and especially Zen Buddhism.
167
  The value of Tracy’s analysis rests in his 
understanding of how “[n]ot only Nothingness but One, Intelligence, and Esse seem to 
[Eckhart] appropriate if always inadequate language.”168 While Tracy follows McGinn’s 
“interpretation on dialectic in Eckhart,” his critical analysis of the importance of language in 
Eckhart’s theology is beneficial.   
 In David Chidester’s understanding of Eckhart, he draws out his “point[ing] to a 
similar annihilation of the self through divine union in which the soul ‘has a will and a 
                                                             
161 Bernard McGinn and Edmund Colledge, trans. and ed., Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, 
Commentaries, Treatises and Defense (New York: Paulist Press, 1981).  
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longing for nothing.’”169 Chidester goes on to examine Eckhart’s usage of nothingness in 
relation to Christian concepts including the clarification of the divine Godhead.
170
 Chidester’s 
conclusion argues for an interesting view of Eckhart’s influence: “In the bright darkness of 
the Godhead, Meister Eckhart found that the soul was nothing but God.”171  
 David Linge discusses many of Eckhart’s primary sermon topics (specifically 
poverty) and how they relate to nothingness.  He highlights a central theme in the sermons 
that includes an understanding of God that is intrinsically related to nothingness insofar as 
God is “Beyond all names, beyond goodness, truth or being, the Godhead is the Abgrund, the 
abyss of deity.  Desert, wilderness, darkness, nothing are all terms he uses to point to the 
Godhead.”172 Bernard McGinn goes in a different direction; he emphasizes Eckhart’s appeal 
to unification with God in nothingness because, “The unum is not negation, but negation of 
negation, the sum qui sum (“I am that I am”) of Exod. 3:14 that signifies the conversion of the 
ground of esse upon itself.”173 While McGinn’s emphasis is different than Linge’s, the point 
is made that Eckhart’s understanding of nothingness in relation to the self and God is made 
with paradoxical statements.  Frank Tobin’s reading of Eckhart places emphasis on his use of 
analogy: “Eckhart’s doctrine of analogy demands that we call creatures nothing if we call 
God esse, or that if we attribute esse to creatures we must call God something else.  The 
essential feature of this doctrine of analogy is that it is not legitimate to join God and creature 
in any single concept.”174 This latter point is not necessarily in distinction from McGinn and 
Linge, but the emphasis is important to note: for McGinn and Linge the understanding of 
emptiness and esse is paradoxical, but Tobin draws the parallel with Eckhart’s doctrine of 
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analogy.  For Michael Sells, the emphasis on Trinitarian theology is central to understanding 
Eckhart’s concept of self, other, and God: “…Eckhart’s language violates the normal 
grammatical division between perfect and completed action, and imperfect or action in 
progress: the one and only-begotten son always has been born and always is being born.”175 
How Eckhart expresses himself in terms of apophaticism is important in the secondary 
literature because numerous thinkers address how he wrestles with the difference between the 
self and God.   
D. Eckhart and Buddhism 
 The vocabulary and conceptual argumentation used by Eckhart have given themselves 
well to contemporary interpreters of Buddhism; specifically Eckhart’s usage of terms like 
“nothingness,” “God beyond God,” dependence upon negation, etc. have appealed especially 
to modern Zen interpreters.  This comparison is essentially a twentieth century enterprise 
insofar as knowledge of Buddhism in Europe and knowledge of Christianity in Asia was 
limited prior to the twentieth century. However, modern comparative analysts have moved 
between the two traditions by drawing on Eckhart’s understanding of negation.  
 This specific comparison is a major subject of D.T. Suzuki’s Mysticism: Christian 
and Buddhist, first published in 1957.
176
 Suzuki uses a Zen Buddhist framework of 
understanding to interpret Eckhart’s understanding of nothingness as it applies to Christian 
theology. Suzuki contextualizes Eckhart’s theology as not fitting quite within the “type” of 
Christianity “we generally associate with rationalized modernism or with conservative 
traditionalism.”177 Suzuki goes to great pains to understand Eckhart in his own terms, with his 
own chosen vocabulary, and within the context of his historical time and thinking.  In turn, 
Suzuki goes further to propose how a comparison between Eckhart and Zen is beneficial 
                                                             
175 Michael Anthony Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
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because he admits to “grow firmly convinced that the Christian experiences are not after all 
different from those of the Buddhist.”178 Only a few years after publication, Thomas Merton 
levels several apt criticisms of Suzuki’s use of Eckhart.179 He highlights some confusion 
between the usage of “mystical theology” and “experience of the Zen Masters.”180 Merton’s 
clarification is not so much a criticism of Suzuki’s analysis as a clarification of the use of 
nothingness in inter-religious comparisons.
181
 
 Outside of the Zen tradition, and within other (more generalized) forms of Buddhism, 
Richard Jones explores how Eckhart’s nuanced understanding of the self contributes heavily 
to a comparative understanding of the Buddhist rejection of the self.
182
 Beverly Lanzetta 
explores this idea in a different direction, arguing that Eckhart’s “pragmatic nothingness” 
serves as an excellent comparative tool to measure “similarity” in “dynamic openness.”183 
Lanzetta goes on to argue,  
...in comparing the desert of the Godhead with dynamic śūnyatā, Buddhist 
scholars content that, while Eckhart presents a radical apophatic perspective, 
the desert of the Godhead still retains an ontological vocabulary intrinsic to 
Christianity...The radicalness of Zen is evident from the fact that it speaks of 





Lanzetta’s article pushes the boundary for comparison because her wide-sweeping 
comparisons open new concepts of comparison, namely in the understanding of how 
Eckhart’s understanding of theism and nothingness form the very framework of his apophatic 
theology.
185
 Joseph Politella uses the same comparative tools, nothingness in Eckhart’s 
apophaticism and śūnyatā, to emphasize a different nuance in Eckhart’s thought: “He helps 
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us find a new meaning for Śūnyatā.  It is Suchness and Emptiness and No-thing-ness, but it is 
also Self-ness.  The real thus finds expression in the visible world, but the expression is not 
the essence.”186 Politella’s reading of Eckhart seems to differ from Jones’ reading insofar as 
Eckhart’s understanding of the self is concerned, and more applicably how that is to be 
applied in a comparative way.  It is important to note that much of the connection rests on 
how terms like “emptiness” and “being” are defined.  Tobin explains much of the difficulty 
lies with Eckhart’s thought, “…being is a term restricted to creatures.  This is why one must 
refer to God as understanding or knowing, and not as being or existence.”187 Reiner 
Schürmann further qualifies this point: “The opposition between being and nothingness in 
creatures is expressed in a different terminology…Iht [“something”] is denied; the creature is 
not ‘a something.’ Iht designates the existing in general: the creature endowed with a 
borrowed being…”188 
 The methodological problem of comparing apophaticism in a fourteenth-century 
Christian mystic with that of Buddhist emptiness is addressed by the sources that attempt to 
do so. The textual problem that is not addressed (at least explicitly) deals with whether the 
language of both traditions is as compatible as scholars might want it to be.  In other words, 
while dialogue is certainly possible, sometimes the language appears to be so close that it is 
tempting to simply take the analysis in the direction of direct comparison.  
E. Christian Apophaticism and Eckhart 
 In the same way that the analysis of Buddhist emptiness pivots within the context of 
the nuance of the various traditions, the analysis of Christian apophaticism is enriched with 
the specific analysis of Eckhart’s thought.  The idea here is to paint a more nuanced context 
by addressing the general issue (apophaticism) and then complimenting it with a specific 
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example (Eckhart).  An examination of Eckhart’s thought to contextualize apophaticism 
shows the difficulty of his thought and the fact that comparing it with other traditions is 
difficult at best.  This difficulty of comparison highlights the need for an analytical bridge 
with which to bridge the gap of understanding.  In this project, the thought of Jacques Derrida 
is examined for this purpose: deconstruction allows for a more fruitful discussion of 
negativity in Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism.   
V. Jacques Derrida: Negativity and Deconstruction 
A. Context 
 The thought of Jacques Derrida is immensely complex and difficult; while this project 
does not intend to focus primarily as an elucidation of his thought, the hope is that 
engagement with particular pieces of it will illuminate a way to align Buddhism and 
Christianity.  More specifically, Derridean deconstruction, or a close reading of texts that 
brings out the subtle nuances, the various voices within the text, and the plethora of 
meanings, is utilized as a tool with which to examine negativity. As with the above contexts, 
first painted in general terms and then filled out with more specific examples, the thought of 
Derrida is specifically addressed with his idea of différance in Buddhism and khôra in 
Christianity.  
B. Derrida: The Primary Literature 
 In an exceptionally productive career, Derrida wrote copiously.  Amongst the most 
relevant (to this study) early texts is his Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on 
Husserl’s Theory of Signs,189 Of Grammatology,190 and Writing and Difference.191  It is 
important to note that Derrida’s early work did not deal with religious topics specifically, 
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though there are occasional references.  Much of his commentary regarding religious topics 
emerged later in his career, most specifically in articles such as “How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denials” and “Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices” which are both published in 
Coward and Foshay’s highly relevant Derrida and Negative Theology.192 Later texts, such as 
his On the Name
193
 and “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits 
of Reason Alone”194 highlight Derrida’s direct engagement with the study of religion.  
 Derrida’s major early work, Of Grammatology, examines the literary work of thinkers 
including Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau; the major 
implication of this early work is an examination of how texts are read, what presuppositions 
inform (a) reading, and the possibility of the binary opposition of presence/absence in what 
he labels “logocentrism.”  The analytical value of work like Speech and Phenomena and 
Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs and Writing and Difference is not directly 
applicable to religious texts as such, but more to how religious texts might be read alongside 
other texts.  Such themes as the authority of the text (namely that of the voice of the author), 
coupled with the binary oppositions of language (demonstrated as irreconcilable tensions), 
have direct consequences for all forms of literature, including religious literature.  This later 
led to discussions of how certain concepts like difference/différance and khôra appear to 
function in a similar fashion as apophaticism. An introductory work that helps sort through 
the Derrida’s challenging vocabulary includes an early set of interviews published under the 
title Positions.
195
 Significant to this text is Derrida’s uncharacteristic clarity in stating directly 
his take on particular logocentric ideas.   
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C. Derrida’s Interpreters: Secondary Literature 
 Quality introductions to Derrida’s work are rare simply due to the complexity of his 
work; amongst the most clearly-written and applicable to this study include Christopher 
Norris’ Derrida,196 an older exposition on his early themes.  An excellent study of how 
Derridean themes might be applied to theological and philosophical themes includes Kevin 
Hart’s seminal The Trespass of the Sign.197 
 Foundational works like John Caputo’s The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida198 
and Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida
199
 are essential to 
this study because they detail the intersection of religion and deconstruction; indeed, Caputo 
writes specifically on how différance and khôra are applicable to religious studies.
200
  
D. Derrida, Buddhism, and Christianity: Contemporary Interpretation 
 One of the forefronts of Derridean interpretation and appropriation is the idea that 
deconstruction may contribute significantly to the comparative activity of Buddhism and 
Christianity.  Furthermore, recent work has explored a connection between Derrida and 
Buddhism, Derrida and Christianity, and all three together.   
 Perhaps the foundational text for examining Derridean deconstruction in light of 
Christian theology is Hart’s aforementioned The Trespass of the Sign.  The analytical value 
here is also Hart’s treatment of other thinkers, including Kant and Heidegger amongst others, 
and how a more complete picture might be drawn with these appropriations.   
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 On the forefront of interpreting Derrida, Buddhism, and Christianity together is 
Robert Magliola.  His Derrida on the Mend
201
 is an early and foundational text that compares 
key themes in Derridean thought, especially at the intersection of Buddhism and 
deconstruction.   His later On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, 
Culture
202
 examines the concept of the negative in relation to Buddhism and Christianity with 
Derrida’s deconstruction as the method.  While Magliola’s Derrida on the Mend is beneficial 
because it is an early appropriation of how Derridean thought might be relatable to 
Buddhism, his later work borders on the incomprehensible; Magliola seems to shift between 
interpreting and actually “performing” deconstruction (it may be put like that), and perhaps 
this is his intent to shift, (re)shape, and subvert language, but that overall analytical import for 
this project is limited.   
 Other important comparative analyses of Derrida, Buddhism, and/or Christianity 
include Howard Coward and Toby Foshay’s Derrida and Negative Theology, Youxuan 
Wang’s Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a Comparative Semiotics,203 and a 
compilation edited by Youru Wang, Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought.
204
  A 
detailed bibliography of the recent works in these comparisons can be found in Jin Y. Park’s 
Buddhisms and Deconstructions.
205
 Perhaps one of the most engaging compilations of 
comparative literature in this genre, Park’s compilation of essays treats with the various 
contours of applying deconstruction to a/the study of Buddhism.  In the introduction, Park 
elucidates the reasoning behind making such comparisons:  
                                                             
201 Robert Magliola, Derrida on the Mend (Lafayette: Perdue University Press, 1984).  
202 Robert Magliola, On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
American Academy of Religion, 1997).   
203 Youxuan Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a Comparative Semiotics (Richmond: Curzon, 
2001).  
204 Youru Wang, Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought (New York: Routledge, 2007).  This 
compilation has several essays mentioning the analytical importance of Derrida’s différance, specifically Victor 
Forte’s “The Ethics of Attainment: The Meaning of the Ethical in Dōgen and Derrida,”and Robert Magliola’s 
“Hongzhou Chan Buddhism, and Derrida Late and Early.” 
205 Jin Y. Park, Buddhisms and Deconstructions (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006).  
73 
 
Like dependent co-arising in Buddhism, Derridean différance, is the name 
which attests to the impossibility of drawing a line between things, between 
events and beings, because there is always something to come.  That is the 
very inexhaustibility of contexts of one’s existence.206 
 
Further, Park elucidates particular themes in Derridean context and how they apply to a 
deconstructive analysis of Buddhism.
207
  Articles by Ian Mabbett
208
 and Zong-qi Cai
209
 
elaborate on how Nāgārjuna and deconstruction have specific points of contact and how the 
school of Mādhyamika share analytical tools with Derridean deconstruction, respectively. 
One of the major contributions to this compilation is E.H. Jarow’s suggestion of how 
Derridean deconstruction can lead to a development of on-going religious dialogue between 
Buddhism and Christianity, as well as other religions.
210
 
E. Derridean Themes  
 This brief introduction into the primary and secondary literatures that make up the 
thought of Derridean deconstruction is meant to develop a few sweeping contexts for further 
study.  Specifically, it is a fairly recent analytical activity to engage deconstruction for the 
purpose of studying religion; this means that there are many slightly or underdeveloped 
themes that deserve consideration.  The difficulty here is how to summarize such positions 
succinctly and lucidly; however, the potential benefits include how generative the approaches 
taken here may be.  Deconstruction may be successfully argued to show the function of 
language in religion, even the masked and silenced voices within the texts. However, an 
initial critique of deconstruction in the study of religion might include how previous work in 
the field seems to attempt an all-inclusive methodology. Deconstruction is fluid and 
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unpredictable; thus, the attempt here is to loosely frame deconstruction within a typology to 
allow for this fluidity.   
VI. Conclusion 
 There is much work to be done in the emerging field of Buddhist-Christian studies.  
Though there have been increasingly-influential dialogues undertaken in the last half century, 
the research done thus far simply does not begin to cover the rich and varied histories of two 
of the world’s most significant religious traditions.  As this study attempts to undertake the 
goal of contributing to this dialogue, albeit in a small way, the expressed goal is to read, 
write, and understand each tradition in and on its own terms.  The typology and methodology 
seek to outline how this might be accomplished: through extended and detailed studies of 
Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism, without discussion or interference of the 
other tradition, each in and on its own terms.  This drives a purposeful division between the 
two, though this is a comparative study.  This maneuver is for the sole purpose of setting up a 
bridge by which Derridean deconstruction might contribute to how emptiness and 
apophaticism are studied. 
 The survey of literature helps situate the methodology and typology within this 
growing field; foundational studies show the fruitfulness of such endeavors, while also 
illustrating where future studies might pick up.  The intent here is to be one such study 
because the methodology allows for both a general study of religious studies in terms of 
deconstruction, as well as how the specific deconstructive terms difference/différance and 








Buddhist Emptiness: Contextualization, Language, and Internal Logic  
 
I. Introduction: The Paradigm of Buddhist Emptiness 
 One of the key components of the methodology of this project is to preserve the 
unique voice of both the Christian and Buddhist traditions.  To do that, it is important to 
situate emptiness in the Buddhist tradition and apophaticism in the Christian tradition as 
separate constructs.  The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize Buddhist śūnyatā, or 
emptiness, within the wider narrative of Buddhism; this is accomplished by examining the 
function of how emptiness (in)forms three traditions of Buddhism. This sets up a framework 
for later discussion on how to align Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism via 
Derridean deconstruction, though in separate analyses. The purpose here is to be as holistic as 
possible, though it is acknowledged that this is a difficult task because emptiness is not part 
of an entire “system” of thought. In order to address this general theme, emptiness is the 
commonality, the central theme that runs through the examination below. 
The goal here is to show how emptiness informs the interior logic of Buddhism; this 
will allow for a more nuanced and filled-out analysis when emptiness is examined through 
Derridean difference/différance in Chapter Four.  In this discussion on the internal logic of 
emptiness, it is argued that negative language strips away falsities and forces the boundaries 
of language of particular teachings. Thus, it is more accurate to call this approach, through 
specific traditions in particular functions, a paradigmatic approach because “[e]mptiness 
means no longer Zero, but unlimitedness, overflowing reality that cannot be expressed, 
contained, or limited in any specifiable way...”211  The paradigmatic approach means viewing 
emptiness as more than religious dogma; it means analyzing emptiness as a key aspect of 
Buddhism. This chapter is primarily descriptive because it serves to situate Buddhist 
                                                             
211 Winston L. King, “Śūnyatā as a Master-Symbol,” Numen, vol. 17, fasc. 2 (August 1970), 103.  
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emptiness with the construct of negativity; secondarily, it sets up how negative language 
might be appropriated within Derridean deconstruction in Chapter Four. 
A. The Scope of the Study: the Value of Emptiness 
1. The Philosophical Problem 
 In a general sense, Buddhist emptiness exposes non-substantiality, or that it not only 
lacks substance “itself,” but that it exposes the lack of substance of all things; emptiness 
stands against reification, or “thing-ness.” Paul Williams helps flesh out the logic: “If an 
entity is causally conditioned then ultimately it does not exist.”212  Intrinsically, then, the 
philosophical problem is quite uncomplicated: how is emptiness expressed without some sort 
of reification that automatically draws the description into an un-expressible paradox?  Not 
surprisingly, the response is similarly uncomplicated: emptiness is not express-able because it 
must remain empty of reification, of “thing-ness.”213  This, however, does not accurately 
work out how emptiness is paradigmatic to Buddhism. The problem persists: in order for 
emptiness to play such a central role in Buddhist thinking, it can be described in some way, 
albeit with incomplete language. The question can be asked here, though, of what is lost 
with/in emptiness?  Is there not something always “other,” always separate, always 
incomplete with emptiness? Williams helps tease this out: “All words have referents, but 
these referents are prajnaptimātra, that is, they exist only as referents, there is no ultimate 
real behind their referential status.”214 
What is demonstrated in this chapter is that Buddhist thinkers go to great lengths to 
clarify and de-reify the language of emptiness; therefore, the language that makes up 
emptiness is important in how it informs Buddhist thinking. One key pattern to the language 
                                                             
212 Paul Williams, “Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka,” Journal of Indian 
Philosophy, vol. 8 (1980): 13. 
213 King furthers the nuance in his working definition: “Indeed it is by definition utterly beyond all specification, 
definition, or direct symbolization: to deal with it by concept or representation of any sort is to falsify or limit 
it.” Ibid. 97.  
214 Williams, “Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka,” 13. Italics original.  
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of emptiness, whether in extant ancient or modern texts, is the relational aspect: emptiness is 
used to describe other teachings, but not necessarily “itself.” This is important to remember 
because the relational aspect informs the internal logic. In the earliest Buddhist writings, 
emptiness is rendered philosophically negative, though not necessarily in the conventional 
sense.  Rather, emptiness seems to act more as a tool to demonstrate non-substantiality, non-
reification and the centrality of dependent co-origination.
215
  However, the thinking may go 
deeper than that: perhaps emptiness is the inner critique of ancient Indic philosophical 
assumptions.  As a philosophy and religion of reform, Buddhism’s sharp critiques of other 
Indic practices seem to center around the demonstration of the “emptiness” of all things and 
no-things.
216
  A close examination of some of the earliest Buddhist texts reveals how 
emptiness finds its locus within other major teachings, and is, therefore, a centerpiece of 
Buddhist thinking.  A careful delineation is spelled out here, though: whereas teachings like 
dependent co-origination, samsāra, dharma, and even nibbāna (to an extent) can be 
philosophically elucidated within the limited confines of language, emptiness remains 
slippery, elusive, and of no substance in itself.  A specific example would be in the 
                                                             
215 For example, Michael Barnhart clarifies that Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamkakārikā “forcefully” argued that 
“No thing, including nothing itself, had svabhāva or substantial and individual being, self-identity, self-being, or 
self-existence.  Rather, emptiness, or śūnyatā was dependence; that all things were empty meant that all things 
were mutually (and thoroughly) dependent...” This is an important clarification, and in Nāgārjuna’s mind 
reform, of Buddhist emptiness: that emptiness defined “existence” by no-thing-ness.  Michael Barnhart, 
“Śūnyatā, Textualism, and Incommensurability,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 44, no. 4 (October 1994): 649.  
Italics original. A recent article takes issue with this (and other) interpretations of Nāgārjuna.  Abraham Vélez 
de Cea argues that “the common identity between samsāra and nibbāna that is inferable from Pāli texts cannot 
be monistic and absolute, but rather limited and relative to the emptiness of self and taints experienced by 
liberated beings” (pg. 513; italics original).  Cea goes further to call such traditional interpretations of 
Nāgārjuna’s emptiness “questionable” because they rest on “assumptions” (pg. 516).  Rather than the traditional 
“assumptions” that Nāgārjuna’s use of emptiness represented a radical shift in Buddhist philosophy, Cea asserts, 
“Since the Kātyāyana Sūtra contains a connection between the teaching of dependent arising as the middle way 
and the teaching of nonself, and since the concept of nonself is a synonym for emptiness, I do not see enough 
grounds for considering Nāgārjuna’s equating of dependent arising and emptiness as a revolutionary innovation 
not entailed by the Pāli suttas.” Abraham Vélez de Cea, “Emptiness in the Pāli Suttas and the Question of 
Nāgārjuna’s Orthodoxy,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 55, no. 4 (October 2005): 523. Italics original.  
216 King seems to support this thinking with the following justification: “Beginningless-endless-rebirth governed 
by moralistic cause-effect of karman, an existence whose hallmarks are impermanence, emptiness of reality, and 
suffering, and the possibility of an absolutely full and final release from all this (moksa-nibbāna) are assumed 
without question – as well as many other views of ontological / metaphysical implication.” Winston L. King, 
“The Existential Nature of Buddhist Ultimates,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 33, no. 3 (July 1983): 264.  
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Madhyamika school’s approach to emptiness; as D. Seyfort Ruegg explains, “…Mādhyamika 
theory, which stresses the fact that it is not the function of śūnyatā to make dharmas empty 
but that śūnyatā simply reveals that dharmas are empty.”217  The efficaciousness (if any) of 
emptiness is found when it is not delineated, expanded upon by itself, or used as a means in 
itself; emptiness remains elusive of final definition or description because it is always in 
“flux.”  Michael Barnhart suggests that the “problem” with emptiness is “if it is true that 
everything is empty in the sense that absolutely and mutually dependent, then we lack the 
ability to define horizons, perspectives, the space of reasons, and meaningful conceptual 
boundaries.”218 However, Barnhart does not go far enough because it seems like this is 
exactly the point: the value of emptiness is relational in terms of non-substantiality. In other 
words, Buddhist emptiness exposes the empty nature of all things.  This view of emptiness is 
further supported by the thinker Nāgārjuna; as King clarifies his position, “When Nāgārjuna 
demonstrated the empty-because-relative nature of all substantive concepts, he did not then 
enthrone śūnyatā in their place.  For him emptiness was a mode of apprehension of the 
universe, the core of spiritual discipline, not an entity of any sort.”219 
2. The Problem of the “Existence” of Emptiness: Paradigmatic Inquiry  
 What does it mean to say that emptiness is paradigmatic of the inner logic of the 
Buddhist tradition? The critiques explored thus far suggest there is no answer, not even a 
description, which could even approach that question.  However, emptiness appears in each 
Buddhist tradition with varying degrees of influence.  Thus, it must have some analytical 
“value” insofar as it is a symbol, metaphor, or signification to a greater or deeper truth.  
Winston L. King addresses this paradox by calling Buddhist emptiness a “master symbol” 
because it “participates integrally in all of the limited reality-forms which our limited 
                                                             
217 D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Uses of the Four Positions of the ‘Catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of 
Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 5 (1977/1978): 31. Italics original.  
218 Barnhart, “Śūnyatā, Textualism, and Incommensurability,” 650.  
219 King, “The Existential Nature of Buddhist Ultimates,” 267.  
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apprehensions project upon It.”220 Though King presents a creative way to examine śūnyatā, 
he risks the objectification and ultimate reification that symbols posit.
221
 However, what he 
says has much analytical value because it gets closer to the paradox of śūnyatā, albeit with 
the warnings of reification and objectification.  This brings into sharper focus a central 
question: at what point is language dispensed for the “truth” of emptiness expressed 
negatively? Even more: how is śūnyatā paradigmatic of Buddhist thought, indeed as a 
connection with other teachings, if it is (un)limited linguistically to non-substantiality and 
non-reification?  In a separate article, King addresses these questions:  
...the basic Buddhist point of view...is that there is some sort of ultimate reality 
beyond our merely subjective thoughts and sensations that occasions them; but 
that in our thoughts, our terms and names for these realities, and our 
philosophical systems we do not deal with ultimate entities at their deepest 




Thus, King points to a central component of this study: Buddhist teachings are not limited to 
strict, literal, linguistic studies, and they are not limited to symbolic metaphors.  Ever the 
“middle way,” Buddhist understandings of emptiness gather their analytical “value” in their 
paradoxical interpretations of non-substantiality and linguistic non-reification.  
3. The Problem of Language: Emptiness in/of Buddhism  
 Emptiness is foundational to understanding Buddhism, but it remains pivoted between 
reification and as a critique of substantiality.  The question here is the “effect” it has on other 
Buddhist teachings since it “is” not substantiation “itself.”  The teaching of emptiness eludes 
clear articulation because of its effect upon other teachings (i.e. non-substantiation) is 
tempered by the fact that it cannot be reified into a teaching/thing “itself.” D.T. Suzuki helps 
clarify this position:  
[Śūnyatā] is what makes the existence of anything possible, but it is not to be 
conceived immanently, as if it lay hidden in or under every existence as an 
                                                             
220 King, “Śūnyatā as a Master Symbol,” 103. Italics original.   
221 Ibid.  
222 King, “The Existential Nature of Buddhist Ultimates,” 265.  
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independent entity.  A world of relatives is set on and in śūnyatā; śūnyatā 





The important thing here is the difficulty of writing on/about emptiness because the language 
falls short.  Emptiness must remain somewhat in inexpressible paradox because language 
reifies and signifies emptiness; negation helps further contextualize emptiness because it 
posits a negation in front of the language: (non)substantiation, (non)reification, etc.  This is 
examined in more detail below in the considerations of how language functions in emptiness, 
and specifically with(in) negation.  
B. Buddhist Traditions and Studies of Emptiness 
1. The Complexity of Buddhism as a Natural Limit 
 A major world religion, Buddhism exists today in many fragmented traditions; this is 
true historically, as well.  As in any tradition over 2,500 years old, Buddhism is today 
composed of many various major traditions and scores of schools within each sect. Like 
many other religious traditions, the history of sectarian fragmentation is almost as old as the 
tradition itself; the reasons for this vary widely: differing scriptural interpretations, 
geographic dissemination, cultural divides, and development over time.  The sheer size and 
breadth of Buddhism causes a natural limit in discussion of what is “Buddhist” and what is 
not.  As previously mentioned, the philosophical teachings, belief systems, and interpretation 
of Siddhartha Gautama make any basic discussion of “Buddhism” very difficult.  The need 
for precision in terminology, historical factors, and primary source material are of the utmost 
importance; at best, when speaking of one generalized term, case studies can be applied to 
more closely examine one finite point within the entirety of the tradition.   
 Analytically, this may pose many problems, of which points more forcibly to the need 
to study an aspect of Buddhism within the specific context of paradigmatic change within the 
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tradition and how it relates to other teachings, both subtle and over-arching.  In short, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to say anything other than that of generalities when it comes to 
conveying “Buddhist emptiness.”  Barnhart frames this problem in a similar way: 
Because if everything is mutually dependent, then the categories which 
comprise the same conceptual scheme have no closer a relationship than do 
the categories which feature in different conceptual schemes. A conceptual 
scheme or a tradition must maintain a relative autonomy from some range of 




Rather than the vastness of the tradition limiting critical inquiry, the advantage rests with the 
possibility of focusing a study specifically in a critical issue. The intention here is to provide 
a cross-section of Buddhism with the delineation of emptiness because time and space 
prohibit a comprehensive discussion of every Buddhist tradition and school’s interpretation 
of emptiness. However, a detailed discussion of carefully-chosen representative texts can 
provide a cross-section of Buddhist emptiness. 
 In some religious traditions, there are representative individuals whose analyses, 
ideas, and writings can be interpreted as reflections of the whole tradition.  Buddhism, due to 
its various nuances, cultural divides, and historical changes, makes this process a bit more 
difficult.  For example, even many of the Pāli texts attributed directly or indirectly to 
Siddhartha Gautama have come under textual criticism in possible doubt that surrounds even 
the earliest teachings.  An individual, say Nāgārjuna, a major voice in ancient Buddhism with 
vast influence, is still not reflective of the entirety of the tradition; indeed, many ancient and 
modern voices contradict Nāgārjuna and his teachings.  To that end, modern interpreters, like 
D.T. Suzuki or Masao Abe for example, still fall squarely within a certain sectarian 
interpretation of Buddhism.  Thus, it is not prudent to use the nuances and interpretations of 
such a vast teaching as emptiness in just one interpreter; multiple voices from multiple 
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traditions must be cobbled together in a way that transcends generalities.  This is true because 
even the ancient traditions held various interpretations of emptiness.  As King highlights,  
...in common with Theravāda anattā, emptiness represents two elements of an 
experiential nature: it is the experience of freedom from the bonds of ordinary 
self and space-time oriented personhood; and it springs out of the meditative 
discipline. To this might be added...though not exclusively, Mahāyāna feature: 




2. Selected Buddhist Traditions that are Reflective of the Tradition  
 As argued above, it is impossible to discuss Buddhist emptiness in any kind of way 
other than that of overgeneralization if all traditions could be included in the discussion.  
Thus, it is necessary to delineate several larger traditions and discuss how the language of 
emptiness functions within each; from here, it is possible to connect this with a larger 
framework within the tradition.  Each tradition acts as a “voice” within Buddhism, though the 
differences will be especially noted; some of the influential thinkers within each tradition will 
also be highlighted, again for the purpose of giving a more analytical voice to the entirety.
226
   
 For the purposes of time and space, Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Zen have been 
selected to represent some specific Buddhist teachings of emptiness.  These are chosen to 
represent an early tradition (Theravāda), a reformist tradition (Mahāyāna) and a further 
expansionist tradition (Zen in Japan and Ch’an in China).227  These three traditions were 
selected for their ancient relevance, breadth of teaching, and geographic span.  Naturally, 
these are only three traditions amongst many, but they represent a cross-section of Buddhism.   
 In one sense, these representative texts are meant to convey the teachings and reforms 
of the Buddha as “...the concrete realization of a Truth which cannot be reduced to any 
precise formula, philosophy, or metaphysic...the Buddha too is primarily a ‘religious fact,’ a 
                                                             
225 King, “The Existential Nature of Buddhist Ultimates,” 268.  Italics original.  
226 As an introductory text, Bibhuti Baruah’s Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism (Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2000), 
provides an excellent primer into the major sects within Buddhism and their various histories.  
227 An excellent guide to summarize the major shifts in Buddhist traditions can be found in Nancy Wilson Ross’ 
Buddhism: A Way of Life and Thought (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). 
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presence in the world which can...be explained by diverse philosophies but never wholly 
explained.”228  What is presented here are three different “approaches” that are meant to 
situate the context of emptiness in Buddhism.
229
 In another sense, it is important to delve into 
the specific details of emptiness, and that requires detailed study of a selected set of 
traditions.  The ability to connect emptiness within Buddhism depends on the emphasis 
placed on emptiness within the tradition. 
C. A Focus on the Conceptual: A Limitation of Language 
 Even though the scope of examination has been narrowed somewhat to the use of 
reflective traditions, the problem of how emptiness might be written remains.   Specificity is 
important for analysis, but does this really convey the “nature” or “essence” of emptiness?  Is 
there not always something lacking, something missing, something misappropriated when 
emptiness is put into words? It is acknowledged that any “essence” of emptiness is flawed 
and mistaken because emptiness is “essence-less.”  However, if this fundamental problem of 
conveyance might be temporarily suspended – and it is acknowledged that all 
descriptors/descriptions are flawed from the outset – perhaps there might be something said 
beyond the limitations of language?  What does this beyond look like? Is it, as will later be 
argued, an aporia of language?  The attempt here is to work in/through that aporia and push 
the normal limits of language. If emptiness cannot be conveyed properly in language, perhaps 
it will at least allow for the asking of better questions within the tradition.  
 A discussion of emptiness, then, must be conceptual because it must bear in mind 
various clarifications and nuances.  To fill out how these nuances inform the discussion, it is 
necessary to delineate emptiness into the experiential, meditative, and practical or 
                                                             
228 William Theodore de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1972), xvii.  
229 The term “approaches” is borrowed from Nancy Wilson Ross; she presents a similar method to cover various 






  These clarifying delineations seek to convey continuity between 
emptiness that is experienced by a practitioner, the emptiness found in meditation, and 
emptiness as a philosophical construct that tears down conventional language.   
 These three general usages of emptiness are indicative of a need to further elucidate 
how emptiness functions within Buddhism; this is often unclear in the secondary literature 
that discusses emptiness.  It is not possible to discuss emptiness in any kind of detail without 
first delineating how it generally functions within a given tradition.  Specifically, experiential 
emptiness is a key aspect of Zen Buddhism: “Zen is a school of Buddhism and has developed 
from the enlightenment-experience of Śākyamuni.  This experience is best expressed by the 
doctrine of śūnyatā, which means ‘emptiness.’”231 Emptiness also carries an experiential 
aspect in other traditions.  King argues that “...Śūnyatā also functions as a reality mode.  As 
such it is sometimes non-committally designated as Tathatā, i.e., suchness, thatness.”232  
Emptiness “functions” as the experience that leads to enlightenment, though this is also 
experienced through the functionality of meditation.  King explains, 
...this inner-versus-outer time contrast climaxes in the mystical experience 
when the boundaries of self-hood and self-consciousness become obscured in 
a unitive awareness...such experiences...were basic to the growth of Śūnyatā as 
a religious entity; out of the Indian yogic timeless-spaceless trance-awareness 
came the conviction that such experiences were direct encounters with the 
Absolute Reality – that Reality which can only be slightly indicated by such a 
term as Śūnyatā.233  
 
This connection, though central to understanding the function of emptiness, still remains 
different because experiential emptiness and meditative emptiness carry different 
connotations within the three examined traditions.  This is done through a practical or 
conventional approach that clarifies various philosophical ideas and constructs through the 
                                                             
230 The use of the phrase “practical or conventional” is borrowed from Barnhart’s article, “Śūnyatā, Textualism, 
and Incommensurability,” 653.  
231 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, “The Philosophy of Zen,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 1, no. 2 (July 1951): 4. 
Italics original.  
232 King, “Śūnyatā as a Master Symbol,” 102-103. Italics original.  
233 Ibid. 101. Italics original.  
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usage of emptiness.  This is most clearly seen in Nāgārjuna’s use of emptiness within the 
Mahāyāna tradition. In a recent article, Asaf Federman argues that there is an intrinsic 
connection between the Mahāyāna usage of skillful means and emptiness;234 this type of 
analysis presents a philosophical usage of emptiness to show connections with other 
teachings.  As Williams helps clarify,  
Madhyamaka is essentially not another form of epistemology or ontology, 
another philosophy like those which it opposes.  Rather it aims to teach us to 
see things in a new and liberating way, a way that cuts all grasping – including 





Clarifying categories of usage are discussed below, but the initial approach to emptiness must 
take seriously the various usages within the traditions.  There is much overlap and some 
categorical interdependence, but using an analytical delineation, much is to be gained by 
sorting out the various nuances within the wording.   
II. The Internal Logic of Buddhism: Emptiness (Re)Examined 
 In order to delve into the internal logic of Buddhism, a specific lens must be 
employed; here the focus is on emptiness through a lens of negativity. The methodological 
question centers on the function of negativity in how the language informs teachings 
in/through/by emptiness. 
A. Original Languages 
 One of the more obvious and documented difficulties in studying Buddhism is the 
sheer number of languages that are used in both primary and secondary sources.  In an 
ancient context, knowledge of Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese would make an 
acceptable start, but even more languages are involved in the history of Buddhism.  This 
presents something of a natural barrier unless the focus is on one particular context, tradition, 
                                                             
234 See Asaf Federman, “Literal Means and Hidden Meanings: A New Analysis of Skillful Means,” Philosophy 
East and West, vol. 59, no. 2 (April 2009): 125–141. 
235 Paul Williams, “On the Interpretation of Madhyamaka Thought,”Journal of Indian Philosphy, vol. 19, no. 2 
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or document.  For a study such as this, it is simply not feasible to try to undertake a full 
examination of emptiness in all of the languages that it appears.
236
  Rather, the intention here 
is to examine the function of language, how it operates within particular contexts, the effect it 
has on other teachings, and what it might “mean” in terms of negativity.   The larger intent 
here is to situate this function within the scope of negativity and how that might be further 
examined with Derridean différance.  
 In order to build a context for Buddhist emptiness, the earliest languages of Pāli and 
Sanskrit are briefly touched upon below.  Like any other major teaching within Buddhism, 
emptiness has “changed,” either in focus, meaning, or context through history, but the 
original languages are examined briefly to establish the earliest meaning possible.   
B. The Use of Pāli with Reference to Suññata 
 An early Buddhist liturgical language, Pāli was a Middle Indo-Aryan language 
originating in India.
237
  These early texts, divided into “three collections of texts,” or the 
Tripitaka, make up what is rendered the Pāli Canon.238 Early English analysts like T. 
Michelson highlight the difficulty of making general assumptions about Pāli renderings as 
having “existed over too long a stretch of time to expect uniformity in every detail; Pāli being 
contemporaneous with Buddha is naturally more archaic than the Asokan dialects...”239 
Michelson goes on to demonstrate that the age, widespread usage of Pāli, and various texts 
                                                             
236 The use of texts is limited to English translations as this project is not primarily concerned with particular 
nuances in translation; rather, the primary concern here is with the function of negativity in language of 
emptiness.  
237 The early twentieth century saw an increased interest in Pāli studies.  This is discussed in various articles 
from the early parts of that century; see especially T. Michelson, “Walleser on the Home of PĀli [sic],” 
Language, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1928): 101.   
238 Whitfield Foy names the three divisions: “(1) the Vinaya Pitaka, (2) the Sutta-Pitaka and (3) the 
Abidhamma-Pitaka” in Man’s Religious Quest (London: The Open University, 1978), 171. Additionally, 
Hajime Nakamura’s Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 
22-60 is especially useful for a full discussion (with a supporting, extensive bibliography) regarding the Pāli 
language and the Tripitaka.  
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written in Pāli make interpretation of early Buddhist texts especially precarious.240 In a 
similar article, Walter Clark argues forcibly that while many early Buddhist texts were 
written in Pāli, this should not automatically disqualify other linguistic expressions of 
Buddhism from equal measure of study.
241
 However, as it is important to Pāli studies, Clark 
goes on to argue, “[w]e do not know in what dialect Buddha himself taught.”242 He continues 
to suggest that the history of the Pāli canon cannot be assumed to have first existed as a 
continuous set of texts, but rather he points to early sources that suggest that the Pāli canon 
existed firstly as a loose grouping of texts, “partly by subject matter and partly by reference 
to different types of verse and prose.”243 Thus, while much of the earliest sources attesting to 
Buddhism do exist in some form or variant of Pāli, it is unfair to assume that Pāli is the the 
most authoritative, comprehensive, or conclusive source of Buddhist textual evidence.
244
 
 In many modern English translations, the Sanskrit version of “emptiness,” or śūnyatā, 
is often used.  However, the Pāli references to suññata, are used in Theravāda literature 
because it represents an earlier etymological referent.  Whereas the Mahāyāna tradition 
                                                             
240 Ibid. 105.  
241 Walter Eugene Clark, “Some Problems in the Criticism of the Sources for Early Buddhist History,” The 
Harvard Theological Review, vol. 23, no. 2 (April 1930): 121-122.  
242 Ibid. 132. Clark goes further to suggest that the Buddha taught in Māgadhī because this would have been the 
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243 Ibid. 134. Clark continues: “A large part of the Pali canon consists of mingled prose and verse.  It seems clear 
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Davids and the Pāli Text Society,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, vol. 27, no. 
1 (2007), 180. One of the most important contributions made to the study of Pāli was the understanding that, 
“even at the most generous estimate, they had been written at least a century or more after the passing of the 
Buddha.  They were the work of his followers from a much later date, shaped by their desire to express their 
reverence for him.” Ibid. 190. However, as Snodgrass highlights, “The great value of Buddhism to [T.W. Rhys 
Davids] was that the vast collection of its extant sacred texts preserved a record of the evolution of its religious 
thought from its development out of Brahmanism of the fifth century BCE right through to the present.” Ibid. 
191.  This is important to the shape and understanding of the Pāli texts because it represents a specific 
detachment (historically and objectively) from the original teachings of the Buddha.  As Snodgrass highlights, 
the work of Mr. and Mrs. Rhys Davids provided the foundation of early Pāli text translations into English; this is 




focuses heavily on śūnyatā, references in Theravāda tend to be more subtle.  A various 
general translation of suñña is “empty,” but the nuances are far more complicated.245 Winston 
King suggests that the meaning of suññata (at least in the Theravāda tradition) shares 
meaning with anattā because “emptiness represents two elements of an experiential nature: it 
is the experience of freedom from the bonds of ordinary self and space-time oriented 
personhood; and it springs out of the meditative disciple.”246 Kenneth Inada gives a similar 
description when he writes, “...that relational-origination, in its unique sense of voidness, 
refers to a Buddhist notion of temporality.  In this sense, temporality is that experience which 
is coterminous with reality of things as they are.”247 Inada goes further in his definition and 
interpretation when he says,  
...it is void (suñña) with a twelvefold voidness (that is, reference to the sense 
faculties and the sense objects, including the mind and its objects) and spins 
on and on...Śūnyatā is what makes the two realms coexistent, not side by side, 
but as two sides of the same reality.  Thus relational-origination spans the 





 In both King and Inada’s interpretation of the term for “empty,” the experiential plays 
a major part in understanding the term. Also with this understanding, both point to a 
knowledge factor whereby reality is revealed in emptiness.  This is further connected and 
elucidated by Donald Swearer’s understanding of K.N. Jayatilleke’s description when he 
explains: “...in the Pāli texts the two differing levels of understanding – direct (nītattha) and 
indirect (neyyattha) – lead to one truth.  This truth or state of being cannot be described or 
understood rationally, but it can be realized and attained.”249   
                                                             
245 A.K. Warder, Introduction to Pali, 3rd ed. (Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 1991), 414. 
246 King, “The Existential Nature of Buddhist Ultimates,” 268. 
247 Kenneth K. Inada, “Time and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 24, no. 2 
(April 1974), 177. 
248 Ibid. Italics original.  
249 Donald K. Swearer, “Two Types of Saving Knowledge in the Pāli Suttas,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 
22, no. 4 (October 1972): 356. Italics original.  
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 An interesting observation about how modern interpreters understand emptiness is 
that they often find connections with other doctrines to make sense of emptiness.  Thus, 
emptiness does not seem to say much on its own; rather, an examination of other teachings is 
necessary for a more complete understanding.  This is true for the opposite: emptiness makes 
other doctrines coherent. For example, Swearer makes this connection: “The insight of 
pañña, therefore, may speak in descriptive terms of impermanence, conditionality and so on, 
but the ‘vision’ aspect of pañña makes only such simple assertions as emptiness (suñña) and 
signlessness (animittatā).”250 He goes on to connect this with “freedom of the mind or 
consciousness (cetovimutti).”251 The larger context Swearer builds with his analysis centers 
on the experience of emptiness, namely that in “freedom.” He elucidates: “This freedom may 
be delineated in the suttas in the sequence of appamānā (immeasurable), ākiñcañña 
(nothingness), suññata (emptiness) and animittatā (signlessness).”252 Swearer’s analysis 
contributes to a better understanding of emptiness because he rightly points to intricate usage; 
he highlights how emptiness plays a central role in understanding other teachings.  Abraham 
Vélez de Cea makes a similar connection in his understanding of Nancy McCagney’s 
argument: “According to the Theravāda tradition, in the abode of emptiness, the liberated one 
is aware of the empty aspect of nibbāna and enjoys the fruition of attainment of arahantship, 
so emptiness here refers to the experience of nibbāna.”253 Such research is indicative of the 
interconnectedness of emptiness with other significant teachings.   
 Some recent discussions of suñña tend to focus on how the Pāli scriptures were 
interpreted, especially in the later understanding of Nāgārjuna’s use (either in an orthodox or 
                                                             
250 Ibid. 367. Italics original.   
251 Ibid. Italics original.  
252 Ibid. 367-368.  Italics original.  Swearer goes on: “The above limited references appear to indicate that 
salvation-knowledge as suñña denotes not only the negation of form associated with phenomenal world but also 
a reality beyond form.  Pañña perceives this reality as suññatā, not mere emptiness, but as that ultimately real 
which gives meaning to the world of multiplicity.” Ibid. 368. Italics original.  This is an important clarification 
of Swearer’s argument because he further connects emptiness with other central teachings.   
253 de Cea, “Emptiness in the Pāli Suttas and the Question of Nāgārjuna’s Orthodoxy,” 508. 
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heterodox way) of the Sanskrit “śūnyatā.”  A short discussion of Sanskrit with direct 
reference to the usage of śūnyatā is necessary to not only pattern how the original texts 
interpret it, but also to engage in the modern discussion of how emptiness is used in either a 
heterodox or orthodox way.   
C. The Use of Sanskrit with Reference to Śūnyatā 
 An early Indo-Aryan language
254
 with widespread use amongst the first Buddhist 
writers, Sanskrit is the language with which the most commonly used rendering of emptiness 
is used: śūnyatā.255 Though Sanskrit has been studied in the West for some time, generally, 
most studies center on the vast body of literature affiliated with Hinduism, specifically in 
Vedic literature.
256
 However, it is out of this religious and literary tradition that Buddhism 
arose, so the importance of Sanskrit to the early written formation of Buddhism is 
invaluable.
257
 It is also important to note that the widespread use of Sanskrit led to not only a 
vast body of Indian literature, but also its survival into a modern (albeit altered) language.
258
 
Though space and time limit a full discussion of the development of the Sanskrit language, it 
is important to note Buddhism’s usage of Sankrit as a reformation religion based directly out 
of Hinduism means much of the vocabulary, linguistic nuances, and philosophical 
assumptions are borrowed, both directly and indirectly, from Vedic sources.
259
 For that 
matter, there is much borrowed directly in other Indic languages and dialects, including 
Pāli.260 
                                                             
254 For a general discussion of Sanskrit’s Aryan influence, see T. Burrow’s The Sanskrit Language (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 2001), 1-2.  
255 George Cardona and Dhanesh Jain, The Indo-Aryan Languages (New York: Routledge, 2003), 106.  
256 For an excellent, early study of the transmission of Indian literature written in Sanskrit, then translated into 
English, see Arthur MacDonell’s A History of Sanskrit Literature (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 
1900), introduction.   
257 Ibid. 7.  
258 Ibid. 8. Burrow also notes that the importance of “three thousand years of continuous linguistic history.” 
Burrow, The Sanskrit Language, 2.  
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 Definitions for śūnyatā vary somewhat, though most modern interpreters and ancient 
commentators seem to agree that it is some version of “emptiness.” Winston King notes that 
it translates into “Void, Emptiness, and Nothingness.”261 The various nuances between the 
aforementioned words are not fleshed out in King’s work, though the general philosophical 
meaning of “emptiness” suffices to his understanding that “it is by definition utterly beyond 
all specification, or direct symbolization.”262 Thus, for King the deeper meaning of śūnyatā is 
wrapped up in it “as [a] matrix or ground of symbolic being in which all of the other 
Mahayanist Buddhist symbols live, move, and have their being.”263 George Rupp indicates 
that the original Mahāyāna teaching of śūnyatā centered on “the traditional Buddhist 
insistence that there is no perduring substantial self...affirmed as applicable to the whole of 
reality.” King and Rupp point to the greater meaning of the (originally) Indian Mahāyāna 
tradition and one of its foundational thinkers, Nāgārjuna, whose central work dealt primarily 
with śūnyatā.264 Roger Corless’ reading of Nāgārjuna takes these meanings as an explanation 
to “direct our attention towards reality-as-it-is.”265 Furthermore, Corless expands on 
Nāgārjuna’s usage of emptiness insofar as he says Nāgārjuna uses śūnyatā “to describe 
reality without describing it...This is not a neologism, but his use of it is distinctive.  It is 
found in the Rg-Veda with the meaning of ‘loneliness, desolateness’...It always means 
absence of some sort, and for Nāgārjuna it means the absence of concepts about reality.”266 
Corless here makes an important etymological connection between the Indian words for 
emptiness to assert the meaning Nāgārjuna uses.  Barnhart takes the implication of 
Nāgārjuna’s thought to another logical extreme when he asserts: “Far from avoiding the 
                                                             
261 King, “Śūnyatā as a Master Symbol,” 97.  
262 Ibid.  
263 Ibid. 98.  
264 The usage of the Sanskrit term śūnyatā is most used by Nāgārjuna in his analysis of the emptiness of reality, 
things, etc.  The analysis of the etymology of the term thus focuses heavily on Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of the 
term.  
265 Roger J. Corless, “Speaking the Unspeakable: Negation as the Way in Nicholas of Cusa and Nāgārjuna,” 
Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 2 (1982): 109.  
266 Ibid. 109.  Italics original.   
92 
 
criticism that śūnyatā disables such truths, Nāgārjuna argues quite to the contrary that only in 
the equation of śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda [dependence] can we hope to give these truths 
any alethic status.”267 Ewing Chinn makes a similar point in his thesis that “there is no 
paradox or problem of self-refutation, because the true doctrine that Nāgārjuna refers to is not 
śūnyatā but the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent arising or origination).”268 Hence, 
Chinn and Barnhart point to the interpretation that śūnyatā is not a “thing,” even a doctrine, 
in itself, but it is, rather, a pointer to other teachings. Perhaps most relevant to this discussion 
is Williams’ outline of the linguistic problems at hand: “One of the principal problems with 
the linguistic interpretation of Madhyamaka is that it requires a distinction between meaning 
and reference.  Words, it is maintained, can have meaning without referring to any extra-
linguistic reality.”269  Recent debate in Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of śūnyatā has centered on 
his usage, with respect as to whether or not his terminology was utilized in an orthodox or 
heterodox way. Nancy McCagney alleges that his interpretation of śūnyatā is fundamentally 
heterodox because,  
Whereas the term “suññatā” in the Pāli Canon is well translated by the term 
“emptiness,” Nāgārjuna’s usage is inspired by the imagery of the sky or space 
(ākāśa) in early prajñāpāramitā literature, particularly the Astasāhasrikā.  The 
Asta conception of ākāśa is distinct from ancient and modern Western 
conceptions and refers not to a void or vacuum, but to something like the 
medieval Western conception of space as an ether. But unlike the Western 
conception, ākāśa in the Asta is a luminous ether, filled with light.270 
 
This presents an interesting, and perhaps heterodox, view of Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of 
śūnyatā as distinct from earlier Sanskrit references.  Taking issue with McCagney’s point, de 
Cea draws upon the earliest nomenclature: “The terms suñña and suññaka, in what seems to 
be their original meaning, refer to the physical absence of something.  From this original 
                                                             
267 Barnhart, “Śūnyatā, Textualism, and Incomensurability,” 651. Italics original.  
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physical meaning, the usage of emptiness was extended to apply metaphorically to the 
psychophysical components of beings.”271 De Cea goes on to explain, “Emptiness in the Pāli 
suttas also has the philosophical meaning of nonself or absence of self...there seems to be a 
relationship between seeing the emptiness of the world, the practice of mindfulness, and the 
destruction of views of self.”272 De Cea does not go so far as to defend Nāgārjuna’s 
orthodoxy; he does not think McCagney has provided sufficient argumentation as to the 
heterodox interpretation of śūnyatā.273  
 While a more complete analysis of Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of śūnyatā is provided 
below, it is important to note that his widespread use of the Sanskrit term “popularized” the 
concept, as much later thinking was based on his understanding of emptiness.  Thus, what is 
known today about the Sanskrit term follows greatly from Nāgārjuna’s interpretation.   
D. The Language of Emptiness 
 The language of emptiness is not only wrapped up in the intricacies of the history of 
Buddhism, but also with the signification of other concepts like enlightenment and dependent 
causation amongst others.  What a brief study of the earliest references to emptiness show is 
this interconnectedness and the difficulty of expressing the meaning of emptiness.  Though 
many of the earliest references discuss emptiness in terms of a void or a vacuum, what does 
this really mean?  Does this correspond to other references that describe emptiness in terms 
of ether, with references to light?  Not to belittle the question, but is emptiness (if put on a 
spectrum of senses, for the sake of argument) a dazzling infinite light or a bottomless void of 
night?  What the language of emptiness shows are that these descriptions are inadequate at 
best and mis-constructed at worst.    
                                                             
271 de Cea, “Emptiness in the Pāli Suttas and the Question of Nāgārjuna’s Orthodoxy,” 509. Italics original.  
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 What makes a study of emptiness so difficult is not only the breadth of history, 
languages, and contexts, but also that emptiness breaks down language in a way that shows 
the faultiness of conventional logic, reason, and signification.  Emptiness almost requires a 
new language, a moving, fluid, dynamic language. This “new” language might be examined 
through the lens of negativity because negativity allows for a specific lens into the function of 
language, but also a construction of language that is fluid and dynamic.  
III. A Language of Negativity: Emptiness  
A. Writing Emptiness: A Context 
 The central problem to this analysis is how to speak/write/signify emptiness in a way 
that is non-reified, that conveys non-substantiality, yet bears the same meaning that emptiness 
has upon the inner logic of Buddhism.  To work through this problem, the development of a 
way to establish how the various voices of Buddhism contribute to the entire spectrum of 
Buddhist thought is necessary; this is carried out, specifically, through the lens of how 
negativity works in the language of Buddhist thought.   
Furthermore, three traditions of Buddhism are selected to contribute to the specificity 
that is necessary for such an analysis.  The intent is to utilize the methodological strategy of a 
cross-sectional approach to emptiness because this will help fill out the various and complex 
“voices” within the tradition.  This will help set the backdrop to the discussion of Derridean 
deconstruction in Chapter Four, wherein the voices of the various traditions are of vital 
importance to contextualization.  Of further highlight here is the strategic choice to outline 
the differences in such traditions; the point is to stay true to the complexities and nuances of 
Buddhist emptiness.  This is accomplished through the examination of negativity in the 




The intent here is to approach the task of examining Buddhist emptiness through the 
prism of three separate traditions in order to see how the difference(s) of negativity function 
in the internal language structures of each.   
B. The Problem of Existence: A Definition of Śūnyatā 
 Though the basic translation of śūnyatā is “emptiness,” the complexity of the term 
might be measured in the appropriation of emptiness as the absence of a self, or it might refer 
to the lack of substance of all existence.  For that matter, it might refer to all things being 
devoid of independent existence, or it might refer to the commonality of all existence as (a) 
“being” of dependent causation.  The point here is that śūnyatā is a complex term that wraps 
up various nuances of negativity in it.  A working definition of śūnyatā is necessary to carry 
on an analysis with any kind of depth; here, while “emptiness” is certain kept intact, the 
deeper problem is that of absence.  In order to get beyond a definition and more into the 
deeper meaning of śūnyatā, it is necessary to take into consideration the negative function of 
the term: śūnyatā fundamentally expresses absence; whether as the absence of an 
independent, uncaused existence or the lack of self (or, anātman in the earliest texts), śūnyatā 
stands in negation of other terms because it expresses the absence of substance. To quickly 
sum a working definition of śūnyatā, the term applies to questions of existence where it 
expresses, through negativity, the absence of substance.  While this working definition will 
be expressed in various ways, a more full explanation of the connection between emptiness 
and absence is in the concluding remarks of this chapter.    
C. Major Themes of Emptiness: An Assessment of Language of Negativity 
 Apart from an examination of various Buddhist traditions through the strategic use of 
a cross-sectional approach, further categories of assessment are necessary to situate emptiness 
not only in the internal logic of Buddhism, but also within a structure of negative language.  
This means that a study of the major themes of emptiness is necessary to fill out how the 
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structure can be used in the later analysis of emptiness in relation to Derridean différance.  
These categories are not exhaustive but rather representative of the ideas in the earliest extant 
texts as well as more modern secondary sources.  The selected categories include liberation, 
rejection of reification, non-duality, and enlightenment.   
1. Liberation 
a. Anātman and Emptiness: Language of Negativity 
 A central and foundational concept to Buddhism is that existence is relational to 
suffering of sentient beings.  Suffering might be due, for example, to craving in terms of 
existence, delusion to the true nature of things, or karmic consequence for previous action, 
but the consequence is the same: suffering begets further suffering and this is intrinsically 
related to the condition of what it means to exist.  Thus, from the earliest texts, the 
elimination or liberation from suffering is a key component of Buddhist teaching.  It is 
interesting to note here that suffering is often discussed in terms of tying experiential desire 
to that of existential concerns; the Cūlasunnata Sutta, an early Theravāda text, describes the 
monk’s experience of liberation as having “…his mind…liberated from the taint of sensual 
desire, from the taint of being, and from the taint of ignorance.”274 There are a few points of 
immediate concern here: the mind is wrapped up in this liberation, so it is integrally involved 
in the monk’s freedom from existence, but the freedom extends to complete cessation:  
Such talk as deals with effacement, as favours the mind’s release, and which 
leads to complete disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, peace, direct 
knowledge, enlightenment, and Nibbāna, that is, talk on wanting little, on 
contentment, seclusion, aloofness from society, arousing energy, virtue, 
concentration, wisdom, deliverance, knowledge and vision of deliverance…275 
 
The adjectives used to describe an all-encompassing liberation leads to cessation are 
fascinating because they are far-ranging in their philosophical implications.  Certainly the 
                                                             
274 Middle Length Discourses, 969. 
275 Ibid. 974.  
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immediate implication is that liberation is of central importance to Buddhist teaching. 
However, here it is important to trace back to the root of bondage, of suffering; with that 
comes about the uniquely-Buddhist teaching of the anātman, or no-self. 
 In trying to get to a better understanding of Buddhist liberation, it is important to 
specify who is being liberated; coupled with the Buddhist teaching of anātman, this begs the 
question of who or what is being liberated?  Is it some disembodied self, the mind, or a 
person’s entire essence?  These questions, while attempting to answer certain aspects of 
liberation, inadvertently miss the point.  The teaching of emptiness is intrinsically related to 
anātman because the self is substantially no-thing; so who or what is being liberated is a 
tangential question; the better phrasing might be the (non)what or the (non)who is being 
liberated.  For, as Winston L. King argues that “…emptiness is neither substantial Absolute 
Being nor nihilistic nonbeing, but somehow transcendent-immanent in ‘being’ and ‘non-
being,’”276 then, too, the question of liberation must be one that existentially pivots not on the 
who or what, but on the empty nature of human phenomena; here liberation means “to enter 
and abide in emptiness internally by giving no attention to all signs.”277 Donald Lopez makes 
the connection much more plainly: “...all phenomena are falsely imagined to have a self, a 
soul, an ‘own-being’, a reality which they, in fact, lack…all phenomena in the universe are 
devoid of any essence or intrinsic existence; indeed, it is the very absence of such an essence 
that is the true nature of things.”278 The language here is filled with negations: “devoid,” 
“lack,” and “absence” help express the deeper truth that all things are essentially empty; thus, 
the connection with liberation is that in order for one to achieve liberation, the key insight 
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that all things are devoid of their own substance is necessary.
279
  For, as the Mahāyāna 
Perfection of Wisdom sūtra expands, “Through the fact of there being no personal soul, no 
living being, no person, that utmost, full and perfect awakening is fully and perfectly 
awakened to as identical with all meritorious things.”280 Elsewhere, in The Kāçyapaparivarta, 
the connection between emptiness and the self must be understood properly: “It is not…that 
emptiness leads to the annihilation of personhood; persons themselves are empty and 
emptiness itself is empty, absolutely empty, empty in the past, empty in the future, empty in 
the present.”281  This is further substantiated in Nāgārjuna’s Dharmadhātustava when he 
states that, “The mind is purified by [contemplating] the three: ‘impermanent, suffering, and 
empty’.  The quality that purifies the mind best, however, is the absence of intrinsic 
nature.”282 Again the overriding theme here is the lack of intrinsic nature, the absence of 
some-thing, a no-thing, is that which leads to liberation.  The functions of the negations are 
for “purification” in a way that expresses the paradoxical fullness of emptiness.  These 
passages help briefly elucidate the problem of the no-self in relation to liberation in the 
bigger scope of emptiness.  However, to further explore how the no-self is treated in ancient 
Buddhist texts, it is beneficial to turn to Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā to fill out the 
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b. Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Vigrahavyāvartanī: The Paradox of the 
Emptiness of Emptiness 
 
For Nāgārjuna, the basic inter-relationship of things is best described as dependent 
arising, or, simply that every phenomenal thing is caused by something else.
283
 L. Stafford 
Betty aptly shows how Nāgārjuna consistently affirms, "'emptiness,' the true state of all 
empirical things, is diametrically opposed to 'self-existence.'"
284
 Betty’s analysis is valuable 
here because it establishes the interior tension between what conditionally exists as a 
phenomenal “thing” and that is understood as fundamentally empty.  Nāgārjuna describes 
dependent arising in terms of "arising, abiding, and ceasing."
285
 However, even these 
categories are ultimately empty of their own substance. David Kalupahana summarizes this 
point when he says, "Causality, according to Nāgārjuna, is pure relativity, and this relativity 
is synonymous with emptiness."
286
 Nāgārjuna's thesis of emptiness is made to prevent the 
logical conclusions of equating the properties of dependent arising with any kind of 
(self)existence, for "Neither an existent nor a nonexistent / Can be properly said to arise. / As 
it is taught before with / 'For neither an existent nor a nonexistent.'"
287
 Nāgārjuna’s careful 
use of negative language here, as throughout the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and 
Vigrahavyāvartanī, serve to show how phenomena are, ultimately, empty.   
In Nāgārjuna's thought, causal relationships function on the logic that nothing arises 
nor not-arises.  For this causal relationship demonstrates that nothing is "permanent" and thus 
there are no "fixed essential natures."
288
 Following this logic to its conclusion means 
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asserting that if emptiness shows that nothing is "fixed" or "permanent," then everything is 
characterized by "arising, abiding, and ceasing." The internal logic is characterized by 
negation, by impermanence and the no/never/not-lasting of emptiness.  Ruegg helps unpack 
this logic:  
…to say that something is neither A nor non-A (Ā) does not represent an 
attempt on the part of the Mādhyamika to define some entity (bhāva, i.e. a 
thing possessing svabhāva) that is neither A nor Ā (i.e. indeterminate), but 
rather a way of stating the Buddhist theory of conditionship in terms of the 
Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness of own being (svabhāvaśūnyatā) and non-
substantiality of all factors (dharmanairātmya).289 
 
Nāgārjuna's thesis is that nothing exists nor not-exists independently.  The further implication 
in this argument is that emptiness, if conceived either as a descriptor, or even as an "essence" 
of something else, is also empty.  Williams makes a very careful distinction here between 
emptiness and things that are empty: 
Emptiness is not itself the same as the world which is empty, the two truths are 
not literally the same thing, emptiness and the thing which is empty could not 





If emptiness has no inherent existence, because it has no essential essence, then it, too, is held 
in this causal relationship.  Garfield lucidly summarizes this point: "...as far as one analyzes, 
one finds only dependence, relativity, and emptiness and their dependence, relativity, and 
emptiness.”291 
Nāgārjuna shows that because emptiness is itself empty, the Four Noble Truths are 
affirmed in their path to liberation and cessation.
292
 Nāgārjuna uses the powerful logic of the 
emptiness of emptiness to question: "If suffering, arising, and / Ceasing are nonexistent, / By 
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what path could one seek / To obtain the cessation of suffering?"
293
 Even then, Williams 
clarifies, “…śūnyatā must refer to an entity’s being empty of something, although this is an 
interpretation of śūnyatā which was specifically denied by the Madhyamaka.”294 Williams’ 
clarification argues for Nāgārjuna’s own position to be bracketed as neither a thesis nor a 
non-thesis.  As Nāgārjuna cogently demonstrates in the twenty-ninth verse of his 
Vigrahavyāvartanī, he does not state a position: “If I had any thesis, that fault would apply to 
me.  But I do not have any thesis, so there is indeed no fault for me.”295 This refutation allows 
Nāgārjuna to deal with the semantics that come between the meaning of emptiness and 
holding a position on emptiness. As Ruegg argues, “…the fact, or truth, of the interdependent 
origination of things is then referred to by the term śūnyatā, emptiness, a designation not 
belonging to the object-language applied conditionally to this state of affairs.”296  Indeed, this 
is entirely necessary, as Jan Westerhoff argues, to defend the thesis of universal emptiness, 
including the emptiness of the thesis itself.
297
 
By bracketing the language used in the emptiness of emptiness, Nāgārjuna shows a 
middle way towards liberation and cessation.  Though his bracketed language navigates 
“between” affirmation and negation, Nāgārjuna’s final analysis stands the test of logic: he 
affirms the Buddhist concept of the path to nirvāṇa as the stripping away of assumptions, 
falsity, and delusion.  Included is the attainment of liberation through viewing conventional 
and phenomenal truths as essentially the same.
298
 For Nāgārjuna, the doctrine of dependent 
origination shows the logical fallacy of the delusion of existence as permanent.  As Williams 
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helps clarify, “An entity seen as dependent and thereby illusory is understood according to its 
paratantra aspect; its illusory nature is realised, like the Madhyamaka śūnyatā, due to 
dependent origination.”299 This doctrine, coupled with the logic of conventional and 
phenomenal truths as empty, allows Nāgārjuna to affirm the path to cessation through the 
ultimate realization of emptiness: "Whoever sees dependent arising / Also sees suffering / 
And its arising / And its cessation as well as the path."
300
  
The greater point here might be Nāgārjuna’s emptiness, at least as far as liberation is 
concerned, is found in the limits of language, where language collapses.  This is important 
analytically because ultimately, the emptiness of emptiness exposes delusion through the 
emptiness of conventional and phenomenal truth.  Williams lucidly sets out the logic here:  
In terms of existence, emptiness has as much real existence as anything else.  
It is the true, really true, way of things, inasmuch as it is the way things really 
are.  In this sense it is an ultimate truth. But if emptiness itself is searched for, 
then…emptiness is not found and therefore there is emptiness of emptiness.  





  Garfield's analysis of this conclusion helps contextualize the greater point: 
But if...we treat ourselves, others, and our values as empty, there is hope and a 
purpose to life.  For then, in the context of impermanence and dependence, 
human action and knowledge make sense, and moral and spiritual progress 
become possible.  It is only in the context of ultimate nonexistence that actual 




Nāgārjuna’s summation suggests that existence, whatever that may entail, operates in a type 
of bracketed dialectic because conventional and phenomenal existences are not without 
emptiness, and conversely, “emptiness is the truth of emptiness itself.”   
 The Zen/Ch’an traditions help push the logic into the experiential (specifically) and 
into consciousness (tangentially); this is of importance to understanding how emptiness 
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works within the confines of logical negativity in terms of liberation. More specifically, a 
discussion of the experience of emptiness helps address the nuances of expressing emptiness 
in terms of negative language. 
c. Zen and the Experience of Emptiness 
As previously discussed, there are multiple ways to address how emptiness might be 
conveyed conceptually.  In Zen, the emphasis is often expressed in terms of experience, so a 
different way of conceptualizing negative language in emptiness is necessary; while not a 
paradigm shift as such, the point here is to round out the conceptualization within terms that 
are utilized in Zen.  C. Lawson Crowe argues that Zen, as a development of earlier Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, holds emptiness and enlightenment together as the paradox of experience; 
furthermore, this contributes to a discussion of liberation because the earlier traditions point 
to the importance of realizing emptiness in all things and the enlightenment that may come 
from it.  Crowe connects key Mahāyāna ideas with how Zen experience shapes the language 
of emptiness and enlightenment: 
These [Mahāyāna] Sūtras teach that the mind attains nirvāna when it 
comprehends the emptiness of all things.  Reality is essentially void, and this 
experience of the void is what is referred to in the Zen doctrine of “seeing into 
one’s true nature.” This “seeing” is not “seeing something.”  It is a state of no-
seeing, no-consciousness, and no-mind.  Strictly speaking, nothing can be 
predicated of “no-consciousness.”303 
 
Crowe describes Zen experience as “mystical” insofar that experience “ends, paradoxically, 
by viewing the concrete as essentially formless and empty.”304 Nieda suggests a similar 
interpretation of holding these two teachings together experientially because, “…one can 
perceive ‘nothing’ and approach the fresh truth of Buddha through ‘nothing’ and one can 
release oneself from the crowded world of earth, and be open to expand oneself toward the 
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infinitely broad sky.”305 While the earlier Mahāyāna tradition relies on something like 
experience (to realize emptiness in all things), it is not spelled out as such; rather, the later 
Zen tradition broadly connects experience with enlightenment as central to liberation.  Hideo 
Kishimoto argues that the development of Zen from Mahāyāna thought included the teaching 
of the Buddha that “…enlightenment and nirvāna, were almost synonymous.  To become 
fully enlightened meant to disappear from this world.”306  Yet, what seems to depart from 
Buddhist teaching is the possibility of unification in enlightenment: “[Zen] emphasizes a 
unifying absolutist awareness and thus dissolves separative individualism.”307 Even further, 
King pushes the argument to suggest, “The aim is to go beyond mere one-pointed 
mindfulness to a fully existential realization of anicca-anatta-dukkha (impermanence-
emptiness-suffering) in one’s own body-mind totality.”308 As a preliminary suggestion, the 
synonymy of emptiness and enlightenment means, at the basic level, recognition of the 
“uniqueness…in the elimination of the stages in the journey to nirvāna.”309  
Here a major idea of liberation is important to note: whereas in the earlier traditions, 
the language that makes up liberation is primarily negative (realizing non-substantiality, etc.) 
while the language of liberation in the Zen tradition is seemingly positive insofar as 
emptiness eliminates/creates a quasi-unification/falling away.  To flesh out this paradox, D.T. 
Suzuki posits that śūnyatā prevents “contradiction” in Zen experience because the totality of 
śūnyatā is “absolutely one.”310 The contradiction that is foremost in Suzuki’s thinking is the 
problem of subject-object relationships.  He proposes that “śūnyatā is experienced only when 
it is both subject and object;” this “intellectual reconstruction” is a logic whereby both 
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oneness and emptiness are essentially the same experiential reality.
311
 For Suzuki, śūnyatā 
must be inherently illogical, devoid of linguistic meaning, and pregnant with significance 
because experience is the central predicate of Zen.
312
  
An interesting point in Suzuki’s thought mentioned above is his insistence that Zen, as 
properly experienced in śūnyatā, is essentially inter-connected, an “ātman, master of itself,” 
and fully independent of subject-object relationships.
313
 Furthermore, and of greater 
importance, is Suzuki’s appeal to logically presenting illogical concepts when “reasoning 
defeats itself.”314 Rather, it seems as though Suzuki points to a higher reasoning, a logic-
beyond-logic, where affirmations are informed only through experience, whereby oneness 
and brokenness are the same, where emptiness and fullness are implicitly identical.
315
 
Suzuki’s use of a Zen passage describing unification in the experience of Zen enlightenment 
illustrates the greater point that within the context of overcoming logic, enlightenment is 
essentially “broken” and “full:” 
When the mountains are seen as not standing against me, when they are 
dissolved into the oneness of things, they are not mountains, they cease to 
exist as objects of Nature.  But when they are seen as standing against me, as 
separate from me…they are not mountains either.  The mountains are really 





In Suzuki’s thinking on śūnyatā, the plane of existence for the Zen practitioner no longer 
“find[s] anything frightening in infinite possibilities, unlimited freedom, never-ending 
responsibilities.”317 Even further, Suzuki is quick to point out that the experience of Zen 
means the recognition of things as they are and “contradictions resolve themselves without 
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much ado.”318 In a cryptic critique of the Mahāyāna tradition, Suzuki reasons, “It is not Zen’s 
way to annihilate the whole world or to reduce it to an abstract non-entity in order to 
experience the dissolution of contradictions.”319 
d. Liberation and Emptiness 
 To quickly sum up the relationship between liberation and emptiness, negative 
language plays a pivotal role from the emptiness of emptiness to the realization of non-
substance in all things.  Between the three examined traditions, there are differences in 
nuance, especially as experience is concerned; an overriding theme is, however, the need for 
liberation from the allusion of substance; this liberation is freedom from the suffering caused 
by thinking that things have independent substance.  This is “accomplished” through the 
realization of emptiness in all things, including emptiness itself.  The Buddhist teaching of 
liberation, especially in terms of negative language, is intrinsically related to the uniquely 
Buddhist teaching of the no-self.  From this point, it may be said that negative language helps 
shape the language of liberation insofar as emptiness demonstrates non-substantiality of even 
emptiness. The missing element here is, however, the function of how something of essential 
no-substance, emptiness properly figured, can be expressed in language.  It is important to 
delve into Nāgārjuna’s rejection of reification to further explore negative language in 
Buddhist emptiness.   
2. Nāgārjuna’s Rejection of Reification: Negative Language Against Itself 
 
a. Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way 
 
 The analysis of emptiness is here heavily influenced by the intricacies of Nāgārjuna’s 
thought because emptiness figures substantially in his explication of the Middle Way.  An 
important development in Nāgārjuna’s thought is his rejection of reification. Reification, or 
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the idea that things have independent substance, substantiates “thingness,” that constructs of 
reality are, in fact, “real.” To a thinker like Nāgārjuna, reification is an allusion because no-
thing has independent substance; to make a phenomenon “real” – to give it thingness – is 
delusional because it does not “exist” independently.  Thus, Nāgārjuna’s rejection of 
reification, or the non-reification of all things, is essentially no-thing-ness.  It is a critique on 
reality assumed as such, as independently existing and caused; further, and more importantly, 
it is a critique on intrinsic substance.  Nāgārjuna’s emptiness is primarily a rationalization of 
the non-reification of all phenomena.   
Nāgārjuna’s rejection of reification is important to negative language and, more 
broadly, emptiness.  In his major work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, one major analytical 
point is the rejection of both reification and nihilism. For Nāgārjuna, nihilism is absolute void 
or nothingness, while reification is the assigning of essence to a material object.
320
 Emptiness 
properly conceived of as lacking substance (of even itself), however, shows a middle path 
between nihilism and reification because it exposes both the lack of essence and the 
dependent origination of all things.
321
  This is an issue of language between referents because 
nihilism and reification operate in terms of referential logic.  As Williams helps clarify, 
“…while we may maintain that our referent is devoid of self-essence and cannot really be 
referred to, yet there is still a dependently-originated given which serves as a substratum to a 
verbal reference which in turn gives rise to the mistaken conception of a self-essence.”322 
Empirically, emptiness is the method by which Nāgārjuna cuts away the delusion of the 
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essence of things and the delusion of independent arising.  Nāgārjuna's final rejection of both 
reification and nihilism is held in relation to an understanding of "essence" in space and time: 
"To say 'it is' is to grasp for permanence. / To say 'it is not' is to adopt the view of nihilism. / 
Therefore a wise person / Does not say 'exists' or 'does not exist.'"
323
 While Nāgārjuna's 
rejection of reification is certainly compelling, a further examination of his negative language 
is necessary to establish how this is vital to the Buddhist teaching of emptiness. 
b. Non-reification and the Middle Way 
Nāgārjuna's primary concern in the differentiation between nihilism and reification is 
what it means to say "essence," or where something has its own qualities. For Nāgārjuna, the 
affirmation of "essence" is called reification, whereby something exists independently in 
space and time.  The conceptual opposite (the absolute negation of "essence"), or that nothing 
exists independently in space and time, is what he terms "nihilistic" because it means, at its 
very root, that nothing exists in either conventional or phenomenal reality. Nāgārjuna holds 
the meaning of reification in direct contrast of nihilism, and vice versa, for the rejection of 
"essence" in both a reificationist and nihilistic way.  Nāgārjuna sees these two concepts as 
logically self-defeating because "'Whatever exists through its essence / Cannot be 




 Nāgārjuna's argument for the rejection of reification pivots on the meaning of 
"essence." He argues that nothing has essence, or that nothing exists independently; for if 
something has essence it would mean that it has essential qualities, or attributes that compose 
a thing in time and space.   Williams helps clarify this view: “To speak of the Madhyamaka 
view is to say that there is a correct way of things, and this is correctly expressed by such 
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statements as ‘all entities lack inherent existence.’”325 Nāgārjuna argues that if there was an 
essence, this would delineate the qualities of permanence, stability, and independence.
326
 
Nāgārjuna's rejection of reification does not conclude with the rejection of essential qualities 
that compose essences, but rather he shifts the focus to understanding the consequence of 
reification in relation to "suffering."
327
 It is here that Nāgārjuna applies a Buddhist 
understanding of "suffering" to the larger picture of what Garfield calls the "soteriological 
character of the text: Reification is the root of grasping and craving and hence of all 
suffering."
328
 The consequence of reification is the continuance of the cycle of delusion that 
things exist independently.    
Furthermore, while Nāgārjuna deals with the views of  nihilism and reification, he 
“pointed out the absurdity of believing that a real thing could appear and disappear at the 
same moment.”329 The logic of suffering as conditioned by the "truths" of existence holds 
conventional and phenomenal reality in paradox.  It is in this paradox that Nāgārjuna teaches 
the middle way. Nāgārjuna's middle way, or the rejection of nihilistic and reificationist 
positions, shows the validity of liberation by holding the "truths" of reification and nihilism in 
paradox.
330
 His middle way is the teaching of emptiness, or that all things are ultimately 
empty of essence.  Nāgārjuna applies this category to conventional and phenomenal truths 
because emptiness shows, in the most extreme way, even emptiness is empty itself.  Williams 
helps unpack this logic when he explains, “Emptiness is therefore itself the very absence of 
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inherent existence of entities, and is not the entities seen dependently originated and 
empty.”331 
Though this examination of negative language attempts to flesh out Nāgārjuna’s 
concept of the Middle Way, it is necessary to discuss how dependent causation contributes to 
the negations used.  Nāgārjuna’s use of dependent origination is central in how emptiness 
works in negative language.  It is important to step back for a moment, though, and examine 
how earlier teachings of dependent origination inform his use of language and then fill it out 
with a student who was inspired by Nāgārjuna’s thought.  The purpose of this is to come to a 
better understanding of how non-reification and dependent causation form the negative 
language of emptiness.  
c. Non-reification and Dependent Causation 
The Buddhist teaching of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is thoroughly 
intertwined with other teachings: “…[the Buddha] explained how suffering arises from 
causes, and argued that by destroying the cause of suffering, suffering would cease.”332 This 
corresponds to emptiness because it exposes how reified things are empty of substance 
because they are caused, hence the importance of Nāgārjuna’s teaching that “…elaborated on 
the Buddha’s claim that everything is empty of self because everything arises in dependence 
on something else; nothing can be independent because everything is dependent.”333 
However, as Lopez rightly observes, this operates within the matrix of karmic consequence 
so the further nuance here is “…the fact of dependent origination means that emptiness is not 
the utter absence of existence, but rather the absence of a specific kind of falsely imagined 
existence.”334 It is important to trace this back further, prior to Nāgārjuna because the 
teaching is so thoroughly intertwined in Buddhist thought; the questions of dependent 
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origination are foundational to further questions of existence, emptiness, and liberation from 
suffering. 
In the Cūlasunnata Sutta, the Buddha confides the state of śūnyatā to his disciple, 
Ānanda: "Now, Ānanda, I often abide in voidness...[a bhikkhu] enters into that perception of 
the base of infinite space and acquires confidence, steadiness, and decision."
335
 The control of 
single-minded concentration is understood by the Buddha to mean that the "[bhikkhu] regards 
[the field of perception] as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he 
understands that which is present thus: 'This is present.'"
336
 This early Theravādan text on 
śūnyatā brings out the questions of how existence are related to emptiness.  John Cobb, Jr. 
calls the early Buddhist teaching on emptiness a "… the realization of oneself as an instance 
of dependent co-origination or the concrescence of all things."
337
 The connection between 
emptiness and empty-mindedness in the Cūlasunnata Sutta is made through simultaneous 
affirmation and negation: 
[the bhikkhu] attends to the singleness dependent on the perception of the base 
of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.  His mind enters into that perception 





The dialectic of affirmation and negation within the complexity of emptiness allows the 
Buddha to communicate the experiential, even existential, nature, or lack-of-nature of 
emptiness.  This is no simple dialectic.  Rather, it is more articulately a dichotomous dialectic 
because there is a dual articulation and negation.  The "perception of the base" is 
simultaneously "neither" and "nor" perception and non-perception.  This dichotomous 
dialectic at once affirms the necessity of perception and non-perception.  However, the 
dialectic in this logic is the conclusion that something is paradoxically gained, that the mind 
                                                             
335 Middle Length Discourses, 965-966. 
336 Ibid. 967. 
337 John B. Cobb, Jr. "Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God," Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, vol. 45, no. 1 (March 1977): 11. 
338 Middle Length Discourses, 968.   
112 
 
"acquires" a certain centeredness thus allowing the experience of emptiness.  It is through the 
affirmation of the acquisition of emptiness that the negation of perception is possible.  This 
view, however, tends to focus on a type of experience of emptiness (as perception, etc.) in 
relation to dependent causation rather than as the emptiness of all things because they are 
dependently caused.   
 Later constructs of dependent causation, undertaken by a Tibetan monk, Tsong kha pa 
(1357-1419), who was influenced by Nāgārjuna, focus on the centrality of dependent 
causation because it “…means that emptiness is not the utter absence of existence, but rather 
the absence of a specific kind of falsely imagined existence.”339 Tsong kha pa focuses his 
devotion to the Buddha on dependent causation because “When you [the Buddha] saw that 
emptiness is the meaning of dependent origination, then [you saw] that the emptiness of 
intrinsic nature and the efficacy of actions are not contradictory.”340 Tsong kha pa goes on to 
counterbalance this with another teaching: “Therefore, you said that apart from things that 
arise dependently, nothing exists.  Thus, apart from things that are intrinsically empty, 
nothing exists.”341 For him, the paradox rests not with emptiness, because emptiness is not a 
thing, but with causation; indeed, the path to enlightenment is where one sees clearly 
causation and thus, that all things are empty of “intrinsic nature.”342 Tsong kha pa traces the 
central teaching of dependent origination back to the Buddha, as “…the path of dependent 
origination is the very essence of your teaching…”343 The centrality of dependent causation is 
important here because it exposes, aside from any experience of emptiness, the logical fallacy 
with things having independent existence: Tsong kha pa shows that if Buddhism is the 
Middle Path (in much the same way as his teacher, Nāgārjuna) between reification and 
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nihilism, causation and (non)causation, dependent origination and independent causation, 
then emptiness must inform all perceptions of (non)substance, showing that all things are 
dependently caused.  For him, the path to understanding, to enlightenment, is understanding 
how all things are empty and dependently caused – and then being able to “see” that: 
“Understanding that all of this is naturally empty and understanding that this effect arises 
from that are mutually supportive, without impeding each other.”344 
d. Reified Negation 
 The language used by Nāgārjuna, Tsong kha pa, and others shows how all things are 
empty of independent substance. Nāgārjuna, especially, deals with the question of dependent 
essence in terms of negative language, purposely set against itself.  If things are dependently 
caused by some-thing else, then they must be empty of intrinsic substance, so they do not 
“exist” by themselves.  Nāgārjuna resolves the problem of reified negation in his language by 
the logic of the tetralamma; he does not take a position on emptiness, yet shows how all 
things are empty. Williams lucidly expands on how Nāgārjuna resolves the problem of reified 
negation: 
That emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence in the Madhyamaka is 
now well known, and was an important point stressed again and again by 
Tsong kha pa.  Thus emptiness is also a conceptual entity (prajnaptisat) 
existing in dependence.  It does not follow from all of this, however, that 
emptiness does not exist in the way that anything can exist, as a 
conventionally existent phenomenon…In terms of existence, emptiness has as 




Negative language is here used to cut through delusion, to expand on this is a falsity for 
whatever reality might be on the path to enlightenment.  However, Nāgārjuna and his later 
disciple do not simply rely on negative language to cut through the brush of delusion; they 
also use it to cut away any misapprehensions of truth or falsity.  This view, that emptiness is 
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itself is empty deals squarely with the logical problem of reified negation, though further 
discussion of non-duality is needed to further contextualize this. A discussion of non-duality 
will help expand the analysis of negative language in Buddhism because it follows from how 
reified negation is used as a logical syllogism.   
3. Non-Duality and Emptiness 
a. A Zen Critique 
 The criticism that Nāgārjuna is reaching for something beyond emptiness is put forth 
by the Zen thinker, D.T. Suzuki: 
[T]he Mahāyānists do not regard negation as the ultimate goal of their 
speculations; for with them negation is but a road to reach a higher form of 
affirmation, and they are aware of the fact that the human mind lives in 




It must be questioned if Suzuki understood the internal logic of the Mahāyāna position on 
emptiness.  For Suzuki, the more influential idea in Mahāyāna thought is the use of negation 
to overcome the "limitations of the human mind" in order to assert a higher truth.
347
 
Furthermore, the highest expression of logic in Suzuki’s appropriation of Mahāyāna “cannot 
be represented by any other means than negation.”348 The intentional use of negation is 
directly related to what Suzuki calls “intuition” because it surpasses conventional thinking 
into what he calls “mysticism.”349 It is this point of departure that Suzuki uses for what would 
become a Zen reform: he says that the Mahāyāna teaching of surpassing through negation 
ventures into “speculative mysticism.”350 
                                                             
346 D.T. Suzuki, "The Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism" in The Awakening of Zen, ed. by Christmas 
Humphreys (Boulder: Prajñã Press, 1980), 5. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid.  6-7.   
350 Ibid. 7. 
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 Though Suzuki stresses that particular schools of Buddhist thought are 
environmentally formed and socially conditioned,
351
 he draws particular attention to the 
dialectic of Mahāyāna that eventually leads to Zen reforms.  For Suzuki, the emphasis on 
negation in Mahāyāna thought only concludes in further negating other negations.  His 
analysis of Mahāyāna thought focuses on the attempt to express an affirmation with logical 
negations.  Zen, he claims, pushes this analysis further and attempts to work out of the 
negations into true affirmations.
352
 
 The larger criticism here pertains to duality, as Nāgārjuna works through the logic of 
the emptiness of emptiness; however, as Suzuki argues, Nāgārjuna instead works into another 
duality.  His criticism of Nāgārjuna seems to echo the much older Theravādan idea that 
emptiness eventually exposes an “undifferentiated” realm; Kenneth Inada presents what may 
be a summation of śūnyatā in Theravada thought: “Śūnyatā is what makes the two realms 
[samsāra and nibbāna] coexistent, not side-by-side, but as two sides of the same reality.  
Thus relational-origination spans the samsāric and nibbānic realms, because it is in essence a 
voidal, undifferentiated process.”353 Suzuki wants to push this further because emptiness, for 
him, exposes the non-duality of (non)existence; thus, in his view, the logic of the earlier 
Theravāda and Mahāyāna schools is flawed.  The tension, indeed the very difference of 
emptiness here, rests in the claims to the original teachings of the Buddha.  
 Nancy Wilson Ross affirms that the early "First Principle" of the Buddha is ultimately 
"positive" because the void is "that fullness without boundaries from which all life 
emerges."
354
 While emptiness is portrayed as positive experientially, the textual negations 
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create an internal dualistic tension. This tension is necessary to describe liberation without 
affirmative descriptors.  Thus, liberation, as understood by the Buddha, is supremely and 
paradoxically, emptiness:  The negation of liberation is the affirmation of that which ensnares 
worldly existence, or "being" properly understood.  
b. The Language of Non-Duality 
 In response to these existential questions of liberation through emptiness, Nāgārjuna 
demonstrates the power of the logic of negation in his view of emptiness.  Malcolm Eckel 
comments that the emptiness of emptiness consequently means, "none of the normal 
distinctions between things applies.  Emptiness itself is a distinct position, too, and when it is 
analyzed from the point of view of Emptiness, it also has to be empty."
355
 From the point of 
view that emptiness is itself empty of substance,  Nāgārjuna’s “position” might be seen as 
thoroughly non-dual.  Garfield calls this:  
a critical three-way relation between emptiness, dependent origination and 
verbal convention, and [Nāgārjuna] asserts that this relation itself is the 




Nāgārjuna sees how the emptiness of emptiness is predicated on non-duality because the 
Middle Way is that which is of non-substantial “being.”  However, this is the same point of 
contention that D.T. Suzuki argues: Nāgārjuna’s attempt at a non-dual understanding of 
emptiness “creates” another thingness with which emptiness is posited.  Suzuki sees Zen’s 
response as a means to go beyond this position. 
 Within the larger problem of addressing proper textual context,
357
 a major focus in the 
corpus of Zen literature seems to point to the rejection of duality.  Robert Powell describes 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
simultaneously affirming and negating existence and non-existence.  Masao Abe affirms this point: "True 
Śūnyatā, being the negation of sheer emptiness as well as sheer fullness, is an active and creative emptiness 
which, just because of being itself empty, lets everything and everyone be and work respectively in their 
particularity." Masao Abe, "Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions," The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 
1, no. 1, (September 1965): 119. 
355 Eckel, To See the Buddha, 43. Capitalization of "Emptiness" is original.   
356 Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 304 (Garfield commentary).   
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the teaching of Zen’s “non-duality…[as] essential to an understanding of the Zen way.”358 
The centrality of non-duality is grounded in the earlier Mahāyāna teaching that “all objects 
and phenomena are unreal in the sense that they are indeterminate.”359 Where Zen departs 
from this earlier Mahāyāna is in the rejection of the self.  In Powell’s understanding of Zen, 
the duality of the self, as the one who experiences emptiness, is negated in the “realization of 
this emptiness of the phenomenal world, of multiplicity, and of the self.”360 He goes further to 
describe the “Reality” that is distinct of earlier Mahāyāna thought, yet is the logical 
consequence of the teaching of non-duality.
361
 In other places of the Zen tradition, non-
duality is better described as “transcendent;” it is the transcendent which seems to clarify the 
distinction between “understanding” and “realization.”362 Furthermore, non-duality implies 
the rejection of “logic and reason” insofar as they imply dualistic considerations: “Logic and 
reason are impure for the simple reason that they lead to reflection and doubt, not only about 
affairs that we do not usually doubt, but also about affairs that we cannot tolerate doubt 
about.”363 The implications of a rejection of duality mean a singleness of mind, transcendent 
meditative stillness, where the practitioner releases the dualistic tendencies of “logic and 
reason.” As a consequence of this rejection of dualism, though, is an “absence of a theory of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
357 Dale S. Wright, Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 47-48. “…[I]f a Zen text can only be understood against the background of its Zen ‘context,’ the same 
would be true of its context as well.  As an object of study, ‘context’ also has a context which requires complex 
interpretation.” 
358 Robert Powell, Zen and Reality: An Approach to Sanity and Happiness on a Non-Sectarian Basis 
(Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961), 88.   
359 Ibid. 89.  
360 Ibid. 90.  
361 “[T]hat one reality which appears as ‘me’ is part of the great stream of Life that not only encompasses 
organic life but also the inanimate world – that stream, which because it is ever in a flux, represents transience 
itself.” Ibid. 91. 
362 Chen-Chi Chang, “The Nature of Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 6, no. 4 (January 
1957), 335. 
363 Dale Riepe, “The Significance of the Attack upon Rationality by Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy and 
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causality.”364 What is transcendent is non-caused in the sense that non-dualism means that 
what “is” simply “is.”    
 Winston King examines the issue of non-duality in temporal terms when he argues,  
Zen seeks to keep both the transcendent and the immanent, the absolute and 
the conditioned, the universal and the particular, the temporal moment and the 





This temporal argument seems to bring together paradoxical metaphysics in a way that 
affirms a “Unity.”  Rather this ambiguous acceptance/rejection of dualism is indicative of the 
paradox that finds a middle ground distinct from earlier Mahāyāna teachings that seem to 
push beyond emptiness into another (some/no)thing.  King elaborates: “The reality of neither 
side in any of these dichotomies is to be sacrificed to the other, or even subordinated to it.”366 
This argument shows that while Zen may use the teaching of emptiness to reach higher truths, 
it also rejects an ultimate affirmation of truth because it is logically inconsistent with holding 
the aforementioned temporally-conditioned aspects in paradox. As T.P. Kasulis reasons, a 
new duality arises when paradoxical dualities are eliminated because “nothingness is a 
universal solvent.  Not only does it dissolve any conceptualization try to grasp it, but, even 
more radically, it dissolves itself.”367 
 Merv Fowler shifts the emphasis on emptiness as the catalyst by which to reject 
dualism insofar as he examines the Mahāyāna position of emptiness: “it is much more the 
idea that ultimate reality is something that cannot exist in finite things or in ideas, even the 
idea of emptiness itself.”368 Rather, for Fowler, the connection between Mahāyāna and Zen 
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Religion, vol. 36, no. 3 (September 1968): 223. 
366 Ibid.  
367 T.P. Kasulis, Zen Action / Zen Person (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981), 41. 
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understandings of non-duality are inherently similar, or that finding meaning “between 
dualities” means finding truth without “finite definitions.”369 
c. Emptiness and Non-Duality 
 The  Mahāyāna position on emptiness plays especial importance with the language of 
non-duality.  Ruegg helps unpack the logic here: 
If śūnyatā had the quality of being an existent (bhāvatva: yod pa), there would 
be no absolute absence (atyantābhāva) of duality (dvayabhāva), no being the 
real nature (dharmatā) of abhūtaparikalpa; and so it has been stated that it is 
not existent…As for its not being non-existent either, non-ens of duality does 
not consist of abhāva having the form of abhāva of duality (dvayabhāva).  
Were it such abhāva pure and simple, there would be existence of duality; and 
there would be no dharmatā of abhūtaparikalpa – like the impermanence and 




Ruegg demonstrates the power of negation in the logic of non-duality in the Mahāyāna 
position by outlining the relationship between existents and what that means in terms of 
duality. Further clarification is given by Paul Williams when he argues in terms of analogy 
when he seeks to outline the full force of negation:  
The opposition prapaṅca::śūnyatā is closely reflected in Madhyamaka texts 
with the identification of niṣprapaṅca and nirvāna; such is interesting in the 
context of the Madhyamaka identification of nirvāna and saṃsāra for it shows 
just one aspect of the creation of a new meaning-giving opposition 
concomitant with the breakdown of this old antithesis. 
 
Williams’ clarification shows how the relational logic operates within a position 
maintained by emptiness.  This is important to understand the Mahāyāna position of 
emptiness in terms of non-duality because it operates within the structures of internal 
tension; this is of importance to teasing out negative language.  
The Zen criticism of Nāgārjuna’s position pushes the framework of non-duality even 
further by stating that the Middle Way is “between dualities.”  This additionally begs the 
                                                             
369 Ibid.  Fowler goes as far as to point to debate concerning the identification of emptiness with a “metaphysical 
ultimate reality.” Ibid.  
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question of what it means to “exist” in between binary oppositions, between thingness and 
emptiness, between affirmation and negation.  Thus, the negative language of non-duality 
pushes this question further because thingness is negated to the point of where even the 
negation is no longer expressible: is this the starting point of enlightenment?  Is 
enlightenment an experience of negations, of stripping away dualities, of finding that Middle 
Way in between binary oppositions?  An examination of Buddhist enlightenment is necessary 
to follow the logic of negative language as it applies to emptiness. 
4. Emptiness and Enlightenment 
a. A Definition of the Indefinable 
Perhaps the entirety of language that informs emptiness might be summed up in terms 
of Buddhist enlightenment: falling away, non-substantiality, complete otherness.  
Nevertheless, the idea of describing enlightenment is logically untenable as “[t]he state of 
enlightenment is often said to be beyond the conception of the unenlightened, and hence 
beyond expression in language.  Yet there have been numerous attempts across the Buddhist 
world to describe enlightenment in words.”371 The language of emptiness shares many 
parallels with that of enlightenment; indeed, negative language plays an especial part in both 
teachings.  What is described here is the function of that negative language of emptiness in 
terms of enlightenment. 
An early connection in the language of emptiness in enlightenment occurs in the 
internal logic of a simultaneous affirmation-negation.  The Theravādan Cūlasunnata Sutta 
goes on to affirm that śūnyatā is, properly understood, liberation from the illusion of earthly 
matters.  The internal logic uses simultaneous affirmation-negation to show that existential 
cessation is possible only through liberation:  
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When [the bhikkhu] knows and sees thus, his mind is liberated from the taint 
of sensual desire, from the taint of being, and from the taint of ignorance.  
When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: "It is liberated." He 
understands: "Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be 




This "liberation" is what the Buddha calls the "abid[ing] in pure, supreme, unsurpassed 
voidness."
373
 Though the Buddha's teaching on the attainment of emptiness is seemingly 
affirmative,
374
 the operative logic uses negativity to create a narrative tension. Hence, the 
function of language here is a dialectical positive and negative approach to emptiness.  
For Nāgārjuna, the position of emptiness expresses enlightenment because the causal 
relationship between empty existents lends further examination into what “is” emptiness.  As 
Jay Garfield shows, Nāgārjuna connects the idea, "there is no difference in entity between 
nirvāṇa and saṃsāra; nirvāṇa is simply saṃsāra seen without reification, without attachment, 
without delusion."
375
 Nāgārjuna's emptiness culminates in an appropriation of the Buddhist 
teaching of enlightenment, or nirvāṇa.  The subtle distinction that Nāgārjuna makes from the 
earlier Theravādan texts is in his definition of nirvāṇa: that cessation is the liberation from 
the delusion of saṃsāra.  Nāgārjuna goes as far as to equate nirvāṇa and saṃsāra because 
"Whatever is the limit of nirvāṇa, / That is the limit of cyclic existence. / There is not even 
the slightest difference between them, / Or even the subtlest thing."
376
 The paradox in 
Nāgārjuna's emptiness is the language of equality. Garfield brings this out: "... nirvāṇa is 
related to saṃsāra as a state of awareness of things as they are as opposed to a state of 
awareness of things as they appear to be."
377
 Within the logic of this equation, however, is the 
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key idea of how paradoxical emptiness figures into the doctrine of nirvāṇa.  The cycle of 
birth, death, and rebirth operates with the same logic as dependent origination in that all 
things arise, abide, and cease.  The circular path of these logical arguments is driven by the 
delusion of the cycle of existence.  It is in the face of emptiness that the delusion of this cycle 
is overcome.  As Williams cogently argues, “…there was a strong tendency in the 
Madhyamaka to treat all causal relationships as coherent empirically only in terms of mutual 
dependence and as collapsing ultimately into their incoherence and emptiness.”378  This 
“collapsing ultimately into their incoherence and emptiness” is why Nāgārjuna goes as far as 
to equate nirvāṇa and saṃsāra because through emptiness one is freed from the delusion of 
cyclical existence as well as the delusion of bondage to existence.
379
  In Kalupahana's 
treatment appropriation, he draws a distinction in Nāgārjuna's understanding of "concepts" 
and "real nature."  He goes further to justify Nāgārjuna's equation because "there is no 
difference whatsoever between the phenomenal (saṃsāra) and the transcendental (nirvāṇa), 
for the reality of saṃsāra or the world is identical with the absolute."380  
This explanation, however, does not address Nāgārjuna's internal logic. Indeed, the 
language of negativity must be pressed further because for Nāgārjuna, liberation is cessation.  
Liberation entails the realization of the emptiness of saṃsāra; thus, Nāgārjuna describes 
nirvāṇa as "unrelinquished, unattained, / unannihilated, not permanent, / unarisen, 
unceased..."
381
 However, Nāgārjuna is careful to avoid the error of reifying nirvāṇa because it 
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is through emptiness that the delusion of saṃsāra is exposed.382 However, as Kalupahana 
reasons, "...Ultimate Reality cannot be communicated without resorting to the conventional, 
and that without understanding the Ultimate Reality one cannot realize nirvāṇa."383 Cyclic 
existence is at once empty and non-reified insofar as it is the realization of cessation; as 
Garfield explains, "[nirvāṇa] is, by definition, liberation from all that characterizes 
saṃsāra."384  It is liberation from saṃsāra, according to Nāgārjuna, that allows one to 
understand nirvāṇa as "neither existent nor nonexistent."385  
Though Nāgārjuna’s view of liberation, and indeed of enlightenment, is thoroughly 
nuanced, there is a tension still at play in the internal logic. Williams draws out this tension 
explicitly: “Such reflects a certain tension between the transcendence of the cause of saṃsāra 
and the universality of emptiness, but such a tension is only possible at the level of 
saṃvṛtisatya, where the primacy must in fact be given to mind.”386  It is important to note 
Nāgārjuna’s powerful influence on later Zen teachings of enlightenment. As Heinrich 
Dumoulin argues: 
The chief elements in the doctrine of Transcendental Wisdom – negativism, 
paradox, religious experience in intuitive cognition, the comprehension of 
things in their thusness – all flowed from the Prajnāpāramitā Sutras through 
Nāgārjuna into Zen, embedding themselves deeply in its substance.387 
 
Similarly, Fowler reflects on the general goal of nirvana in early Mahāyāna; he connects the 
idea of nirvāṇa with emptiness because there is a “total lack of plurality and dualities in all 
things” as well as a “commonality in emptiness.”388 For Fowler, the emptiness shows a 
natural progression of logic within a changing Mahāyāna, for the experiential focus of Zen 
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acknowledges that “it…takes a long time to remove the dualistic, selfish, and deeply rooted 
habitual thoughts arising from passions.”389 
b. Zen Enlightenment 
 Zen enlightenment is found in the act of “beholding, unfolding, or realizing the mind-
essence in its fullness” because much emphasis is placed upon the flash of sudden 
“awakening.” Indeed, scholars point to the necessity of Zen-knowledge of the practitioner, 
not the philosopher, because “Zen is something round and rolling, slippery and slick – 
ungraspable and indescribable.”390 This is not a definitive description, however, because 
other scholars argue that a careful examination of the negative language yields particular 
understandings that are completely within a historically-grounded comprehension of Zen 
truths.  Whether the experience of Zen demands the refusal of “conceptualization” or is 
confined to a historical appropriation, the centrality of the language expressing Zen 
enlightenment is important to the tradition.  For even if many refuse to describe Zen 
enlightenment, it is important “to remember that no school of Buddhism has produced more 
texts than Zen!”391 Furthermore, the central importance of language in Zen thought tends to 
deal with the general issue of existence, for as Rokusaburō Nieda suggests, “Language is the 
place in which existence dwells.”392 
Dale S. Wright explores the meaning behind language in the Zen tradition through the 
use of modern philosophical method. His analysis is on the supposed “transcendence” of 
language in Zen, even though many of the texts seek to “articulate what ‘enlightenment 
is.’”393 Wright argues (albeit implicitly) along the same lines as Suzuki regarding the final 
limitations of languages, but goes further than Suzuki when he clarifies the point: “language 
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is taken as an interpolation between the knowing subject and objective reality which 
inevitably causes distortion.”394 However, Wright again asserts the limitation of language in 
that “mediation” is simply not possible when discussing subject-object relationships in Zen 
thought.
395
 Wright goes on to examine the subject-object relationship of Zen thinking in the 
context of deconstruction with the thesis, “Language, and its entire history of involvement in 
thought and practice, functions to set up a context of significance within which perception 
occurs.”396 For Wright, the “context of significance” allows him to connect the idea of Zen as 
seeing things as they really are with an appropriate linguistic articulation because the 
meaning of subjects and objects seemingly dissolve in Zen enlightenment.
397
 The “context of 
significance” paradoxically details the language of enlightenment.398 Even further, Wright 
shows that early Zen texts contain many passages on the exact nature of enlightenment, but 
many later texts resort to the argument that enlightenment is ultimately “ungraspable.”399 
Wright draws the connection in the development of Zen teaching of enlightenment with the 
changing attitudes toward a “context of significance.”400 He even goes as far as to show that 
the development of differing articulations of enlightenment were “full” of language, “as the 
focal point of its evocation and emergence.”401 
 Within the context of Zen enlightenment, Wright emphasizes the necessity of a 
“reorientation of language [that] would require training to a level of fluency in distinctive, 
nonobjectifying, rhetorical practices.”402  The “reorientation,” even reinvention of language, 
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is necessary to capture what is “both actively manifest and presupposed in the constitution of 
this experience.”403 Kasulis goes even further to argue, “words (and the concepts based on 
them) are ultimately empty and to be mistrusted as a medium for fully understanding the 
nature of experience (or of reality).”404 While Zen enlightenment is thoroughly documented 
as something that must be experienced,
405
 descriptions of the experience vary from “sudden” 
to “overpowering” to “breakthrough experience.”406 Additionally, Wright highlights the 
impact of this uncontrollable experience in relation to language: most lucidly, the Zen 
awakening is the “experience of the ‘void’ at the heart of things, as emptiness, openness, 
groundlessness.”407 He draws attention to the paradox that while the experience of Zen 
enlightenment is, by definition, not relational in linguistic terms, it is the emptiness, the void, 
of the experience which gives Zen its language.  Dumoulin offers a cogent interpretation of 
the relationship between enlightenment and language: “The negations are the indispensable 
prerequisite for a breakthrough to the affirmation which arises in the comprehension of 
thusness.”408  In other words, the emptiness of Zen enlightenment is the thoroughgoing 
experience that allows the awakened to talk about things as they really are.   
Though much of the aforementioned literature and analysis describe Zen in ways that 
seem esoteric, distant, and even atemporal, it is important to view the negative language of 
emptiness in terms of time and space.  Winston L. King carefully argues that Zen practice is 
thoroughly grounded in the temporal, in the here-and-now.  He traces this temporal 
perspective back through early Hindu thought because the Zen practitioner “crav[es] for a 
present experience of an absolutely time-transcending awareness, which is the earnest of 
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man’s true and ultimate condition.”409 However, King goes further to clarify that within the 
context of its own tradition, Zen teaches that this experience, the practitioner “seeks a pure 
non-temporal experience within the temporal itself, not apart from it.”410 Dialectically, King 
points to the internal logic of atemporality in the Zen tradition: temporality is redefined as 
atemporality because sheer cyclical time creates an “Absolute,” which is, by definition, 
rejected.
411
 What holds the Zen doctrines of emptiness and enlightenment in the context of 
temporality is the teaching that the experience of both emptiness and enlightenment are 
located in the present time, the here-and-now:  
…Zen seeks to keep both the transcendent and the immanent, the absolute and 
the conditioned, the universal and the particular, the temporal moment and the 





Furthermore, Zen teaches that the “ordinariness” in time and space is what not only brings 
out, but constitutes, satori (understanding).
413
 This “ordinariness” of life may be connected 
with the teaching of dependent origination: “the uniqueness of experiential events does not lie 
in the separable and independent nature but rather lies in the truly dynamically dependent 
nature of things.”414 King goes even further to negate the importance of time, within the 
context of time itself, because “Zen time-transcendence [is]…the existential realization of 
time’s irrelevance, ever and always.”415 However, King draws a careful distinction in this 
negation, because it is applicable to temporality itself, not the further implication of full 
enlightenment: “a satori-awareness that lives fully in the present has the best of both past and 
future values.”416 Zen enlightenment is grounded in current time; transcendence occurs 
                                                             
409 King, “Time Transcendence-Acceptance in Zen Buddhism,” 219.   
410 Ibid. Italics original.   
411 King later reverts back to the aforementioned connection with Hinduism and concludes the Zen tradition 
breaks with a Hindu understanding of temporality because it rejects the cyclical view of time. Ibid. 221. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Inada, “Time and Temporality,” 175.   
415 King, “Time Transcendence-Acceptance in Zen Buddhism,” 223. 
416 Ibid.  224. Italics original. 
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through time: “…[T]his is one of the major marks of Zen ‘orthodoxy’: the experience must 
come suddenly or it is not Zen.”417 King elsewhere calls satori “truth received in its 
instantaneous wholeness.”418 Further, within the context of Zen enlightenment, emptiness 
shows “a crucial difference between the Zen Buddhist’s experience and an outside observer’s 
characterization of it.”419  Though the present tense describes Zen enlightenment in its 
temporal context, it does not adequately affirm the “distinctive breakthrough experience.”420 
King elaborates on the implication of the “mystical” enlightenment experience that is both 
atemporal and empty.
421
 This experience is at once empty insofar as it is “mystical” and yet 
completely “breakthrough” because it does not accept the “false duality in its contrast to 
‘ordinary’ experience.”422 King highlights this paradox when he follows Keiji Nishitani in an 
attempt to reconcile the aforementioned tension between the temporality of the here-and-now 
and the atemporality of the “distinctive breakthrough experience.”  Nishitani elaborates on 
the enlightenment experience as the awareness of emptiness in relation to death because 
“when a man dies to his former-ordinary state of awareness, thus ceasing to live in the 
present as opposed to past and future…he passes to an entirely different level of being.”423 
 What makes a Zen understanding of time paradoxical in relation to enlightenment and 
emptiness is the tension between temporality and atemporality.  In one respect, enlightenment 
happens instantly, at once within time and yet, by definition, outside of time.  But the true 
tension here is in the proper understanding of emptiness as it applies to this context.  It is 
emptiness that shows how Zen enlightenment can be simultaneously temporal and atemporal 
because, as King shows, the “mystical” element transcends normal boundaries of time.  
                                                             
417 Ibid. 225.  
418 King, “A Comparison of Theravada and Zen Buddhist Meditational Methods and Goals,” 304. 
419 Kasulis, Zen Action / Zen Person, 130. 
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Emptiness is the catalyst by which elements of temporality and atemporality affirm the Zen 
experience of enlightenment through the absolute negation of contextualization and 
simultaneous affirmation of a temporally-conditioned experience outside of absolute time; 
this reveals the internal logic that King uses to assert that the atemporal enlightenment 
experience within temporality.   
c. Emptiness and Enlightenment 
 To quickly sum, negative language plays an important role in describing 
enlightenment, namely because any real enlightenment is indescribable.  Negative language 
allows for a description whereby things fall away, one’s conditioned existence is seen, and 
liberation is realized.  The Zen tradition launches particularly apt criticisms against earlier 
traditions; Zen enlightenment differs from earlier descriptions primarily in terms of 
(a)temporality.  While enlightenment in earlier traditions is described as realizing non-
substantiality, seeing the emptiness in all things, Zen descriptions are much more time-
conditioned, as something that occurs suddenly and fleetingly.  This is an important 
distinction in how negative language is used to describe enlightenment.   
IV. Conclusion: Negativity in Buddhist Emptiness 
 What is attempted above is a filling out of a model of Buddhist emptiness within the 
particular context of negative language; indeed, the language of emptiness pivots on negative 
language.  There are three main functions of negative language in terms of emptiness: 
negative language strips away falsities, forces the boundaries of language of particular 
teachings, and operates as an internal logic in Buddhism.  More specifically, negativity strips 
away falsities and exposes delusion; this is described at length above in the categories of 
liberation, rejection of reification, non-duality, and enlightenment.  Negative language shows 
how emptiness informs each of these key teachings in Buddhism: that is accomplished 
through forcing the boundaries of language and as showing the internal logic within 
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Buddhism.  Firstly, within each of the four listed categories, emptiness exposes the delusion, 
and thus suffering caused, of each category; additionally, emptiness also shows the “way out” 
for each category; this is accomplished through the process of negating delusion.  Secondly, 
and more implicitly, emptiness “operates” as an internal logic to Buddhism, informing some 
of its most ancient and profound teachings.  Negative language helps bring this out 
succinctly: emptiness is not only a vehicle to insight as to the true nature of things, but also to 
liberation from delusion and falsity.   
 There is something more, though, that does not fit the framework suggested above: 
writing/describing/inscribing emptiness is philosophically paradoxical because it is 
attempting to write that which is fundamentally negative, and, thus, impossible.  Though the 
above analyses attempt to find a synthesis of how three major traditions within Buddhism 
view emptiness, the analyses are informed more by difference than by similarity. Admittedly, 
this may be due to internal reforms and development over long periods of time, but there is 
something fundamentally different in how negative language (in)forms emptiness.  As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the distinction between difference and différance helps further 
how the analysis needs a new language of emptiness.   
 A further problem persists, too: as briefly noted above, the language of Buddhist 
emptiness denotes the metaphysical problem of absence of independent substance.  If 
emptiness shows how the internal logic of Buddhism is to expose delusion and falsity, then 
there is something especially relevant with the metaphysics of absence: whether it is the 
absence of unconditioned substance or emptiness itself, absence is a major consideration in 
Buddhist emptiness.  Chapter Four attempts to take the consideration of difference/différance 
coupled with the problem of the metaphysics of absence to further examine the negative 





Apophatic Christian Thought: An Examination of Negative Language in Meister 
Eckhart 
I. Introduction 
 As Buddhist emptiness was contextualized in its own terms in the preceding chapter, 
this chapter, too, is a contextualization of negativity in the Christian tradition in its own 
terms.  Though an examination of negativity in a Christian context may well be addressed 
through many facets of historical theology, the selected prism is through that of the apophatic 
tradition, however loosely framed.  The intent here is to provide a bit of historical grounding 
in how negative language shaped apophatic theology, and then a more specific analysis 
through the work of Meister Eckhart.  The outcome of such an analysis is a further context of 
how negative language might be used later in Derridean deconstruction.  
A. Contexts 
 In the history of Christian thought, apophatic theology plays an especially critical 
function where language is concerned.  Like the apophatic literary device in philosophical 
discussion, Christian apophatic theology focuses upon the precision of language to denote 
that which cannot be positively (cataphatically) stated.  Herein lays a central problem with 
apophatic theory: at some point language, paradoxically expressed in negation, breaks down; 
the question is if it is possible to press beyond that breakdown?  At its best, apophaticism 
strips language of its assumptive nature and attempts to express ideas in paradox.   
 Like the preceding analyses above, this section attempts to explore Christian 
emptiness specifically through the lens of apophatic theology; furthermore, the analysis of 
Christian emptiness is methodologically similar to the analysis of Buddhist emptiness 
because negation, through questions of apophatic language, helps build a cross-section of the 





 what is attempted here is an exploration of the linguistic inner logic of 
apophatic theology as it applies to Christian emptiness.  More specifically, this is 
accomplished through the framing of apophaticism with reference to Meister Eckhart.  While 
the methodology of this section is cross-sectional in intent, the focus is particular themes in 
Eckhart’s apophaticism; it requires much analysis to approach these nuanced and complex 
themes.  Thus, the cross-sectional approach seeks to ground the focus of the analysis, an 
exploration of Meister Eckhart’s apophaticism in relation to emptiness, within the context of 
a larger discussion of Christian emptiness. 
B. Apophatic (Non)Logic 
 As apophatic inquiry is certainly not limited to Christianity, the methodological 
questions of its relevance help sort through a particular logic of negativity.  The cross-section 
of apophatic theology in a Christian context helps establish if there is an inner logic to 
negative language and methodology where specific questions regarding emptiness are 
concerned.  In a sense, the logic of apophaticism would have to be a “non-logic” because 
negativity demands a nuance of expression that would immediately cancel any affirmation of 
a seemingly cataphatic “logic.” If there is an inner logic to apophaticism, it must remain fluid 
and in constant “motion” as a semantic expression.  Michael Sells details this: “It is through a 
continual movement of dual propositions that meaning is generated.  Once the movement 
stops, the mind is trapped in the false signification of the last single proposition.”425 
Furthermore, the inherent paradoxes that occur in any in-depth discussion of apophaticism 
detail a highly-nuanced and nearly unintelligible logic of expression: this is exactly where the 
“logic” or “non-logic” of apophatic theology is the most compelling because statements 
                                                             
424 While an attempt at a full reconstruction and analysis would be fruitful to an overall context, time and space 
compels the necessity of presenting a cross-section of the tradition as it applies to emptiness through 
apophaticism.   
425 Michael Sells, “Apophasis in Plotinus: A Critical Approach,” The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 78, no. 
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remain in “motion,” or as Sells calls “...the attempt to find a meaningful formulation of 
transcendence that leads ineluctably to statements of radical immanence.”426 
 Within the logic (or non-logic) of apophaticism, dialectical expression attempts a 
compelling argument because affirmation and negation are linguistic struggles within the text 
to express something with more authenticity than simple cataphatic expressions.  The 
influence of dialectical logic forms the root of the apophatic model of expression because it 
sets the language in perpetual motion.  The point of dialectical meaning is applied to the 
below analysis, as the role of apophaticism within the context of Christian theology helps set 
language of emptiness and negativity into a sort of motion.  The larger context of exploring 
the logic (or non-logic) of apophaticism in regards to emptiness and negativity in the 
Christian tradition is to explore the possible comparative tools within a moving, fluid 
language.  Thus, religious language, at least as it applies to specific religious contexts, tries to 
express something more authentic in apophaticism.
427
   
II. Meister Eckhart and Apophatic Theology: Nothingness in Negation, Unicity, and 
Detachment 
 
 Through the broader context of examining apophatic language and emptiness in 
Christian theology certainly takes on a plethora of thinkers, perhaps Meister Eckhart gives a 
thoroughgoing analysis of how emptiness may be contextualized and framed in an analytical 
manner.  The three specific themes  of unicity, negation, and detachment are meant to delimit 
how Eckhart’s apophaticism plays into a more general context of negative language and its 
further comparative value; the purpose is to take seriously a conclusion set forth by Davies: 
“...language itself, which (as Eckhart knows) is a fundamental part of the problem.  Language 
                                                             
426 Ibid.  
427 It is important to note here that apophaticism includes not only discussion about the nature of God, but also 
about the world itself. In the logic of viewing creation as a disclosure of the Creator, apophaticism works 
through the logic of the relationship of the Creator to creation.   
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mediates the world to us with all its finiteness in space and time...But if language is the 
obstacle, it is also paradoxically the place of our redemption.”428 
A. Medieval Apophatic Theology: Toward a Definition 
 From the outset it must be stated that defining apophaticism is quite problematical 
because the implications drawn from apophatic thought extend well beyond negation.  As 
indicated above, the preliminary implication of apophatic thought is the affirmation of a 
doctrine that is possible only through negation; further, it is helpful at this point to ask if 
negation not only provides the possibility of an affirmation, but also frames the question in a 
way that inherently shapes the outcome of the affirmation.
429
 Indeed, this question provides 
the necessary back-drop to the idea of experiential negation.   
 Contemporary scholars point well beyond the simplicity of negation to affirm the 
implications of radical negation as defined experientially. Denys Turner suggests that a 
further distinction is needed in what he calls “apophatic anthropology.” He proposes this 
distinction because influential medieval thinkers,  
deny that I am “a self”; or at least, they appear to say that whatever may the 
proper description of the fullest union of the human self with God, there is no 





Turner’s reading of many influential medieval thinkers leads him to suggest “apophatic 
anthropology” clarifies the meaning behind apophatic thought: that, inevitably, when one 
discusses the negation of God and the negation of the “self,” one is radically bringing the two 
together in a way that transcends immediate intimacy.  Turner’s reading of Augustine fully 
integrates this idea of intrinsic intimacy where “God is not to be sought outside the self, for 
                                                             
428 Eckhart, Selected Writings, xxxv.  
429 Denys Turner alludes to this possibility: “Perhaps there is something to be learned from that Christian 
theological tradition which consciously organized a strategy of disarrangement as a way of life, as being that in 
which alone God is to be found.” Turner, The Darkness of God, 8. Italics original.  
430 Ibid. 6. Italics original. 
135 
 
God is already there ‘within’, eternally more intimate to me than I am to myself.”431 Another 
way to examine this point is, as Davies elucidates, that “God is already present to us in the 
way we know the world.”432 Hence apophatic logic tends to suggest a very intimate 
relationship between the divine mystery and the individual self.   
 Though apophatic theology is certainly not confined to the medieval era, the historical 
connection with philosophical negation cannot be understated.  Indeed, the eleventh, twelfth, 
and thirteenth centuries brought about many shifts in philosophical and theological practice, 
in particular “[j]ust as the twelfth century clearly distinguishes the liberal arts from 
philosophy, so it established a complete separation between philosophy and theology.”433 The 
significance of the careful distinction between philosophical and theological goals is 
important because during this period, philosophy was “reduced…to the rank of a vassal and a 
serf of theology.”434  There is convincing evidence of this departure and distinction as early 
as the ninth century.
435
 Furthermore, moving into the fourteenth century, theological inquiry 
was becoming more “concentrated” and “austere”: “it was a time of controversy when the 
major positions had been laid out, Realist and Nominalist, Thomist and Scotist, Dominican 
and Franciscan, and free theological debate was often reduced to narrow-minded, party-
political bickering.”436 
 The importance of raising such a distinction is important, not only “for they differ in 
the aim pursued (sunt ad aliud), the processes (per aliud), the methods (secundum aliud),”437 
but also because the implications of the internal logic of negation go so far as to imply that 
the God of philosophy remains abstract and the God of theology is grounded in the Christian 
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 Rather, this distinction is later clarified in the thirteenth century by 
Thomas Aquinas when he said, “If theology borrows from philosophy, it is not because it 
needs its help, but to place in a livelier light the truths it teaches.”439 The establishment of 
clear motives of theological inquiry by the late medieval era is important to the implications 
of apophaticism.  Namely, when the “mystical” thought of Eckhart is examined, the motives 
differ where they are grounded in theological inquiry.  Furthermore, it is argued below that 
the linguistic ideas behind apophatic thought are indeed dependent on philosophical 
frameworks.  Bernard McGinn argues, “the goal of the mystic path, be it union with God, the 
universe, or some form of transformation or annihilation of our present condition, is beyond 
the power of human concepts or speech to describe.”440 What is attempted here is a 
construction of frameworks to analyze the shape and function of philosophical language as it 
may be applied conceptually in apophaticism. 
B. Meister Eckhart and Apophaticism 
 In a preliminary examination of Meister Eckhart’s thought, it becomes evident that 
Eckhart was willing to push the logical limits of apophatic language.  Indeed, John 
Macquarrie says that Eckhart’s writing was “sometimes careless,” and other sections of his 
work were clouded with “vagueness and ambiguity.”441 Eckhart’s writings challenged the 
accepted orthodox teachings of the medieval church
442
 because, as Macquarrie alleges, “Like 
other mystics, Eckhart tried to do justice to both the transcendence of God over creation, and 
his immanence in it…and seemed to verge on pantheism and to obscuring the distinction 
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137 
 
between God and human beings…”443 Davies takes issue with such a reading of Eckhart, 
noting that “Meister Eckhart, it seems, is all things to all people.”444 Davies goes on to argue 
that Eckhart remains within the tradition, especially “within the Dominican tradition of 
sharing the fruits of contemplatio,” albeit in a provocative way.445 Furthermore, Davies 
grounds his analysis in how “Eckhart’s thinking centres on the concept of God as a form of 
knowing self-reflection, which flows out of itself and floods back into itself as the divine 
Word.”446  Elsewhere, Davies argues, it “...is not that he was introducing new teachings 
which were either different or superior to the doctrines of the Catholic Church, but rather that 
he was within the orthodox tradition and was being misunderstood.  If his accusers charged 
Eckhart with heresy, then he charged them with stupidity.”447  This tension is exactly where 
the analysis of Eckhart’s work is most beneficial because themes like unity, negation, and 
detachment not only inform his writings, but also drive his theology in its epistemological 
claims of God.   
 Eckhart is often referred to as a “mystic” due to these internal textual tensions that 
lend credence to a real “experience” of God.  While the term “mystic” is most certainly 
loaded with meaning, perhaps the best working definition (and indeed the spirit to which this 
term refers here, though the argument rests less with a definition of mysticism and more with 
an understanding of what he was referred to after his lifetime) is proposed by Davies: “...we 
will not go far wrong if we take it as meaning an experience of God...a sense within the 
human person that a transcendent and divine being or power is immediately present to him or 
                                                             
443 Macquarrie, Two Worlds Are Ours, 137.  
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her.”448 Thus, when Eckhart is referred to as a “mystic” it is meant with the historical 
intelligibility that Eckhart believed he had an intimately close experience of God.
449
   
 The historical significance of Eckhart is important to highlight because, as Davies 
lucidly argues, “[t]he bare fact that such [biographical] information is recoverable is in itself 
significant, and is indication of Eckhart’s standing within society of his day, and to the degree 
to which he influenced it.”450 Davies rightly points to a historical criterion that argues 
Eckhart’s importance on the simple fact that his life and writings exist contemporaneously.  
The preservation of his German and Latin texts, coupled with the voluminous secondary texts 
that reflect on Eckhart’s ideas, strongly advocate the validity and significance of Eckhart’s 
influence upon the Christian tradition.  
 For Eckhart, the logical extreme of the apophatic model was found in the hiddenness 
of God.  Treatment of the theme of nothingness is central to his thought: the hiddenness of 
God, expressed in themes like nothingness, negation, and detachment, is the fullness of the 
Godhead, or for Eckhart, the negation of negation.  Specifically, the apophatic method of 
Eckhart “aims specifically to transcend images and to enter the ‘darkness’ and the 
‘nothingness’ of the Godhead itself in a journey which leads the soul to the shedding of all 
that is superfluous, contrary or unequal to God as he is in his most essential Being.”451 These 
themes are examined in light of Eckhart’s dependence upon Neoplatonic negation.  As 
Davies highlights, “The soul follows a path of systematic negation of all which is not God, 
which eventually leads to a place in which it encounters God in an unknowable manner, in 
                                                             
448 Davies, God Within, 1. Italics original. More specifically, and perhaps this is reflected in this analysis, Davies 
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ecstasy and in love.”452 This philosophical backdrop is important to note because it frames 
the context of the analysis of the above themes.
453
 Even as Eckhart is often referred to as a 
mystic, the categories of such a designation are beyond the scope of this study; rather, for 
these purposes, it is more precise to look at his texts in the scope of nothingness, as they 
specifically relate to unicity, negation, and detachment.  
C. Eckhart’s Themes of Nothingness  
1. Introduction 
 The initial question that might be posed of Eckhart’s thinking has to do with the 
official condemnation of his teachings.
454
 While it is readily acknowledged that Eckhart’s 
ideas were challenging to orthodox doctrines, his historical veracity and relevance in the 
context of Christian apophaticism is demonstrable with the lens of negation and how his 
thought influenced later thinkers. As Davies highlights, a careful reading of Eckhart exposes 
a group of ideas that are “shot through with what are apparent contradictions and 
paradoxes.”455 Davies uses this point to argue Eckhart’s significance: “his thought, the heart 
of his work, is not a static but a dynamic one.”456 One of Eckhart’s most dynamic concepts is 
his appropriation of nothingness.  Arguing that Eckhart’s proposition “conforms entirely to 
classical theses,”457 Reiner Schürmann positions Eckhart’s conclusions squarely in the 
concept of nothingness: “All that is created in itself is nothing…He then who loves the 
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creature, loves nothingness and becomes himself nothingness.”458 His explanation of 
Eckhart’s concept of nothingness centers on a highly nuanced interpretation: “The created in 
itself is nothingness: what deserves attention in creatures is the origin of the gift, which is 
greater than its term.”459 The “origin” that Schürmann discusses in his explanation gets closer 
to Eckhart’s understanding of creation-as-nothingness: creation, itself, is inherently empty of 
its own existence; rather, what is behind creation “exists” in the proper sense.  Beverly 
Lanzetta describes this idea of nothingness as “the verdant flowing of life itself – free from 
category, metaphysics, ontology, and so forth.”460  However, the category of nothingness 
means much more to an explanation of Eckhart’s theological propositions; arguably, 
nothingness shapes and centers his inquiry.  Three themes of nothingness, namely negation, 
unicity, and detachment, are informed by Eckhart’s understanding of nothingness.  What is 
discussed below is how these themes of nothingness contribute to a greater understanding of 
apophatic theology in terms of negative language.
461
   
2. Negation 
 Eckhart appeals to negation to approach speaking the unspeakable; negation is 
expressed most concretely in Eckhart’s assertion of the otherness of God in moving, 
paradoxical language. The importance here is specifically outlined as the shape and function 
of Eckhart’s use of negative language; what is attempted here is an elucidation of his negative 
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language as it applies to nothingness and the absolute otherness of God.  Nothingness
462
 as an 
apophatic category functions within Eckhart’s language of God in a way that he calls God 
“nothing created,”463 “empty and free in himself,”464 “being beyond being: he is a 
nothingness beyond being.”465 David Linge helps clarify this: “God is not being at all in any 
formal sense since he is the cause of being.  As causes stand beyond their effects, God must 
be regarded as beyond being.”466  Eckhart’s terms fit squarely in apophatic theology insofar 
as they set God completely apart from all notions of being; the further implications of this 
extend to createdness: “All created things are nothingness, but this is remote from and alien 
to all createdness.”467 Further, what allows Eckhart to probe deeper in the unspeakable-ness 
of God’s absolute otherness is his appeal to the negation of the self:  
When the soul enters the light that is pure, she falls so far from her own 
created somethingness into her nothingness that in this nothingness she can no 
longer return to that created somethingness by her own power.  But God 
places himself with his uncreatedness beneath her nothingness and contains 
the soul in his somethingness.  The soul has dared to become nothing and 
cannot return to herself by her own power – so far has she gone out of herself 




McGinn highlights the significance of this shift in language: “But when esse is understood 
transcendentally, that is, as signifying the reality of God and cosignfying the nothingness of 
creatures, it is legitimately affirmed of the ineffable God.”469 This paradox further delineates 
the otherness of God in the roll of the will, both in the volition of God and of creatures; a 
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465 Meister Eckhart, Renovamini spiritu (Eph. 4:23); DW 83; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 236.  
466 David E. Linge, “Mysticism, Poverty and Reason in the Thought of Meister Eckhart,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion, vol. 46, no. 4 (December 1978): 471. Italics original.  
467 Meister Eckhart, Qui audit me non confundetur (Ecclus. 24:30); DW 12; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 
177.  
468 Meister Eckhart, Intravit Jesus in templum et coepit eicere vendentes et ementes (Matt. 21:12); DW 1; Oliver 
Davies, Selected Writings, 156.  
469 McGinn, “The God Beyond God,” 7. Italics original.  
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further example of this moving language is extended in Eckhart’s appropriation of the will: 
“...God must enter into us; for when someone wills nothing for themselves, then God must 
will on their behalf just as he does for himself.”470 Davies asserts that in this “Eckhart plays 
upon the image of the emptiness of humility as an anticipation of the fulness of God’s 
presence.”471  
 The volition of God connects back with Eckhart’s understanding of the delineation 
between existence and nothingness: “What God loves, has existence, while what God does 
not love, has no existence...”472 This culminates in a moving apophatic language within 
Eckhart’s thought: “But with God there is a negation of negation: he is one and negates all 
else, since there is nothing outside God.”473 The otherness of God and the dependence of 
creation upon the being of God are highlighted here in Eckhart’s apophaticism: the negation 
of negation sets up the category for paradoxical existence because “...if God took back what 
is his, all creatures would fall into nothingness.”474 Davies helps clarify this important aspect 
of Eckhart’s thought: “His meaning is not that God exists while creatures do not exist, but 
that the existence of creatures is given them immediately by God, that it still remains in God, 
and that creatures have no existence other than this.”475  This paradoxical existence allows 
Eckhart to assert the absolute freedom of God in relation to creation as a condition of 
“receptivity.”476 Hence, Eckhart’s language of negation, at least in terms of apophaticism, is 
focused heavily upon asserting the absolute otherness of God in relation to creation. Davies 
suggests that the “opposition” found in Eckhart’s purposely paradoxical language is “brought 
                                                             
470 Meister Eckhart, The Talks of Instruction, On True Obedience; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 3. 
471 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 168.  
472 Meister Eckhart, The Book of Divine Consolation; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 92. Or, put differently: 
“Outside God there is only nothingness.” Meister Eckhart, Unus deus et pater omnium (Eph. 4:6); DW 21; 
Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 180.  
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(Luke 10:38); DW 86; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 199.  
475 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 105. 
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into collision” to “communicat[e]...a transcendent truth.”477  To this end, Eckhart often 
wrestles squarely with the problem of being and nothingness and how this relates to God;
478
 
indeed, his reading of Matthew 23:12 leads him to conclude, “For our entire being is founded 
purely on a process of becoming nothingness.”479 Beverly Lanzetta argues that this is the 
radical moment in Eckhart’s language of nothingness: “...he uncovers the road to liberation 
by going through the metaphysics of Being to the point (or breakthrough) where Being itself 
ceases to be (or unbecomes) in the ground and fount of divinity – the womb of 
nothingness.”480 
 Eckhart’s usage of negative language connotes an important aspect in his 
apophaticism: the dynamics of how negativity impacts his paradoxical expression is driven 
by a further concept – detachment.  Detachment allows Eckhart to further expand his 
understanding of the otherness of God apophatically because it sets up the conditions for how 
Eckhart’s language moves within the concept of being.   
3. Detachment 
 Eckhart uses the term Abegeschiedenheit, or “detachment,” as a key apophatic 
concept to attempt further insight into speaking the unspeakable.  What follows is a brief 
examination of how Abegeschiedenheit features in Eckhart’s apophaticism; namely what is 
examined here is the function of how the language of detachment further leads to one of 
Eckhart’s major themes: unicity.   
                                                             
477 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 192.  
478 Kieckhefer denotes this point specifically when he calls Eckhart’s “negative theology...[that] in which one 
stands in total receptivity to being or God.” Richard Kieckhefer, “Meister Eckhart’s Conception of Union with 
God,” The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 71, no. 3/4, (July-October 1978): 219.  
479 Meister Eckhart, The Talks of Instruction, On Inner and Outer Works; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 46.   
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 In the most general sense, detachment for Eckhart means “that we should become free 
of ourselves and of all things.”481 This is held in paradox, though, because the ultimate goal 
of humanity is “that we should become wonderfully united with him.”482 Davies highlights 
the significance of Eckhart’s meaning of detachment: “true detachment means the spirit 
should transcend the created dimension.”483  The purpose of Eckhart’s Abegeschiedenheit is 
paradoxical: detachment from one’s self is necessary for unity with God. McGinn brings out 
this paradox more fully: “...the dynamic relation between God and creation must be grounded 
in the inner dynamism of the divine nature itself.”484  When this occurs, “...they are inwardly 
detached from the world and are in-formed by the love presence of their God.”485 This is 
accomplished through the volition of the self created in God’s image;486 the important note, 
though, is made with Eckhart’s connection between detachment and negation: 
We must train ourselves in self-abandonment until we retain nothing of our 
own.  All turbulence and unrest comes from self-will, whether we realize it or 
not.  We should establish ourselves together with all that we might wish or 
desire in all things, in the best and most precious will of God through a pure 




Something of the self, something of the individual volition (though created in the image of 
God), must be negated in order that detachment might be possible. This is no easy task; 
indeed Eckhart warns, “all suffering comes from attachment and affection.”488 Indeed, 
Eckhart goes so far with this language of negation as to suggest that “they should be so 
accustomed to being dead to themselves, stripped of their own form in God and transformed 
                                                             
481 Meister Eckhart, Misit dominus manum suam et tetigit os meum et dixit mihi, etc. Ecce constitui te super 
gentes et regna (Jer. 1:9, 10); DW 53; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 127. 
482 Ibid.  
483 Meister Eckhart, Intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum et mulier quaedam, Martha nomine, excepit illum in 
domum suam (Luke 10:38); DW 2; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 163.  
484 McGinn, “The God Beyond God,” 14.  
485 Meister Eckhart, The Talks of Instruction, On Detachment and Possessing God; Oliver Davies, Selected 
Writings, 11.  
486 “...the revealing of God’s image within us makes us like God, for through this image we are like God’s 
image, which God is according to his naked essence.” Meister Eckhart, Manete in me (John 15:4), Beatus vir 
qui in sapientia morabitur (Ecclus. 14:22); DW 40; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 150.  
487 Meister Eckhart, The Talks of Instruction, On Spiritual Endeavour; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 42.  
488 Meister Eckhart, The Book of Divine Consolation; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings,  61.  
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in God’s will.”489 Eckhart’s appeal to negation to explain detachment takes on other variant 
forms, too: “...if God is to make something of you or in you, then you must first become 
nothingness.”490 Davies makes careful note of Eckhart’s meaning here: “Eckhart speaks of 
our self-emptying less in terms of a metaphysical detachment as such but rather in the more 
moral terms of a classical humility.”491  This is approached in two ways: to forsake one’s self 
and to forsake God.  Eckhart’s language uses negation specifically in both points, “If the 
spirit were to know its own pure state of detachment, then it would not be able to incline to 
any thing but would remain in its own detached state...no one can understand my words or 
my teaching unless they have first forsaken themselves.”492 In the latter point, Eckhart’s 
apophaticism extends so far as to forsake God: “Therefore we ask God to free us from ‘God’ 
so that we may be able to grasp and eternally enjoy truth...”493 Eckhart’s radical apophaticism 
emphasizes the complete detachment of the self, or more cogently, the dispelling of the 
allusion that the self may have independent volition from God.  Weeks centers on the 
“...sacrifice which, to his listeners, meant nothing than accepting eternal loss.”494 The 
meaning of the paradox is not lost in the interpretation of Eckhart’s apophaticism: indeed, 
what Eckhart was pushing toward in his theology was the complete loss of an idol of God; as 
Lanzetta grapples with this meaning, “...precisely from the gift of radical detachment in 
                                                             
489 Meister Eckhart, The Book of Divine Consolation; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings,  64. While Eckhart’s 
language is certainly strongly-worded here, it is important to note that he makes explicit reference to Paul’s 
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Davies, Selected Writings, 145.  
491 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 167.  
492 Meister Eckhart, In diebus suis placuit deo et inventus est iustus (cf. Eccles. 44:16-17); DW 10; Oliver 
Davies, Selected Writings, 173.  
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which the Godhead reveals itself as the source and ground of the ultimate Gelassenheit – 
‘that’ which draws the soul into its own indistinction and nothingness.”495 
 Detachment is firmly grounded in negation because Eckhart says the detached person 
has “a pure heart” because it is “detached from all creatures...all creatures are a pure 
nothingness.”496 Davies clarifies this point: “The Eckhartian state of detachment in the world 
is one of complete self-abandonment, in which the giving up of the ego, of the sense of self, 
and the giving up of the sense of possession, are one.”497  Kieckhefer explains this concept 
differently: “...Eckhart speaks of a soul as rapt into eternity (gezücket in êwicheit), so that no 
transitory object can move it, it perceives nothing that is corporeal, and it takes no pleasure in 
worldly things.”498  The “purity of heart” is necessary for unification with God,499 though 
Eckhart’s apophaticism holds this purity of detachment with forsaking God in parallel 
tension.  This tension sets up a paradox in his thought: 
The soul must exist in a free nothingness.  That we should forsake God is 
altogether what God intends, for as long as the soul has God, knows God and 
is aware of God, she is far from God.  This then is God’s desire – that God 
should reduce himself to nothing in the soul so that the soul may lose 
herself...as she lost her createdness, God remained for himself as he is.  And 
this is the greatest honour that the soul can pay to God, to leave God to 




Davies unpacks the dense meaning of the apophatic language at play: “detachment is at once 
our likeness to God, it is the state of our creaturely nothingness, it is our resignation to God’s 
will...Detachment, for Eckhart, is the kind of living in the world which results from the birth 
of God in the soul and the actualization of the God-like essence within us.”501   
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a. Annihilation and Detachment 
 Detachment, then, is a deeply revealing mode of paradoxical being and non-being 
because the soul is detached from the individual identity and ready for the “grace” of God.  
The self is annihilated purposely because it is “an ego-less form of being in which our normal 
self-centered concerns are released in a state of profound equanimity and detachment.”502 
Kieckhefer highlights Eckhart’s thinking that the “soul has fallen ‘into nothingness’ (nihtes 
niht), and cannot return to its ‘created something’ without divine help.”503 Kieckhefer goes on 
to argue that, according to a careful reading of Eckhart, individual identity is not lost in 
annihilation, “that among spiritual beings it is possible for two individuals to be united in 
such a way that one is absorbed into the other, while both are preserved.”504 This is not 
without paradox, as Davies highlights: “[detachment] embraces the sense of non-being which 
results from our containment in the Godhead, who is beyond being.”505 Robert Dobie’s 
analysis of one of Eckhart’s most radical arguments is worth quoting at length: 
God is being transcending both being and nothingness.  This means that even 
God must cease being a god, that is, a “this,” and must divest God’s self of all 
God’s properties (Eigenschaften) as a “this” and unite God’s self to me and 
my “is-ness” if God is truly and really to be God and know God’s self as God 
just as much as I must divest myself of all creatureliness and unite myself to 





Furthermore, the logic of such an affirmation through the negation of negation is quite 
startling: “human nature in its purity is nothing other than the divine nature itself.  For 
existence or “is-ness” is God; and to the degree that we live out of our very own “is-ness,” we 
                                                             
502 Davies, God Within, 59. He clarifies this point further by stating that Eckhart’s logical conclusion can be 
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live out of God’s “is-ness.”507 Through detachment, then, this negation of negation actualizes 
because in it “God is not only the presupposition of all thought but also the precondition for 
all genuine freedom and authentic selfhood.”508 For Eckhart, disinterest is the mode by which 
detachment becomes manifest: “Disinterest is best of all, for by it the soul is unified, 
knowledge is made pure, the heart is kindled, the spirit wakened, the desires quickened, the 
virtues enhanced.”509 Detachment allows for the “purity of existential affirmation” because 
the negation of negation is the strongest, most authentic, affirmation of God.
510
 Macquarrie 
reasons that the affirmation of God is strong in negation because, “If God were always clearly 
manifest, there would be no need to seek him, and the quest for God would come to an end; if 
he were always absent, we would give up the quest through discouragement.”511 Weeks 
further clarifies: “The annihilation of time, place, and number as qualifiers in the divine 
knowledge has as its corollary this identity of human subject and divine object.”512 
 Eckhart’s language of detachment plays a vital role in understanding the scope of his 
theology; indeed, Eckhart’s language points to the concept of unicity.  Detachment, wherein 
the self is completely lost in God, leads to unicity with God.  Eckhart’s language within the 
apophatic movements spells out this loss of self, the loss of ego, and further unity with the 
unicity that is God.   
4. Unicity 
 If there is one concept that brings together Eckhartian thought, it would be the idea of 
the Einheitsmetaphysik, or (contextually) the unicity of God.  Concepts like nothingness, 
negation, and detachment help build the apophatic model to grasp Eckhart’s language of 
                                                             
507 Ibid. 584.  
508 Ibid. 585.  
509 Meister Eckhart, “About Disinterest,” in German Mystical Writings, ed. Karen Campbell (New York: 
Continuum, 1991), 91. 
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unicity. When he phrases statements like, “God is a word: an unspoken word,”513 Eckhart is 
getting closer to his apophatic concept of unicity in God. Elsewhere: “Only God flows into all 
things, their very essences.  Nothing else flows into something else.  God is in the innermost 
part of each and every thing, only in its innermost part, and he alone is one.”514 Further, the 
relationship with humanity is also one of unicity: “He never gave anything to God, nor did he 
ever receive anything from God; rather there is a single oneness here, a pure union.”515 Unity 
with God, though, is paradoxical, because it requires being nothingness: “You should sink 
your ‘being-you’ into his ‘being-him,’ and your ‘you’ and his ‘him’ should become a single 
‘me’ so that with him you shall know in eternity his unbecome ‘isness’ and his unnameable 
‘nothingness.’”516 What is attempted here is an examination of Eckhart’s unicity with direct 
reference to the form and function of his language.  In order to examine Eckhart’s language 
of unicity, two approaches are taken: one deals with the unicity of God within God’s own self 
and the other deals with humanity and the goal of unity with God.   
a. Unicity and God 
 Eckhart’s idea of the unicity of God is defined by his insistence that God is 
completely “one” in God’s own self and, further, that speaking of God is best done through 
speaking denials.  Eckhart’s language in describing God is often apophatic insofar as he 
asserts the “simple ground, to the still desert, into which distinction never peeped, neither 
Father, Son, nor Holy Spirit.”517 Apophaticism is linked solidly with his concept of the “One” 
because he uses language like, “Everything which is multiple depends upon the One, but the 
                                                             
513 Meister Eckhart, Misit dominus manum suam et tetigit os meum et dixit mihi, etc., Ecce constitui te super 
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One depends upon nothing.”518 This One is separated with negative language with what 
Eckhart calls the “Godhead.”  The Godhead is a further negation of “God” to clarify that 
absolute unity – and consequent nothingness – of God: “All that is in the Godhead is One, 
and of this no one can speak.  God acts, while the Godhead does not act.  There is nothing for 
it to do, for there is no action in it...The difference between God and Godhead is that one acts 
and other does not.”519 Eckhart’s term, Gottheit (Godhead), denotes a further negative aspect 
of God: “Eckhart uses the term Godhead (Gottheit) to refer to God as he is in himself, in the 
stillness and hiddenness of his own unity, and term God (Gott) to refer to the divine nature in 
its activity and relatedness.”520 This clarification in language is essential to Eckhart’s 
understanding of unicity because “...God contains all things in himself in fullness; therefore 
God seeks nothing beyond himself but seeks something only in the fullness in which it 
already exists within himself. And no creature can comprehend anything as it exists in 
God.”521 McGinn’s reading of Eckhart casts warning upon making explicit use of Eckhart’s 
concepts where unity is concerned: “From the standpoint of...negation, neither Trinity nor 
Unity are fully adequate terms to give knowledge of a God who is ‘one without unity and 
three without trinity.’”522 
 The metaphors Eckhart uses to express the differences between Gott and Gottheit are 
purposeful; as Linge explains, “[b]eyond all names, beyond goodness, truth or being, the 
Godhead is the Abgrund, the abyss of deity.  Desert, wilderness, darkness, nothing are all 
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151 
 
terms he uses to point to the Godhead.”523  Eckhart’s Gottheit opens up his apophatic 
language because he is able to approach the unspeakable in his language of paradoxical unity:  
This distinction between the trinitarian God and the hidden unity of the 
Godhead might be interpreted as a breakthrough beyond Christian 
trinitarianism to a form of mystical unitarianism...[f]rom the standpoint 
of…negation, neither Trinity nor Unity are fully adequate terms to give 
knowledge of a God who is ‘one without unity and three without trinity.’524 
 
 Perhaps Eckhart goes the furthest in his apophatic language when he describes the 
absolute unicity of God: “If I say that God is good, then I am adding something to him.  
Oneness on the other hand is a negation of negation and a denial of denial...But with God 
there is a negation of negation: he is one and negates all else, since there is nothing outside 
God...God is one; he is the negation of negation.”525 This idea, the negation of negation, 
approaches a particular limit of apophatic language (a sort of double negative); for Eckhart 
the expression is particularly useful because it both delimits the absolute oneness of God and 
the negation of that which is not God.
526
 Davies explains this further:  
...the phrase ‘negation of negation’ expresses the infinity of God. To define the 
nature of something created is at the same time to say what it is not, while in 
defining the nature of God, the uncreated, we negate the principle of negation 
itself.  The negation of negation thus becomes ‘the purest form of affirmation 
as applied to God.’527  
 
The function of the language, especially as it relates to Gottheit, is the prevention of adding 
attributes to God insofar as God is simply “One.” Davies argues along similar lines: 
“...Eckhart’s clear preference for speaking of God in radically negative terms, so that nothing 
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526 Lanzetta makes note of Eckhart’s movement within the dialectic of the negation of negation: “Eckhart insists 
that absolute negation takes place not only within the soul but also with God itself: God becomes and 
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is ‘added’ to him.”528  This is illustrated through Eckhart’s use of the phrasing, “the whole 
abyss of his Godhead” because it denotes the simplicity of God’s oneness.529 
b. God’s Unicity and Humanity 
 Central to Eckhart’s theology is his understanding of humanity’s unity with the 
unicity of God.  The basic apophatic model revolves around the “empty” soul, “emptier of all 
things she is which are not God, then the more purely she grasps God and does so in him, 
becoming one with God...”530 Eckhart’s specific terminology, or the “ground” (grund) of the 
soul, denotes the special nature of this unity; in other words, the grund of the soul is the 
absolute point of emptiness where God may “enter” the soul.  Eckhart is careful with this 
term, though, because he specifically states, “Only pure Godhead can enter the ground of the 
soul,”531 or that it is the emptiness of God (hence the Gottheit) that meets the empty soul (in 
her grund).  This emptiness is described metaphorically as “poverty” as “God can find no 
place in us then, for with this poverty we attain that which we have eternally been and shall 
for ever remain.  Here God is one with our spirit, and this is poverty in its ultimate form.”532 
Metaphorical poverty is, for Eckhart, the signification of emptiness in the grund of the soul: 
“For God does not intend here to be a place in someone where he can act, but if there is to be 
true poverty of spirit, someone must be so free of God an all his works that if God wishes to 
act in the soul he must himself be the place in which he can act...In this poverty, we attain 
again the eternal being we once enjoyed...”533 In this metaphor, poverty works to illustrate 
how the soul “should be stripped of all things and emptied of them, outside and within...”534  
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529 Meister Eckhart, Qui audit me non confundetur (Ecclus. 24:30); DW 12; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 
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 It is the emptiness of the soul that allows the Gottheit to enter the soul in unicity, and 
then to realize the full implication of the imago dei: “...the revealing of God’s image within 
us makes us like God, for through this image we are like God’s image, which God is 
according to his naked essence.”535 It is this point where Eckhart’s apophaticism is the most 
direct and precise in his use of unicity: “...that between that person and God there is no 
distinction, and they are one”536 and furthermore, that Eckhart’s full expression of unicity is 
expressed: “That is why the whole of Scripture was written and why God created the whole 
world and all the orders of angels: so that God could be born in the soul and the soul in 
God.”537 Turner unpacks this idea further: 
…because God’s esse indistinctum cannot be distinguished from the esse 
distinctum of the created human by any relation of displacement, so that to be 
the one entails not being the other; therefore, my being God, infinite, 
uncreated, “nothing,” cannot be exclusive of my being finite, created, a hoc 




 The progression (if it may be called that) to God’s unicity is, itself, paradoxical.  
Eckhart describes it as a “pathless way, which is free and yet fixed, in which we are raised 
and exalted above ourselves and all things, with neither will nor images, although not yet in 
substantial being.”539 This “pathless way” is apophatically conceived in the negation of all 
things, images, idols, and even God himself.  Eckhart’s vision of unicity means that humanity 
is “like the divine nature; in itself it is one and has nothing in common with anything.”540 For 
                                                             
535 Meister Eckhart, Manete in me (John 15:4), Beatus vir qui in sapientia morabitur (Ecclus. 14:22); DW 40; 
Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 150.  
536 Ibid. 149. Davies explains further: “The Greek patristic tradition which was at least part of Eckhart’s 
inheritance like also to see the character of human nature as being ‘in the image’ of God in relation to Christ, the 
Son, who is himself God’s very Image.” Davies, Meister Eckhart, 128.  
537 Meister Eckhart, In illo tempore missus est angelus Gabriel a deo: ave gratia plena, dominus tecum (Luke 
1:26, 28); DW 38; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 113.  
538 Turner, The Darkness of God, 166.  Italics original. McGinn argues a similar point: “To conceive of God as 
unum is to conceive of him as simultaneously distinct and indistinct, at once immanent and transcendent.” 
McGinn, “The God Beyond God,” 7. 
539 Meister Eckhart, Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum, et mulier quadam, Martha nomine, excepit illum (Luke 
10:38); DW 86; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 197.   
540 Meister Eckhart, Ego elegi vos de mundo (John 15:16); DW 28; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 121.  
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Eckhart, unification with the Godhead is the point of existence and, paradoxically, non-
existence.  For this becoming is really becoming no-thing. 
D. Eckhartian Apophatic Language 
  A close examination of Eckhart’s language is an important lens to approach his 
apophaticism; but, like alongside other interpretations, it is one way to appropriate his 
concepts.  Perhaps what makes Eckhart so engaging to readers so long after his death is his 
peculiar and original approach to language.  The relevance of Eckhart’s theology has, as 
Davies puts it, “the deepest consequences for our daily living.”541 It is something in that 
paradoxical language that contemporary readers find engaging and relevant; the struggle is to 
comprehend his concepts, especially in apophaticism.  In order to come to some 
understanding of Eckhart’s form and function of his language of apophaticism, the concepts 
of negation, detachment, and unicity are examined above.  However, it is important to note 
that these concepts are not well examined as separate entities or ideas.  Rather, they have a 
certain fluidity because they flow in and out of one another, interspersed with many other 
challenging concepts, to form some kind of meaningful approach to nothingness. One 
concept cannot be understood without comprehending other aspects of Eckhart’s thought, and 
additionally, Eckhart’s usage of metaphor, antithesis, dialectic, paradox, and poetic 
expression only complicate possible interpretations.  However, in that same light, those 
elements also make Eckhart’s approach to nothingness through negation, detachment, and 
unicity fluid, engaging, and relevant ideas.     
 Perhaps one area of Eckhart’s thought that allows these linguistic concepts to come 
together is in his concept of the negation of negation.  It is here that his expression comes to 
its full connective veracity. Though the idea of the negation of negation appears in various 
religious traditions and their literatures, perhaps what makes Eckhart’s thinking manifestly 
                                                             
541 Davies, God Within, 57.  
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significant is his juncture between the application of negation with the virtue of detachment 
and the efficacy of unicity.  This means that the disappearance of the self into nothingness 
through detachment exposes the inner-dynamism of the human soul and its connection with 
the divine.  Though Eckhart appears cautious of existential language, and perhaps even more 
so of language relating to nothingness, his affirmation of the divine mystery of the Godhead 
points the trajectory of nothingness toward emphatic emptiness.  The connective power rests 
in how this juncture culminates in the efficaciousness of his language to express the radical 
transcendence of God in negation. This transcendence is expressed in different ways in 
negation, detachment, and unicity; the negation of negation shifts this language into a 
comparative mode insofar as it allows Eckhart to convey the otherness – and yet entirely 
intimate – nature of a God who defies cataphatic description.  The language does not cease to 
push these limits; the language to express the unicity of God is hard won in Eckhart’s eyes.  
What might be gained from the above examination is the beginning of how that language is 
hard won and its consequent comparative value.  
III. Conclusion: Apophatic Language and Comparative Methodologies 
 The purpose of this section is to examine how Christian apophaticism approaches 
speaking what is fundamentally unspeakable.  While space and time necessitated a cross-
section of the tradition with special reference to the function of apophatic language, there are 
some significant observations to be made.  Perhaps it is best to discuss what might be the 
most noteworthy paradox that emerges from the above examination: it seems the driving 
momentum behind apophatic language, at least in the thought of Eckhart, is pushing negation 
so far as to grasp absolute unicity.  The paradox is inescapable as a function of the language; 
namely, it is vital to tear down the very structure of language itself in order to “assert” 
unicity. This paradox is explored above in the discussions of unicity in Eckhart, but there are 
further implications.   
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 This section on Christian apophaticism, in order to explore the function of language in 
terms of a cross-sectional study, focused on an examination of Eckhartian themes of negation 
as expressed in negation, detachment, and unicity.  Though this is but a minor selection of 
thinkers and concepts within the general category of Christian apophaticism, what is 
presented here is meant to tease out some of the more significant aspects of the tradition.  
What holds these sections together is an examination of language and the role it plays in the 
particular logic of negation.  As apophaticism tears down the conventions of normal speaking 
(i.e. the cataphatic), what is left?  More importantly, what are the comparative implications of 
apophaticism?   
 What becomes apparent in the above examination is, primarily, that apophaticism is 
not so much about simple negation as it is about where language breaks down.  Speaking 
denials, negations, and no-thing has an inherent absurdity; the value in this absurdity is found 
in the revaluation of the meaning behind the language, the symbolism, the metaphor, and the 
poetry within the expression.  As Tobin argues, “…one can accomplish more by establishing 
what God is not, by removing imperfections and limitations from our notion of Him.  This 
frees a positive core which we cannot grasp.”542  Eckhartian apophaticism, in particular, 
squares with the absurdity of negative language.   
 Perhaps one of the driving features behind apophatic language is what Sells calls the 
movement of symbolism from the “referential to the nonreferential.”543 No longer may 
language simply act as a pointer to objects, ideas, actions, or “references.”  Instead, 
something unsaid, something hidden shakes the foundation of referential assumption and 
forces a movement within the expression insofar as negation forces a “nonreferential” 
asymmetry.  Negative language causes this asymmetry because the functionality of words is 
                                                             
542 Tobin, Meister Eckhart, 83.  
543 Sells, “Apophasis in Plotinus,” 51. 
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called into perpetual question; at best, language must be bracketed as inherently faulty.  
Eckhart’s struggle to express the ineffable God is hard won; his apophaticism takes seriously 
the critique that the concept of reference no longer works within a “system” of language.   
 Removing reference from language logically means removal of predicates; this is 
accomplished with negative language.  For Eckhart’s unicity, negation serves as the method 
to tear down predicates within referential language.  This creates a movement within the 
language because the concept is inherently ineffable, inexpressible, and unspeakable.  
Nevertheless, Eckhart has much to say regarding unicity.  What Sells’ argues in his concept 
of “infinite regress” gets closer to the methodological implications Eckhart’s language.  
Infinite regress within the language, shifted by negation, not only removes predicates, but 
also, quite paradoxically, gets closer to unity.  The pattern of infinite regress within the 
linguistic system of expression systematically and methodically exposes the faults and gaps 
of language.  Turner calls this a “rhetorical strenuousness” in Eckhart because “...he twists 
the discourse, breaks it up, recomposes it.  His rhetorical devices are artifices.”544  However, 
the intention is still the same: language is not a means in itself; language does not exist in and 
for itself; in the context of expressing inexpressible unicity, language must remain but a tool 
to bring out deeper meaning.  Turner explains this further: “...[Eckhart] knows perfectly well 
that the unsayable cannot be placed within the grasp of speech.  Yet he will use speech, 
necessarily broken, contradictory, absurd, paradoxical, conceptually hyperbolic speech, to 
bring to insight the ineffability of God.”545  
 The value in an examination of Eckhart’s thought rests in the failure of language to 
speak the unspeakable.  Eckhart centers on this failure and begins to grasp unicity with God 
through negation.  The failure of language as shown in negativity paradoxically “creates” 
                                                             
544 Turner, The Darkness of God, 151. Italics original.  
545 Ibid.  
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new space to consider the possibility of new linguistic constructs.  The movement of 
language in Eckhart’s metaphorical, dialectical, and antithetical language, creates a 
comparative tool by which to consider other places where negativity has similarly broken 
down language.   
The theoretical question is, of course, whether or not such broken language, perhaps 
now moving forward in speaking the unspeakable, is able to lend comparative insight with an 
entirely different tradition.  Perhaps it is the exposure of the weakness of language, the 
breakdown of predicates, metaphors, and referential symbols that gets closer to a tradition 
where a similar movement of language (in infinite regress) is demonstrable.  However, this is 
not enough by itself to draw convincing parallels in the logic.  If the failure of language, as 
demonstrated in the apophaticism of Eckhart, might contribute to the discussion, then another 
methodological input is needed to expand the logic.  Something more is needed to bridge the 
gap in such broken language, something that shows how Christianity and Buddhism might be 
brought together more productivity in negativity. 
 Though the purpose of this chapter has been primarily illustrative and demonstrative 
of particular apophatic themes as they apply to negative language, it has also set up the 
framework with which further analysis might be conducted.  Derridean themes of 
deconstruction might now be addressed with the grammar of Christian apophaticism in that 
specific locus of aporia.  Furthermore, this is the bridge with which Christian and Buddhist 









Buddhist Emptiness and Derridean Différance: Marking the Path (Not) Taken 
 
I. Introduction 
 The language of Buddhist emptiness borders on inaccessible because it is highly 
nuanced, contextualized differently amongst the traditions, and it is meant to convey a 
seminal “truth” in Buddhist thinking.  As Chapter Three detailed various contexts of 
emptiness, the task in this section is to begin to explore the relationship with negativity, 
especially as it connects with some of the deeper foundations of how language functions in 
Buddhism.  There is an inherent problem with this methodology, though, because it assumes 
that language can convey this function, even meaning, of emptiness through a prism of 
negativity.  This, too, might be a falsity, unless there is another connection to help bridge the 
concepts together in a way that stands on the limits, on the aporia, of language.  More 
specifically, while it seems initially odd to connect the work of a twentieth-century, French-
speaking language theorist with that of the illusive concept of Buddhist emptiness, the fruitful 
conversation that emerges centers on a contextualization of how negativity functions within 
Buddhism.  Indeed, it is this aporia that provides the initial connection of how Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstruction might lend a different way of reading, writing, and communicating 
emptiness.  The levels here are multi-faceted because emptiness is examined through the 
prism of negativity; in a similar way, deconstruction is examined through the lens of 
Derridean différance.  Here Buddhist language is not understood as “Buddhist” as such, but 
rather is opened to the same difference that informs/conforms/deforms all language 
structures; emptiness read with différance means not a/the definitive emptiness, but rather an 
emptiness that informs all other internal structures within Buddhism.  In this way, negativity 
functions as the mode by which différance might be read on/with/beside emptiness.   
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As will be discussed in more detail below, Derrida’s concern is not with religious 
thought as such.  Though he has much to say about the role of “religion” within the context of 
deconstruction, Derrida seems to go in different directions (disseminations), taking aim 
squarely at Western metaphysics.  This does not mean, however, that Buddhist negativity and 
Derridean negativity are incompatible or unable to be compared.  In broader terms, how 
might Derrida’s negativity differ from that of Buddhist negativity?  Might a discussion in the 
contrasts of such understandings of negativity offer new insight into understanding Buddhist 
emptiness?   
A. Buddhism: Religious Negativity?  
 While there is certainly legitimate and productive discussion as to whether or not 
Buddhism might be considered a “religion” (at least in the Western sense) or if it should be 
solely considered a philosophy, that point is not taken up here. However, as a very general 
statement, it might be argued that the aforementioned efforts to flesh out emptiness as a 
foundational aspect of Buddhism, whether as an experiential component, philosophical point, 
or textual pivot to other teachings, the argument may be grounded in the assertion that 
emptiness has some sort of basic precept in Buddhist thought.  To that end, is it fair to also 
assert that if Buddhism might be considered a religion, emptiness acts as a 
textual/experiential/philosophical negativity that runs through numerous Buddhist teachings? 
Thus, to this point, it might be said that emptiness has a textual effect, albeit vis-à-vis 
negativity, and that it drives religious teaching.  This might be referred to as religious 
negativity as it plays a pivotal role in the teachings, offers some sort of salvific effect 
(however nuanced),
546
 and drives textual meaning for the religious community. Emptiness is 
                                                             
546 By salvific effect, this does not carry the same implications or philosophical / theological baggage as Western 
salvation.  Rather, what is intended here is an understanding that emptiness drives the religious adherent in 
meditation, has real “power” in how other teachings are understood, and that it plays a role in eventually 
attaining nirvana.  While this is certainly open to debate, the intent here is to examine emptiness as if the 
aforementioned statements are “true” in that they affect not only Buddhists, but the tradition itself.   
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expressed as negativity because it “is” fundamentally what “is not.” Emptiness is religiously 
negative because it is “made up” of the insubstantiality of all sentient beings, all phenomena, 
and all illusory reality.  Emptiness, as such, might be considered what “is” religious negation 
in Buddhism.  
 Buddhist emptiness, discussed herein as a sort of religious negativity, has 
foundational implications for the religious tradition. However, the question remains of 
whether or not negativity is approachable in Buddhist texts; the further implication here is 
that emptiness, at least as it is expressed in extant Buddhist texts, points to some/no-thing 
outside of itself, whether that is experiential, philosophical, or metaphysical.  While the 
implications of religious negativity in Buddhism are discussed below, the point here is that 
negativity within a specific religious tradition has “value” in its effect upon the tradition. In 
this case, the insubstantiality of all phenomenal existence, of all sentient beings, is the 
foundational component of religious negativity as it applies to Buddhism.   
B. Derridean Negativity   
 As a matter of brief summary so far, the argument that Buddhist emptiness shares 
some relationship with Derridean différance could be elucidated with the proposal that 
deconstruction is a fundamentally negative (non)concept because it is “parasitic.”  It might be 
called parasitic because deconstruction requires that something else be said first; 
deconstruction responds to what is produced, but it does not produce itself.
547
  David Loy 
explains, “This is why deconstruction is necessarily parasitic: not believing that there is any 
non-metaphorical truth-in-itself to be signified, it needs as ‘host’ another text which attempts 
                                                             
547 For Derrida, this is thoroughly a metaphysical problem: “It could be shown that metaphysics has always 
consisted in attempting to uproot the presence of meaning, in whatever guise, from différance; and every time 
that a region or layer of pure meaning or a pure signified is allegedly rigorously delineated or isolated this 
gesture is repeated.” Derrida, Positions, 32. Italics original.  
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to provide such a signified.”548  Deconstruction latches onto what is conveyed and searches 
out what is not being written, the silenced voices within the text, the emptiness within fixed 
textual meaning.
549
  Thus, if différance is one of Derrida’s “tools” in his deconstructive 
toolbox, it, too, “is” fundamentally negative.550  In Derrida’s own lengthy description of 
différance, he elucidates the negative nature of its effect upon a text:   
…we had to note that differance is not, does not exist, and is not any sort of 
being-present (on). And we will have to point out everything that it is not, and, 
consequently, that it has neither existence nor essence.  It belongs to no 
category of being, present or absent.  And yet what is thus denoted as 






Nothing – no present and in-different being – thus precedes différance and 
spacing.  There is no subject who is agent, author, and master of différance, 
who eventually and empirically would be overtaken by différance.  
Subjectivity – like objectivity – is an effect of différance, an effect inscribed in 




Within the corpus of Derridean thought, the purposeful misspelling of “difference” is  
to show the play of differences within any system of thought.  The play of differences, 
using the further stratagem of negation, calls into question the very nature of 
systematization, of language (contra-logos), and of definitive meaning.  Magliola 
calls this one of many, “...provisional names for what somehow ‘constitutes’ that 
which survives absolute negative reference.”553 Différance, then, calls into question 
even negativity itself, as a function, as a meaning, as an effect upon other 
                                                             
548 David Loy, “The Clôture of Deconstruction: A Mahāyāna Critique of Derrida,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. xxvii, no. 1 (March 1987): 76.  
549 This is, of course, a summary of deconstruction, though it is readily acknowledged that the full implications 
of deconstruction, while addressed elsewhere in some measure, are quite complex.  The general summary is 
presented with the hope that deconstruction might be shown to be parasitic and, thus, negative by nature.   
550 Derrida suggests, “…différance finds itself enmeshed in the work that pulls it through a chain of other 
‘concepts,’ other ‘words,’ other textual configurations.” Ibid. 40. Italics original.  
551 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 134. Italics original.  
552 Derrida, Positions, 28.  Italics original.  





  Moreover, if différance is “present” in a text prior to the writing 
of that text, does this not show a certain parasitic value?  
Is this the same as religious negativity? Would it be possible to compare 
religious negativity (in this instance as it applies to Buddhist emptiness) with the 
(non)function of negativity in Derridean différance? Is Derridean negativity, 
understood with différance, comparable with religious negativity?   
II. Difference and Différance: A Buddhist (Re)Working of Terms; Definitions(?) 
 
 Derrida’s intentional misspelling of différance first appears in his 1963 essay, “Cogito 
and the History of Madness,”555 and he later expands his study of difference / différance in an 
article that “…expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and 
temporalizing that puts off until ‘later’ what is presently denied, the possible that is presently 
impossible.”556 Stemming as a reaction to specific Western thinkers like Heidegger, Husserl, 
and Saussure,
557
 différance shares many sympathies with Buddhist critiques of language.
558
  
                                                             
554 John Caputo helps make the case here; he expands the idea of how the play of differences allow for 
questioning even negativity itself: “Différance is the name of a confession or a circumfession, that is, an 
operation of textuality in virtue of which we confess that there can be no fundamental or transcendental 
ontology, neither phenomenological nor psychoanalytic, but only a multiplicity of discursive strategies that 
mutatis mutandis differ with the demands of the irreducible plurality of subject matters under study.” John D. 
Caputo, “Love Among the Deconstructibles: A Response to Gregg Lambert,” Journal for Cultural and 
Religious Theory, vol. 5, no. 2 (April 2004): 52. 
555 Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 31-63.  
556 Jacques Derrida, “Differance,” in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 
trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 129. Italics original. In this text, 
Allison does not employ italics or the accent mark in his writing of différance. When quoting from this text 
directly, fidelity to this translation is maintained here. Derrida offers various nuances of meaning through his 
essay, including: “We provisionally give the name differance to this sameness which is not identical: by the 
silent writing of its a, it has the desired advantage of referring to differing, both as spacing/temporalizing and as 
the movement that structures every dissociation.” Ibid. 129-130. Italics original. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
one of Derrida’s translators, calls “[t]he ‘-ance’ ending…the mark of that suspended status. Since the difference 
between ‘difference’ and ‘differance’ is inaudible, this ‘neographism’ reminds us of the importance of writing as 
a structure.” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface,” in Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), xliii.  
557 Derrida clarifies: “…the difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure’s principle of semiological difference, 
differing as the possibility of (neurone) facilitation, impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference as the 
irreducibility of the trace of the other in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological difference in Heidegger.”  Ibid. 130.  
558 While space and time limit a full analysis of the Buddhist (re)appropriation of Derrida’s différance, several 
sources help summarize the current research.  Specifically, Jin Y. Park’s recent collection of essays, Buddhisms 
and Deconstructions, contains a number of analyses describing how différance might be useful to the Buddhist 
tradition. However, the collection is fairly dependent upon the earlier work of Robert Magliola; while there is 
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The Diamond Sūtra, an early Buddhist text, contains a conversation between the Buddha and 
his student Subhūti, where the student explains that  
…the Tathagata did not realize any such dharma as ‘unexcelled, perfect 
enlightenment.’ Nor does the Tathagata teach such a dharma.  And why?  
Because this dharma realized and taught by the Tathagata is incomprehensible 
and inexpressible and neither a dharma nor no dharma…559 
 
The fundamental disconnect here rests with the attempt, however nuanced, to express that 
which is inexpressible.  The patterns in such passages share the aforementioned sympathies 
with Derridean deconstruction; as Park rightly points out: “Hesitation, avoidance, and 
evasion seem inevitable in Derrida and his voluminous writings as much as in the Buddha’s 
discourse.”560  
 Douglas Berger calls attention to Robert Magliola’s early mention of différance being 
“fruitfully…aligned” with śūnyatā along with the criticism that later thinkers like David Loy 
and Harold Coward do not take the analysis far enough.
561
  The error here, though, is that 
Magliola attempts to make the argument that “Nāgāruna’s śūnyatā is Derrida’s différance and 
is the absolute negation which absolutely deconstructs but which constitutes directional 
trace.”562 While he goes on to make this argument, the direct alignment of the two is simply 
contrary to both ideas. There are a number of recent attempts to examine Buddhist thinking in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
nothing intrinsically errant with this, the influence of his work is questionable insofar as clarity is concerned.  
Magliola’s style seems to want to imitate or re-create Derrida’s circuitous and off-center style of writing; to be 
fair, his writing attempts to (auto)deconstruct in itself.  Where an articulation of opinion might be clear in 
Magliola’s work, the lucidity – and consequently scholarly value – of his work is questionable. Magliola’s 
endnotes are especially useful for an early study in Derridean research in Buddhism.    
559 Red Pine, trans. with commentary, The Diamond Sutra (New York: Counterpoint, 2001), Section 7, pg. 6.  
Jin Y. Park begins her essay, “Naming the Unnameable: Dependent Co-arising and Différance” with the same 
text (The Diamond Sutra), though with a different section.  One of the oldest extant Buddhist texts, the paradigm 
of différance can be examined through the various nuances of language found in the text.  Parks examines the 
Diamond Sutra as a springboard for an examination of a pivotal question: “What is the relationship between the 
name, truth, and reality?  How does one get to ‘what I [the Buddha] teach’ without being trapped by the 
undeclarability of truth and the naming of that truth?” Jin Y. Park, “Naming the Unnameable: Dependent Co-
arising and Différance,” in Buddhisms and Deconstructions, ed. Jin Y. Park (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishing Group, Inc., 2006), 7. 
560 Ibid. 8. Derrida describes différance in terms of a “…movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, 
delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving.”  Derrida, Positions, 8. 
561 Douglas L. Berger, “Deconstruction, Aporia and Justice in Nāgārjuna’s Empty Ethics,” in Deconstruction 
and the Ethical in Asian Thought, ed. Youru Wang (London: Routledge, 2007), 49. 
562 Magliola, Derrida on the Mend, 89. 
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terms of Derridean deconstruction, specifically through différance; they engage with 
differences in texts, constructions, etc., to point to what might be a limitless, endless 
deferring to other texts. This might be akin to what Gregory Jay identifies as “…not the value 
of one term or the other (literal vs. figurative, philosophy vs. literature, etc.), but the meaning 
of the difference between them…”563 This may be so; it is not the intention of this project to 
examine and appropriate such sources, but rather to hopefully draw out some of the more 
subtle nuances and methods for further analysis (or, in Derridean terms, deconstruction).  It is 
important to bear in mind that différance “is” more of an attitude and a technique within 
Derridean deconstruction: “Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement 
that is inhabited by differance.”564 In a similar thread, time and space do not allow for a 
thoroughgoing Buddhist perspective of différance or a Derridean approach to Buddhist 
thinking.
565
  Rather, the intended project is to examine the tensions of différance, teasing out 
how these tensions might allow for further analysis of Buddhist emptiness.  One of Derrida’s 
more illuminating, yet highly nuanced, stratagems is to call into question presence in 
language; one of the ways he does this is through différance.
566
  Derrida’s first use of 
différance shows an economy, a form of writing that perhaps references a bringing-together 
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 Gregory S. Jay, “Values and Deconstructions: Derrida, Saussure, Marx,” Cultural Critique, University of 
Minnesota Press, no. 8 (Winter 1987-1988): 175.     
564 Spivak, “Preface,” lxxviii.  
565 In this methodological move, I purposely attempt a similar approach as Bredeson in his seminal essay, “On 
Dōgen and Derrida.”  In his comparison of the two thinkers, he outlines very clearly from the outset: “I can state 
flat-out that there will be no attempt to take a ‘Buddhist perspective’ of Derrida or a ‘deconstructionist 
perspective’ of Dōgen…[the purpose is] to come to an accurate and well-balanced understanding of what Dōgen 
and Derrida are up to.”  See Garrett Zantow Bredeson, “On Dōgen and Derrida,” Philosophy East and West, 
University of Hawai’i Press, vol. 58, no. 1 (1 January 2008): 60.  This is a useful distinction, but it is 
questionable whether or not the avoidance of a “Buddhist perspective” or a “deconstructive perspective” is 
possible in a comparative analysis.  While Bredeson gives an interesting analysis and comparison, he seems to 
come close to delving into specific perspectives; the purpose in citing his work here, though, rests with the 
attempt to give an outside, objective view of how two seemingly different thinkers might be compared.   
566 Spivak’s commentary is helpful here: “…differance – being the structure (a structure never quite there, never 
by us perceived, itself deferred and different) of our psyche – is also the structure of ‘presence,’ a term itself 
under erasure.  For differance, producing the differential structure of our hold on ‘presence,’ never produces 
presence as such.”  Spivak, “Preface,” xliii.  
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of concepts, to elucidate how they are deferred, moved aside, scattered for other texts,
567
 
other meanings:  
The relationship between reason, madness, and death is an economy, a 
structure of deferral whose irreducible originality must be respected…It is 
more written than said, it is economized.  The economy of this writing is a 
regulated relationship between that which exceeds the exceeded totality: the 




This early demonstration of profusion of meaning in language – the play of an “economic 
concept designating the production of differing / deferring”569 – begins to illustrate the lack of 
presence in language;
570
 the question for this project, specifically, is how différance is 
(re)economized in Buddhist emptiness in a way that expresses “deferred presence.”571  
Différance might be closer to what Buddhism terms a “skillful means,” a tool for 
examination, rather than a system itself.  Thus, there is something linguistically corruptive
572
 
in Derrida’s distinction between difference and différance; the purpose of the below sub-
sections is to clearly (de)lineate a few of those strands of linguistic corruption in ways that 
are profitable for a discussion of how Derrida’s différance helps elucidate interpretations of 
emptiness in Buddhism; to that end, what appears below are a few hermeneutic angles with 
                                                             
567 John Caputo sums this nuance clearly: “There never is anything simply outside of knowledge and economy, 
never a ‘simple, ineffable exteriority’ to the circle.  The idea never is to simply step outside them rather, by 
virtue of the double injunction, to learn to move within and interrupt knowledge and economy, to loosen them 
up in order both to give beyond economy and to give economy its chance.”  Caputo, “Love Among the 
Deconstructibles,” 46. 
568 Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 62. Italics original. Earlier in this essay, Derrida sets up the 
various implications of this claim through an analysis of Foucault’s reading of Descartes: “…demonstrate how 
the neutralization of the factual world is a neutralization (in the sense in which to neutralize is also to master, to 
reduce, to leave free in a straitjacket) of nonmeaning, the most subtle form of an act of force.” Ibid. 60.   
569 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 23.  
570 Derrida goes on to demonstrate this throughout numerous texts; his first reference to différance is specifically 
stated here to set the context for later analysis.  Thus, this is not the only reference to lack of presence in 
language, nor the most best-articulated; its “value,” insofar as this study is concerned, lies with its original 
contextualization. This is illustrated, for example, in his essay on différance: “The economic character of 
differance in no way implies that the deferred presence can always be recovered, that it simply amounts to an 
investment that only temporarily and without loss delays the presentation of presence, that is, the perception of 
gain or the gain of perception.”  Derrida, “Differance,” 151. 
571 Ibid. 
572 Corruptive insofar as différance “is” “…an irreparable loss of presence, an irreversible wearing-down of 
energy, or indeed as a death instinct and a relation to the absolutely other that apparently breaks up any 
economy?” Ibid. 150.  
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which Derridean différance might contribute to a reading of emptiness in an early Buddhist 
text, the Heart Sūtra.   
A. Middle Way(s) and Différance: An Economy of Language 
 The central problem examined here deals with Buddhist emptiness and how that 
might be “understood” with Derridean différance, and perhaps more telling, with 
difference(s) of emptiness.  Fundamentally, the connecting piece is the approach of that 
which cannot be expressed, but might be attributable to an internal attitude of deferring and 
differing.  The teaching of emptiness in the Buddhist tradition purposely defies definition, 
slips from intellectual grasping, and is not a “thing” with which language can even describe.  
Ellen Y. Zhang describes emptiness in her study of Ji Zang: “…śūnyatā is not a cognitive 
concept to referring to any reality, but simply a convenient / skillful device to teach one to 
free oneself from all clinging and attachments.”573 In much the same way, the Derridean 
distinction between difference and différance strives for this same philosophical root of 
resisting “thing-ness” in favor of a “skillful device.”  This is why Zhang brings together this 
connection with Derridean deconstruction: “Derrida insists that différance is a ‘middle way’ 
of ‘middle voice,’ a space between limits and no-limits rather than a transcendental principle 
which could be theoretically articulated.”574 Jin Y. Park makes a similar connection with a 
caveat that the Buddhist Middle Way is not equivalent to Derrida’s “middle voice” because 
“[t]he Derridean ‘middle’ also designates the impossibility of drawing a clear-cut 
demarcation between conditions that the history of philosophy has defined as binary 
opposites and that our linguistic convention has separated into two opposite realms.”575 
                                                             
573 Ellen Y. Zhang, “Ji Zhang’s Śūnyatā-Speech: A Derridean Dénégation with Buddhist Negations,” in 
Buddhisms and Deconstructions, ed. Jin Y. Park (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2006), 
112. Italics original. According to Zhang, Ji Zang lived between 549-623 and was “…the systemizer of the 
Sanlun School (or, the Three Treatises School) of Chinese Buddhism…” Ibid. 109.   
574 Ibid. 117. Italics original.   
575 Park, “Naming the Unnameable,” 12. Park makes an important caveat here in the history of philosophy.  
Though she argues persuasively that there should be a clear distinction between the Buddhist Middle Way and 
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Youxuan Wang, however, makes a careful distinction between Derrida’s différance and the 
Buddhist tradition: that of the origin: “Even if we can understand that this notion of ‘origin’ is 
subject to the play of différance, Derrida is still describing this indeterminate origin as the 
‘well-spring’, the ‘virgin ground’, and ‘common root’…His deconstruction is motivated by 
an overwhelming desire to reach an origin of sorts.”576 From the outset, we might 
provisionally understand a general connection between Buddhist emptiness and différance; 
whether that connection can be made firmly between the “middle-ness” of Derrida’s 
expression of différance and the philosophy of the “Middle Way” in Buddhism is a point of 
debate not examined here.  Instead, the concept of a middle language – in both Derrida and 
Buddhism – provides interesting analytical points of contention; the question is whether or 
not this middle language might be used in a study of emptiness.     
B. Language and Experience 
 The functionality of the middle voice between language/concepts/paths cannot be 
easily articulated.  Modern theorists like Toby Foshay help illuminate how particular 
Buddhist thinkers, in this case Nāgārjuna, bring together the centrality of emptiness with a 
“middle” concept like différance, suggesting that the non-dual nature of his thought shares 
similarity with Derrida’s non-dual middle voice.577 Foshay goes on to connect experience 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Derridean différance, the “impossibility of drawing a clear-cut demarcation between conditions” may be found 
in other strands of Buddhism; for example, it could be argued (following the argument of Toby Foshay below) 
that Nāgārjuna’s project is to explain how the Middle Way functions specifically for this reason (to delineate 
between nihilism and reification).  Thus, while not engaging in this specific argument and the subsequent 
caveats, it might be stated that Derrida says that différance “indicates the middle voice, it precedes and sets up 
the opposition between passivity and activity. Derrida, “Differance,” 130. It is also important to note here that, 
for Derrida, différance is more of an attitude than a specific context; while a Buddhist might integrate rational 
thinking into some kind of contextual “philosophy,” Derrida purposely resists this move.  To that end, it is 
important to bear in mind that différance should remain as a voice or an attitude, not as a comparative 
philosophy.   
576 Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction, 199. 
577 See Toby Avard Foshay, “Denegation, Nonduality, and Language in Derrida and Dōgen,” Philosophy East 
and West, University of Hawai’i Press, vol. 44, no. 3 (July 1994): 549-551. Foshay goes further to connect these 
ideas with Derrida’s denegation: “Like the notion of śūnyatā, which declares its own provisional and inessential 
character, denegation asserts the self-dividedness of every articulation – not only its participation in two 
registers of significance, of the expressible an the inexpressible, of samvrti and paramārtha but also the self-
negating or empty character of the relation, or intersection, or symploke, of these dimensions.” Ibid. 554.  
169 
 
(understood through language as “…one of the activities common to all human beings…”578) 
with “…the exercise of language itself is surely a vivid instance of the paradoxical fullness 
and emptiness of our experience, of our representation of experience, and of our experience 
of representation.”579 Foshay here draws a necessary parallel between experience and 
emptiness with the limited construct of language.
580
 Further, Magliola describes Nāgārjuna’s 
thought with language more in line with deconstructive lexicon: “Nāgārjuna…has already 
shown that a carefully reasoned logocentrism leads to pure negative reference.  One must 
conclude, then, that all happenings, being utterly dependent, must be empty (śūnya) of self-
nature and empty of entitative transfer or continuance.”581 What might be gained here is 
whether the Buddhist concept of emptiness, fundamentally understood as a no-thing that is 
grasped with experience, and less so with language, may be elucidated with 
difference/différance.   
 Insofar as Derrida is concerned, it might be helpful to highlight the role of 
“playfulness” in his writing style; this is linked to experience because it illustrates both a 
potentiality and limitation for the reader.  This is linked specifically with a middle way of 
understanding language: “[i]n Derrida, we see the effort to develop indeterminate concepts 
that can no longer be enclosed in traditional oppositions, a preference for neither/nor, a 
playful and elusive style.”582 Thus, an experience of emptiness may be deconstructed with 
différance in a way that is not only “playful and elusive” but also with the possibility that 
“[l]anguage turns against itself, and is inscribed with self-erasure, in order to negotiate the 
                                                             
578 Ibid. 555.  
579 Ibid.  
580 He states this paradox as “…language cannot be seen as necessarily obscuring the truth of our nature.  
Everything depends on grasping language rightly.” Ibid.  
581 Magliola, Derrida on the Mend, 115. Italics original.  
582 Youru Wang, “Liberating Oneself from the Absolutized Boundary of Language: A Liminological Approach 
to the Interplay of Speech and Silence in Chan Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, University of Hawai’i 
Press, vol. 51, no. 1 (January 2001): 84.   
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limits of language.”583 A connection between Buddhist emptiness and différance might be the 
(near) impossibility of marking the experience of emptiness with language, but does this 
convey an impossibility or, rather, a (re)positioning of emptiness at the limits of language?
584
  
Derrida’s différance helps draw this distinction out further because it “operates” at the limits 
of language with(out) hope of pushing beyond what is found in the corruption of language; 
différance forces a re-examination of terms as they apply to the experience of emptiness 
because “[o]nce enlightened, hence free from any fixation, one is then a master of using 
language, a master of playing on and around the limits of language.”585 Though there is a 
tinge of hope or expectation found in the Buddhist Middle Way(s) of enlightenment, such a 
position is not necessarily found in Derrida; rather, the endless deferring/differing to other 
texts, other meanings, elucidates a difference in hope(s) of language; at once language is used 
for the “(re)inscribing” of enlightenment through absence, loss.  Is this hope for Derrida?586 Is 
it the “viens, oui, oui” that he appeals to in terms of the otherness of language?  While there 
is no way to correlate Buddhist enlightenment, via emptiness, with Derridean “viens, oui, 
                                                             
583 Ibid. Wang’s recent work deals with “liminological” understandings of Derrida; his project is important and 
beneficial to understanding a connection between Derrida and Buddhism.  His project may be summed as 
follows: “…the problematization of any absolute limits of language, insight into the mutual connection between 
the two sides of the limits of language, and linguistic twisting as play at the limits of language – are the major 
elements of a liminology of language as addressed by postmodern thinkers.  Stemming from its Latin root, the 
term liminology puts much weight on the meaning of the threshold that connects, or makes a transition between, 
the two sides, rather than on the meaning of an absolute borderline.”  Ibid. Italics original. What he proposes, a 
“liminological” understanding, is advantageous, but he may not have completely worked out this idea in his 
article.  Like other studies dealing with the limits of language and expression, Wang highlights and discusses the 
logical impasse, but does not provide a fully-worked out way forward.  This has excellent value, of course, in its 
own right, but the question of moving past / through / in this impasse is important.   
584 Wang encounters a similar conclusion: “The Middle Way thus provides a solid ground for a Buddhist 
liminology of language.  If language use was not necessary and inevitable, the Buddha would have remained 
silent forever.” Ibid. 89.   
585 Ibid. 93.  
586 Derrida alludes to this:  “After this laughter and dance, after this affirmation that is foreign to any dialectic, 
the question arises to as to the other side of nostalgia, which will call Heideggerian hope.” Derrida, 
“Differance,” 159. Italics original.  
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oui,” perhaps the strand of hope conveyed in the text is enough to draw out the differences at 
the limits of language.
587
 
C. Difference(s) of Interpretation: The (non)Language of Différance and Emptiness 
 How, then, might Buddhist emptiness be understood as/with/in difference?  This is 
something of an impasse in language when the experiential and liminological
588
 
underpinnings of emptiness are examined with(in) Derridean terminology; what is at play 
here is nothing less than self-referential emptiness as it is applied (if that is even possible) to 
endless deferral and differing.  As David Loy sums, “For Derrida, what is problematic is the 
relationship between name and concept; so it is not surprising that he concludes with an 
endless recirculation of concepts.”589  Thus, the entire question of language, in this case 
Buddhist language in reference to emptiness, becomes something of an impossibility.  
Instead, what might be drawn out is the limitation of language to conclusively demonstrate 
the deferral and difference of emptiness in a Buddhist context; however, this impasse might 
tease out other possible paths because “[o]nce the absolute, impassible demarcation between 
silence and speech is obscured, the path for playing on the borders of language is opened.”590 
 This linguistic impasse is reflective of the problem of using language to express 
emptiness; indeed, Buddhist commentators are quick to delineate the inability to convey 
emptiness as a “thing,” as a “concept.”591 Rather, as Loy connects emptiness and différance 
                                                             
587 Jacques Derrida, Points…, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf, et. al. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 65.  
588 This term is borrowed from Youru Wang in “Liberating Oneself from the Absolutized Boundary of 
Language.”  
589 David Loy, “The Deconstruction of Buddhism,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and 
Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 249. Derrida acknowledges this tension in 
grappling with Nietzsche: “It is out of the unfolding of this ‘same’ as differance that the sameness of difference 
and of repetition is presented in the eternal return.”  Derrida, “Differance,” 149. Loy’s connection with 
Nietzsche is in direct reference to Derrida, but the further connection with Buddhism is less clear.  Specifically, 
a Nietzschean “eternal return of the same” presupposes a different chronological context than that of Buddhist 
philosophy. Whether or not the indirect connection Loy is making here is articulate enough between the two 
philosophies is not entirely clear.   
590 Wang, “Liberating Oneself from the Absolutized Boundary of Language,” 92.  
591 For example, Loy comments: “The corresponding danger was that śūnyatā would itself become 
reappropriated into a metaphysics, so Nāgārjuna was careful to warn that śūnyatā was a heuristic, not a 
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to demonstrate that both are “deployed for tactical reasons but [are] denied any semantic or 
conceptual stability.”592 The important note here, Loy says, is that both emptiness in a 
Buddhist context and Derridean différance are “permanently ‘under erasure,’” thus indicating 
the comparative value.
593
 Derridean “under erasure” might be provisionally understood as a 
response to Heidegger’s difference between being and nothingness; as Walter Brogan 
explains: 
The sous rature, the erasure, is not an afterthought but belongs essentially to 
the original writing of Heidegger’s difference.  It is genesis – the originary 
difference that is traced in this act that contradicts the origin even as it 
signifies it.  It is the trace that differentiates while deferring its own difference.  




The important element here, erasure in terms of différance (to understand Derridean 
différance in its original contextual reaction against Heidegger in the larger western 
philosophical tradition), is useful to Buddhist emptiness as a critique because 
Being means security, the grounding of the self, whether it is experiencing 
something transcendent or intellectually sublimated into a metaphysical archē.  
We want to meet God face to face, or see our essential Buddha-nature, but 
trace / śūnyatā means we never catch it.  The sense-of-self wants to gain 
nirvāna / enlightenment, but trace / śūnyatā means it can never attain it.595   
 
Hence, even though contextually-speaking, it may not seem reasonable to hold Buddhist 
emptiness with Derridean différance, the critiques of the metaphysics of presence through 
erasure, finds similarities in how both terms (if they can be called that) correspond to their 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
cognitive, notion.” Loy, “The Deconstruction of Buddhism,” 234. Italics original. Herein is an important 
connection with the comments made above (see note 16); Loy rightly points out the slippery notion of 
emptiness.  Just as différance is a heuristic, so is śūnyatā.  
592 Ibid. A further note of clarification is needed on Derrida’s use of “deployment” in relation to différance, 
specifically because it engages Heidegger’s understanding of “Being.”  As Derrida comments, “…differance is, 
to be sure, but the historical and epochal deployment of Being or of the ontological difference.  The a of 
differance marks the movement of this deployment.” Derrida, “Differance,” 153. Italics original.  
593 Ibid.  
594 Walter A. Brogan, “The Original Difference,” in Derrida and Différance, ed. David Wood and Robert 
Bernasconi (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 36. Italics original.  
595 Loy, “The Deconstruction of Buddhism,” 238.  Italics original.  It might be asked here if Loy makes 
preliminary conclusions with the full force of his argument; in other words, are his connections too premature?  
Especially in his connection of Derridean trace and Buddhist śūnyatā, Loy seems to connect ideas in a way that 
is not fully fleshed out.  While the trace and archē are certainly terms of great analytical worth, the connection 
here seems to be too premature.  
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original contexts: in Derridean différance, “[it] is undiscoverable but not because it holds 
itself back and remains concealed. Différance has no proper names or meaning to discover at 
all,”596 which bears striking similarity/difference with Buddhist emptiness: “We interpret 
pratītya-samutpāda [dependent origination] as śūnyatā.  Śūnyatā is a guiding, not a cognitive, 
notion, presupposing the everyday.”597 Thus, in a way, both terms’ slippery avoidance of 
meaning, their difficulty in pinning-down, makes them paradoxical comparative differences.   
 Though we can delineate out and study différance and Buddhist emptiness, there is 
always the risk of reification, of definition, of thing-ness of which both terms resist.
598
  The 
fact that both “stand” outside of their respective traditions (as no-things, erased, traces), and 
yet thoroughly within the traditions, makes them deconstructive concepts; hence the risk of 
creating and sustaining a “master concept.”  To that end, for différance and emptiness to have 
no-thing-ness, they must stand apart from a conception of “master concept.”599 Their 
meaning, though, is wrapped up in erasure – whether that is outright rejection of Being (in 
the Heideggerian sense) or the rejection of all thing-ness.  
D. A Rejection of Master-Concepts: Erasure 
 The risk in isolating any particular word over another is developing a master-concept; 
both Derrida and Buddhist thinkers were well aware of this problem.  The isolation of terms 
like différance and śūnyatā lend themselves to analytical master-conceptualization, whereby 
other ideas are imposed or withdrawn.  In one sense, the terms do seem to stand alone insofar 
                                                             
596 Brogan, “The Original Difference,” 38. Italics original.  
597 This is quoted by David Loy in his article “The Deconstruction of Buddhism.”  It is from Nāgārjuna’s MMK, 
12.8, 24.11, 18.  Loy, “The Deconstruction of Buddhism,”  233.  Italics original.  
598 Magliola helps clarify this: “The relation of the ‘present’ to the ‘past’ and ‘future’ is a negative relation, that 
is, the present is not the not-now. The relation, even if negative, is a sort of shadowy ‘time’s becoming spatial’ 
(spacing); but the relation becomes spatial only to self-differ, for the not-now, spatially and thus under erasure, 
is brought alongside the now only to differ from the now.  And the now is nothing but the not not-now which is 
functioning in the (crossed-out) same space.”  Magliola, Derrida on the Mend, 24. Italics original.  
599 John Caputo calls différance “a quasi-transcendental anteriority, not a supereminent, transcendent 
ulteriority.” Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 3. This lends credence to the thinking that 
différance does not and could not act as a master-concept, as a term with which to hold over other terms.  
Rather, it is the “quasi-transcendental anteriority” which makes for an interesting discussion.   
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as they act as analytical “pieces” with which to grasp another concept, but this transforms the 
term/concept/trace into exactly what it “is” not.600   In other words, when différance and 
śūnyatā become master-concepts, they are able to “stand” on their own, to convey meaning 
outside of the text, or point to other meanings.  By preventing différance and śūnyatā from 
“being” master-concepts, the fluidity of the trace, the remnant, the supplement can 
deconstruct with(in) a given meaning; as Kevin Hart highlights,  
We can better appreciate the status and scope of ‘affirmative’ when we realize 
that what is affirmed in deconstruction is the non-coincidence of being and 
meaning.  Derrida dubs this non-coincidence différance, and maintains that it 
precedes all grounds while resisting becoming another ground precisely 
because it forbids self-identity of any sort.
601
   
 
It is important to note the purposeful and indicative intention to “allow” the fluidity (and, 
consequently, no “ground”) of différance and śūnyatā insofar as they might help elucidate 
deconstruction within the Buddhist tradition.  In this way, Derridean différance might express 
Buddhist emptiness as “…the effect of language that impels language to represent itself as 
expressive re-presentation, a translation on the outside of what is constituted inside.”602  
 Derrida’s language of différance is (re)presented in a way that prevents self-existence.  
Derrida describes this careful nuance: “What differance, the trace, and so on ‘mean’ – which 
hence does not mean anything – is ‘before’ the concept, the name, the word, ‘something’ that 
would be nothing, that no longer arises from Being, from presence or from the presence of 
                                                             
600 Wang highlights the “…multiplicity of metaphors – trace, supplementary, circle etc. – in a rhetoric that acts 
out the motif of decentralization, or in an effect to prevent the idea of différance from becoming a master 
notion.” Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction, 209. Similarly, Spivak suggests that différance “comes close to 
becoming Derrida’s master-concept,” but that he ultimately resists this move.  Spivak, “Preface,” xliii. Thus, it 
is important to note that although différance might be close to a master-concept, Derrida denies this within his 
own terminology; différance is also subject to deconstruction. 
601 Kevin Hart, “Jacques Derrida (b. 1930): Introduction,” in The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader, ed. 
Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1997), 161. The connection with Buddhist emptiness might 
be made here; used as a descriptor, but not a “thing,” emptiness, like différance, “precedes all grounds while 
resisting becoming another ground.”  The Buddhist understanding of skillful means is useful here because it 
describes emptiness as a method of sorts while not ascribing it definitive being or existence.   
602 Derrida, Positions, 33.  Here différance has implications for the Buddhist tradition insofar as Derrida 
critiques metaphysical language; he shows a way to critique from within the tradition.  This means that though 
emptiness might seem prima facie a metaphysical concept, applying Derridean différance allows for a critique 
from within.  The further implications of this are spelled out below.   
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the present, nor even from absence…”603 Here Derrida is grappling with Heidegger’s 
difference between Being and nothingness; he demonstrates that such clear difference is not 
possible; instead further dissemination (to borrow from Derrida’s lexicon) is necessary 
because Being cannot be confined to (or in) words, nor expressed with language.  So, Derrida 
has effectively criticized the notion of presence in language; he must go further to avoid (or 
criticize from within) metaphysical language.  Derrida uses erasure,
604
 or the marking through 
or crossing out of words, allows him to “write” a term without the term “existing” on its own 
and without it “mean[ing] anything.”605  This is a careful move away from Heidegger’s 
crossing through as it is marked through with différance.
606
  Brogan identifies this move as a 
“radical shift and … a move that Heidegger obviously struggled with but resisted.”607  More 
specifically, Derrida was responding to self-presence in Heidegger’s Dasein:608 “…if it is true 
that différance is not able to be named at all, it is especially true that it cannot be named 
ontological difference.”609 Brogan goes on to connect erasure with différance: “Derrida 
                                                             
603 Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward 
and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York, 1992), 79. Italics original.  
604 Though Derrida’s use of erasure is used widely in his literature, in this instance it is intended from his 
purposeful “crossing-out of the archē and the transformation of general semiology into a grammatology…” 
Derrida, “Differance,” 146. Italics original.  
605 Derrida helps clarifies this point: “We can expose only what, at a certain moment, can become present, 
manifest; what can be shown, presented as a present, a being-present in its truth, the truth of a present or the 
presence of a present.  However, if differance is (I also cross out the ‘is’) what makes the presentation of being-
present possible, it never presents itself as such.”  Derrida, “Differance,” 134.  
606
 Caputo’s remarks are helpful here: “…[I]t would be a serious misunderstanding to think that différance is a 
master name, the secret, a hidden name of Being beyond Being, the hidden name of a presence so pure that it 
cannot appear and be present except by names of the imperfect traces of itself that it leaves behind as it 
withdraws from the world seated on a cloud of unknowing… Différance is not the trace left behind by the deus 
absconditus but the coded tracing within which are generated all names and concepts…” Caputo, The Prayers 
and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 9. Italics original. Caputo’s description of différance is helpful because it 
highlights the point that insofar différance does not stand above other concepts, it is also subject to a play of 
differences itself.   
607 Brogan, “The Original Difference,” 38.  
608 Brogan unpacks this assertion carefully: “The sameness of différance and the ontological difference lies in 
their metaontological status.  Both are radically other than anything that metaphysics could conceive or name in 
a discourse about difference.  The difference  between différance and ontological difference is that for 
Heidegger this otherness is an accessible otherness – an otherness with which Dasein dwells.  Dasein is the 
being who can transcend the insurmountable gap which separates beings and Being.  Dasein is the scene where 
this contradictory relation occurs.  For Derrida, this contradiction needs to be radicalized and experienced as a 
contradiction.”  Ibid. Italics original.  
609 Ibid. Italics original.  
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crosses out the ontological difference.  He does not in order to open up a new space but in 
order to operate freely in the clearing that has been given to him as a task for thinking.”610 
Derrida’s différance “does not exist, and is not any sort of being-present (on),”611 so, erasure 
is the “operative” move of différance insofar as it denies “being” in meaning, ontological 
necessity, and Being (in the Heideggerian sense
612
).  Derrida calls this a “strategy without 
finality…The concept of play (jeu) remains beyond this opposition; in the eve and aftermath 
of philosophy, it designates the unity of chance and necessity in an endless calculus.”613 
Through erasure, Derrida attempts to write without self-presence; how might this be applied 
to Buddhist emptiness? If emptiness cannot be adequate described, appropriated, etc., might 
Derridean différance allow for new ways of writing (about) emptiness?
614
  
 Erasure allows différance to act with(in) śūnyatā to prevent either term from 
becoming a master-concept.  By erasing the term, the supplement, the trace, emptiness is no 
longer expressible as a concept above/with/in others in Buddhism; in the same regard, erasure 
prevents it from being radically other from Buddhism. In the Derridean context, śūnyatā is 
both with(in)(out) its respective tradition, all the while resisting master-concept status.   
III. Reading Différance(s) in Buddhist Emptiness 
 Buddhist thinkers have numerous ways of denoting emptiness, yet all are described as 
faulty, insufficient, and incomplete.  At best, emptiness might be called a “pedagogical term 
                                                             
610 Ibid. 38-39.  
611 Derrida, “Differance,” 134. Italics original.  
612 To clarify this very loaded phrasing, the intent deals with Derrida’s critique of the position of metaphysics: 
“This privilege is the ether of metaphysics, the very element of our thought insofar as it is caught up in the 
language of metaphysics.  We can only de-limit such a closure today by evoking this import of presence, which 
Heidegger has shown to be the onto-theological determination of being.” Ibid. 147. 
613 Ibid. 135. Italics original. Caputo’s summary remarks of différance are helpful here: “…deconstruction, like 
negative theology, finds itself constantly writing under erasure, saying something without saying it, even 
deforming and misspelling it.” Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 2.  
614 This question is developed out of Spivak’s appropriation of différance insofar as “…being the structure (a 
structure never quite there, never by us perceived, itself deferred and different) of our psyche – is also the 
structure of ‘presence,’ a term itself under erasure.” Spivak, “Preface,” xliii.  The connection is that by deferring 
and by a different emptiness, can emptiness “be” (re)thought of in a different way?  
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that points to the futility of any concept to accurately express the nature of reality.”615 Writing 
the term emptiness does not convey the “true nature of reality…[as] empty of any abiding 
substantiality,”616 nor does it convey self-presence or lack of self-presence. How might 
Derridean différance be useful in examining emptiness? Even Buddhist texts that assert that 
the true nature of emptiness is realizing that all is empty of “abiding substantiality” rely on 
methodological tools of expression to point to an origin of sorts: non-substantiality.  In this 
way, différance might be useful because it “…is the nonfull, nonsimple ‘origin’; it is the 
structured and differing origin of differences.”617 Différance may help write emptiness 
without conveying “substance.”  More specifically, différance provides a way for inscription 
on/in this page in a way that transcends time and space because “…[Differance] retains the 
mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a 
future element.”618 Through différance Buddhist emptiness can be written as non-substantial, 
without occupying “space,” and without being a thing or (a) no-thing. 
 How might reading Derridean différance in/on/through Buddhist emptiness bring out 
new ways of thinking about emptiness?  This question is examined below in a reading of an 
early text that deals specifically with emptiness: The Heart Sūtra. 
A. Dissimilarities in Différance 
 While it might be shown that différance is “present” in a Buddhist text, perhaps to the 
point where definitive meaning is not possible, it is also important to note here some careful 
dissimilarities between Derridean différance and Buddhist emptiness.  The prima facie 
observation here might be that while Buddhist emptiness is a foundational concept in 
Buddhist thought, différance is more akin to an attitude, a way of showing difference in a 
                                                             
615 Judith Simmer-Brown, “Preface to the Vintage Spiritual Classics Edition,” in Buddhist Wisdom: The 
Diamond Sutra and The Heart Sutra, trans. and commentary Edward Conze (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 
xix.  
616 Ibid. xviii.  
617 Derrida, “Differance,” 141.  
618 Ibid. 142.  
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text.  While différance is regarded as a “mark of…suspended status,”619 Buddhist emptiness 
is more of a mark of “reality” as it points to the nonsubstantiality of thing-ness.  In this way, 
Buddhist emptiness is a way of communicating the wrongly-assumed status of things, while 
différance is more of a tool to help unravel the binary oppositions that form the language of 
such things.   
Though there is clear dissimilarity between différance and emptiness, différance is a 
purposeful step to separate out presence in language structures; indeed, to show their lack of 
presence, emptiness serves a similar function in Buddhist language.  Emptiness is more like a 
realization, a step toward enlightenment where all things fall away, where language structures 
are not regarded as having presence, indeed that all phenomenal realities are empty 
themselves.  The strength of using différance in a study on emptiness rests with the ability to 
deconstruct presence in language, to separate out binary oppositions within negative 
structures, and to show how emptiness, though empty “itself,” is still conditioned by 
différance.  
IV. (Deconstruction[s] of/in/from) The Heart Sūtra 
 The Heart Sūtra, one the earliest extant texts arising out of the prajñā (wisdom) 
literature,
620
 is an excellent early source for discussing śūnyatā in the Buddhist tradition 
because it centers on “emptiness, the absolute nature of reality.”621 While this may appear 
paradoxical, the focus is not so much on emptiness as such, but on “reality,” on the “self,” on 
the non-substantiality of all things.  The Heart Sūtra is short, very dense, and requires an 
understanding of other Buddhist teachings; that is to say, a basic premise of the text is that the 
language employed has the ability to convey the non-substantiality of reality; or does it?  
                                                             
619 Spivak, “Preface,” xliii. 
620 Simmer-Brown follows Conze in situating the Heart Sutra as one of “the most renowned texts of the Indian 
Mahayana collection known as the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā in Sanskrit).”  Simmer-Brown, 
“Preface,” xv. What appears below is not a commentary on the entirety of the Heart Sutra, but a detailed 
analysis of sections that deal with emptiness explicitly.   
621 Ibid.  
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Herein lies the important step to examining the Heart Sūtra through the lens of Derridean 
deconstruction.  When discussing such ubiquitous things like “reality,” “emptiness,” and 
“non-substantiality,” it is fair to assert that the text “exists” as a text today because it was 
important for early Buddhists to convey insight into the nature of reality.  This also lends 
credence to the authority of the Buddhist texts upon community; even if language was limited 
in how it conveys the (non)meaning of emptiness in contradistinction to the experience of 
emptiness, it still asserts authority over the teaching of emptiness as a religious text; the 
authority lies in the claim that all phenomena are empty, including emptiness itself.  
However, early Buddhist thinkers were careful not to assume that their words conveyed 
presence (to borrow from Derrida’s phrasing of the problem) or (conversely) absence.  
Rather, it can be posited that the Heart Sūtra “exists” as a text in order to point the reader to 
his/her own (non-)substantiality, the text’s own (non-)substantiality, to letting go of craving 
for “existence.”  To that end, would it be fair to call this sūtra a tool, a “skillful means” to use 
Buddhist phrasing, to expand upon the centrality of emptiness in the tradition? Perhaps, but 
this does not necessarily posit that either the ancient or modern reader possesses the “skillful 
means” with which to unpack the dense meanings and subtle nuances of the sūtra.   
 To identify the author-reader problem is but one piece of this examination.  There are 
various other problems as well; for example, the text conveys the non-substantiality of 
emptiness while eliminating such terminology.   Does the text (the ancient narrator, no less) 
go far enough?  Is it possible to “grasp” the “meaning” of the text without craving, without 
ego, without substance (grammar, lexicon, syntax, etc.)?  Might there be a different way to 
read the text?  What is suggested here, and hopefully worked out below, is the possibility of 
(re)reading/(re)writing emptiness in the Heart Sūtra through the lens of Derridean différance.  
The examination – deconstruction – of such a text with différance does not pre-suppose 
meaning, nor does it pre-suppose the possibility of “understanding” with any kind of “plain 
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reading” of the text.  Rather, deconstruction lays bare the other voices, the (non)substance of 
the text, the play of words, and, perhaps, a différant “meaning” of emptiness.  There is no 
pre-tense of rewriting Buddhist emptiness, nor is there is the attempt to suggest a 
fundamental disconnect (though that may be part of the conclusion), but rather the teasing out 
of possibility.   
 As suggested above, Derrida’s possible answer to writing622 emptiness without 
presence, as a no-thing, would be through erasure, through emptiness.  As confined to 
language, the term “emptiness” here is written with différance as “différance inhabits the very 
core of what appears to be immediate and present.”623  Thus, the project here is not so much 
to learn to “write” or “understand” emptiness so much as it is to bring out the nuances of 
having to write emptiness; to that end, is a “new” way of writing necessary?  It is possible to 
“write,” or in Derridean terminology, inscribe, emptiness?  Just as Derrida wrote out a 
“science of writing,”624 is not a grammatology of emptiness necessary?  This would take 
seriously the possibility of (re)inscribing emptiness insofar as the grammatology is “a science 
that would study the effects of this différance which Western metaphysics has systematically 
repressed in its search for self-present truth.”625 While the connection between Western 
                                                             
622 Barbara Johnson elucidates the distinction between writing and speech: “Writing…is considered by the 
logocentric system to be only a representation of speech, a secondary substitute designed for use only when 
speaking is impossible.  Writing is thus a second-rate activity that tries to overcome distance by making use of 
it: the writer puts his thought on paper, distancing it from himself, transforming it into something that can be 
read by someone far away, even after the writer’s death.  This inclusion of death, distance, and difference is 
thought to be a corruption of the self-presence of meaning, to open up to all forms of adulteration which 
immediacy would have prevented.” Barbara Johnson, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Dissemination (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1981), ix. Italics original.  The implication here is that Derrida’s distinction 
between logocentric thinking, as expressed in words, is immediately corrupted and incomplete; thus, emptiness, 
conveyed in language, must be (re)written with erasure to convey the displacement and corruption of the term.  
623 Ibid. Italics original. Johnson’s further comment in this definition is important: “The illusion of the self-
presence of meaning or of consciousness is thus produced by the repression of the differential structures from 
which they spring.” Ibid.  
624 Ibid.  
625 Ibid. ix-x.  While it may be alleged that this amounts to applying a criticism of Western metaphysics to 
Eastern thinking, the intention here is to show (through the below analysis of the Heart Sutra) how the same 
error may have been committed in Eastern thinking.  Admittedly, there may not be a direct correlation here; 
instead, from the outset it might be alleged that the error was made in the form seeking self-present Truth 
through negations.   
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metaphysics and Buddhist emptiness is not inherently self-evident, the connection might be 
made with an analysis of how the language is used to substantiate the priority of emptiness.  
As emptiness is central to texts like the Heart Sūtra, and also to Buddhism in general, the 
implicit and explicit use of negations might be deemed as a search for self-present (self-
absent) Truth.  To that end, the (un)developing of a grammatology of emptiness through 
différance might help present a lens of emptiness that could be useful for analysis.  As such, 
the grammatology of emptiness, informed by différance, becomes the writing of emptiness 
that is neither presence nor absence, both presence and absence, and (neither nor) presence or 
absence.
626
 The (un)development of a grammatology of emptiness sets up a tension in the 
text, a(n) (anti-)lens  by which to view the negations of emptiness as neither present nor 
absent.    
An analytical lens, however, is simply not sufficient on its own; rather, the lens must 
be informed by différance, by textual tension, by instability.  This allows for an interaction, 
even a bridge, between the thought of Derrida and Buddhist śūnyatā.  Methodologically, the 
progression follows a similar logic of Youxuan Wang: “…I want to submit Derrida’s text to a 
play of différance, and argue that…we can also translate Derrida’s post-modern project of 
deconstruction into the pre-modern Madhyamaka language without ending up equating one 
with the other.”627 While Wang’s examined texts differ from those herein, the methodology 
he presents is a logical delineation of differing principles (namely pre-modern Buddhism and 
post-modern Derridean thought); Wang examines both (non)systems of thought 
independently of one another and yet sets up a tension that allows for analysis and discussion.  
                                                             
626 The use of différance here employs the idea that “[d]ifferance is not a ‘concept’ or ‘idea’ that is ‘truer’ than 
presence.  It can only be a process of textual work, a strategy of writing.” Ibid. xvi. Italics original.  
627 Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction, 192.  
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The same methodological tactic is applied here, with the attempt to view the pre-modern 
Heart Sūtra with post-modern différance.628   
A. Emptiness and Form: Différance(s) of the Self 
Here, O Sāriputra, form is emptiness and the very emptiness is form; 
emptiness does not differ from form, form does not differ from emptiness; 
whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness that is form, the 




 The above passage, comprising several of the critical verses of the Heart Sūtra, 
demonstrates the nuance of Buddhist emptiness; however, though it is a key passage in the 
early wisdom literature, is it intelligible on this side of enlightenment?
630
  If the main motif 
here is the non-substantiality of all things, is it possible to convey this through writing?  The 
above analysis of Derridean différance helps unpack this question further, as well as provide 
a way to write (about) emptiness.    
1. (The) Text: Commentators  
 Edward Conze’s discussion of the Heart Sūtra is quite helpful because he focuses 
heavily on the centrality of emptiness to the Buddhist tradition.
631
  He expounds upon the 
idea that emptiness is the non-substantiality of all things, including the self: “As long as the 
self still struggles to extinguish itself in emptiness, it will set form against emptiness, and so 
                                                             
628 The Heart Sūtra, along with many other pieces of early Buddhist prajñā (wisdom) literature, is quite short in 
length; the accompanying commentaries, however, both ancient and contemporary, are quite lengthy.  To that 
end, time and space limit a full discussion of nuances of emptiness in these commentaries; rather, what are 
examined are major points that help bring out the various nuances of emptiness for further examination.   
629 Edward Conze, trans. and commentary, Buddhist Wisdom: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2001), 86.  
630 Lopez helps contextualize this: “The Buddha neither abandons samsāra nor covets nirvāna, knowing both to 
be like a dream, equally empty.  He abides in neither the cycle of rebirth or the nirvāna of the Hīnayāna, but in 
the unlocated (literally ‘non-abiding’) nirvāna that is the summum bonum of the Mahāyāna.” Italics original. 
Donald S. Lopez, Jr., The Heart Sūtra Explained: Indian and Tibetan Commentaries (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1988), 66. 
631 It must be noted, however, that closer examination of his work may show the limitation of his understanding; 
as Conze was an early translator of ancient Buddhist texts into English, this might be held in a specific context.  
Though his interpretation is certainly nuanced, it is oftentimes limited comparatively with other commentators.  
For example, Conze often appeals to explicitly Western philosophical terminology to explain Buddhism; while 
this may not be inherently “wrong,” it betrays a rather limited understanding of traditions in their own right.   
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on.”632 Here Conze highlights perhaps one of the more difficult nuances of emptiness: to see 
the world, objects, emotions, etc. as fundamentally empty is a difficult task, but to see the 
self, yourself, as fundamentally empty (of ego, substance, etc.), is immensely difficult; the 
self wants to cling to something, to (it)self, others, to identity, etc.  The Heart Sūtra suggests 
that this should not be so difficult because all things are empty of substance; Donald Lopez, 
Jr. clarifies this subtlety: “…although emptiness is the mode of being of form, emptiness does 
not negate the conventional appearance of form. Thus, emptiness is form.”633   Furthermore, 
Conze cautions that not letting go of the self, seeing the self as fundamentally empty of 
substance, too, will lead to setting “form against emptiness, and so on.”634 What is at play 
here might be called “an affirming negative (paryudāsapratiședha)”635 because it requires a 
type of dialectical logic; the tension here is clear: one must see that all things lack 
independent substance, including the self; furthering the delusion of form and emptiness does 
not allow the dialectical tension to play out. 
 However, an interesting negation arises here; if “forms” are empty of substance,636 
emptiness must, too, be empty of meaning, substantiality, etc.  Fundamentally, all is negated 
– including the Heart Sūtra, with its short, yet pregnant, words, and its tension of form and 
emptiness.   Even more, the negation employed to do so is also itself negated in this 
process.
637
  Does this reach the point of inexpressibility with words?  Here Conze offers an 
interesting way forward: “But where self-extinction is accomplished, there a non-difference 
                                                             
632 Conze, Buddhist Wisdom, 89.  
633 Lopez, The Heart Sūtra Explained, 58.  
634 Conze, Buddhist Wisdom, 89. 
635 Lopez, The Heart Sūtra Explained, 60. Italics original.  
636 Lopez helps clarify this statement: …”’form is emptiness’ can be taken to mean that the form of reality, 
which is emptiness, is empty of the thoroughly imagined form and designated form.  ‘Emptiness is form’ means 
that the form of reality has the same final nature as the other kinds of form; they are all empty.” Ibid. 64.  
637 Lopez offers helpful commentary here; he follows this logic to its natural conclusion: “But if it is not asserted 
that the wisdom of the non-duality of object and subject ultimately exists, why is it not non-existent? It is not; it 
is asserted to be dependently arisen conventionally and it has passed beyond being ultimately existent or non-
existent.  Existence is overcome.” Ibid. 71.  
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of world and emptiness will ensue.”638 Does this suggest a type of negative unification once 
the self is “extinguished”?   What is the “non-difference” that Conze suggests?  Conze 
examines the etymological roots of śūnyatā as the “absence of any kind of self.”639 
Furthermore, he suggests that “…all dharmas are ‘empty’ in the sense that in their reality no 
‘self’ can be found, nothing that owns, nothing that belongs.”640 Conze’s use of “non-
difference,” though, carries different meaning: “[t]he emptiness which is envisaged here is 
not empty of that which it excludes, but it includes it, is identical with it, is full of it.”641 The 
non-difference Conze is discussing allows the subtle nuance of emptiness and fullness within 
“the self” and within “the world.”  The ancient commentator Triratnadāsa elucidates the 
impact of the tension between difference and non-difference:  
Because there is no way in which form could be other than emptiness, that 
form having the character of the aggregates could be other in terms of 
emptiness.  However, form is only emptiness; it does not differ from 





These are intrinsically related to one of the key ideas of the Heart Sūtra: “form is emptiness 
and the very emptiness is form.”643  
2. Différances in / on the Text  
 While the sort of non-difference Conze discusses in his commentary is an attempt to 
grapple with the nuances of emptiness (especially in a Western framework of thinking), it 
comes too close to asserting some sort of negative unity.  Perhaps the lens of Derridean 
différance comes closer to expressing the subtleties of śūnyatā in regards to the (no)self.  
                                                             
638 Conze, Buddhist Wisdom, 89.  
639 Ibid. 85.  
640 Ibid. 85-86.   
641 Ibid. 91.  Lopez fleshes this out a bit more clearly: “Form is a positive phenomenon and impermanent; 
emptiness is a negation and permanent in the sense that it not in constant flux.” Lopez, The Heart Sūtra 
Explained, 72.  
642 Triratnadāsa, as quoted in Lopez, The Heart Sutra Explained, 77.  
643 Conze, Buddhist Wisdom, 86.  
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Steven Laycock outlines the difficulty of examining the concept of the self in Derridean 
language: 
No matter how faithful, no matter how accurately descriptive it might be, 
reflective [re]presentation , could disclose the self only if it were possible to 
speak of consciousness it[self], consciousness as such; only, that is, if it 
presented the ‘self’ of [self-]consciousness; only, once again, if consciousness 
maintained an ontic/ontological and transtemporal integrity; only if it refrained 
from its perplexing habit of flinging itself centrifugally beyond itself, 





This highlights, with a very purposeful Derridean shift of différance, the difficulty associated 
with pinning down definitive meaning of the self and self-consciousness; herein is a play with 
the slippery notion of consciousness and how might a “self” be defined.  The similarities with 
Buddhism are striking: just as the self is rejected in Buddhism, différance also suggests that a 
definitive vantage-point, a bird’s eye view, an objective and detached narrator,645 is not 
possible (nor should it be assumed), thus calling into question the possibility of a self 
amongst others, a self detached from otherness, or a centrality to the human person.
646
  
                                                             
644 Steven W. Laycock, “Self and Self Image,” in Buddhisms and Deconstructions, ed. Jin Y. Park (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2006), 211. All italics and brackets are original.  
645 See especially Derrida’s critique in his essay, “The Attending Discourse.”  Specifically, “[The Attending 
Discourse] unites the motif of presence (the presence, the pressing solicitude of the interlocutory voice that calls 
you “you,” thus invoking the presence of the reader-spectator who attends the spectacle or discourse while it is 
happening) with the motif of the auxiliary (a discourse of aid, of indefatigable attentiveness, or vigilant 
prevention, a kind of Platonic boetheia that supports with its speech – its present speech – the faltering and 
frightened infirmity of an ekgonos, a dispossessed son, a stray product, a seed exposed to all the violence of 
writing: you).” Derrida, Dissemination, 324-325.  Italics original.  
646 Derrida’s analysis of the self is conceptually important to his thought; it is not possible to make an adequate 
summation of his concept of the self here, rather, a highlight of his discussion is important to contextualize the 
tension between the self and presence: “Within its most general form, the mastery of presence acquires a sort of 
infinite assurance.  The power of repetition that the eidos and ousia made available seems to acquire an absolute 
independence.  Ideality and substantiality relate to themselves, in the element of the res cogitans, by a 
movement of pure auto-affection.  It calls itself infallible and if the axioms of natural reason give it certitude, 
overcome the provocation of the Evil Spirit, and prove the existence of God, it is because they constitute the 
very element of thought and of self-presence.  Self-presence is not disturbed by the divine origin of these 
axioms…God is the name and the element of that which makes possible an absolutely pure and absolutely self-
present self-knowledge.” Derrida, Grammatology, 97-98. Italics original.  Here Derrida is critiquing the Western 
conception of the self, specifically in the thought of Descartes and Hegel; he demonstrates how the possibility of 
a self-present knowledge or entity is not possible (with the possible exception of what he terms “God”).  This 
distinction is important to this discussion because Derrida’s demonstration calls into question the possibility of 
any self or knowledge of a self.   
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Rather, through emptiness – or “lack” – the self is negated.647  David Loy suggests that 
Derrida’s skepticism of a self is rooted in the idea of a “self-existing, Cartesian-like 
consciousness.”648 The skepticism seems to go further, though, perhaps even to the possibility 
of perspective – in this case, a detached, objective standpoint:  
The basic difficulty is that insofar as I feel separate…I am insecure, for the 
ineluctable trace of nothingness in my fictitious (because not self-existing / 
self-present) sense-of-self is experienced as a sense-of-lack; in reaction, the 
sense-of-self becomes preoccupied with trying to become self-existing / self-
present, in one or another symbolic fashion. The tragic irony is that the ways 
we attempt to do this cannot succeed, for the delusive sense-of-self can never 
expel the trace of lack that constitutes it; while in the most important sense we 
are already self-existing, insofar as the infinite set of differential traces that 




The possibility of a whole, a unity, in this case of a sense of self or of the self, is called into 
question due to the ever-present delusion of sense-perception, ego, and “clinging.” This 
generally parallels with a Buddhist rejection of the self; Loy goes further to suggest that the 
connection with Derridean deconstruction is made with the natural “end” of the self: “The 
sense-of-self wants to gain nirvāna / enlightenment, but trace / śūnyatā means it can never 
attain it.”650 
                                                             
647 In this way, emptiness might be negated in the same way as “…the movement of différance, as that which 
produces different things, that which differentiates, is common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark 
our language, such as, to take only a few examples, sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture, 
etc.” Derrida, Positions, 9.  Italics original. In this model, would emptiness/negation become another of 
Derrida’s “oppositional concepts” that are marked by différance?  This may be, but not necessarily.  If 
emptiness somehow means that which is negated (pure negation?), and it must be informed by différance, but it 
is a play of signifiers when emptiness is written – and written in a way that signifies the emptiness of all 
qualities – can it be another in a(n) (endless) list of “oppositional concepts”? The point here is not whether or 
not emptiness / negation are defined or deconstructed as such, but rather if they inform the discussion of how / 
when / why the self is negated in a play of différances.  In this way, the self, understood through emptiness, 
becomes / is negated.  
648 Loy, “The Deconstruction of Buddhism,” 238.  
649 Ibid.  
650 Ibid. Italics original.  Loy offers the following to substantiate his analysis: “I think this touches on the 
enduring attraction of logocentrism and ontotheology, not just in the West but everywhere: Being means 
security, the grounding of the self, whether it is experiencing something transcendent or intellectually 
sublimated into a metaphysical archē.  We want to meet God face to face, to see our essential Buddha-nature, 
but trace / śūnyatā means we can never catch it…The problem, again, is our desire for self-presence, emphasis 
here being as much on the self- as on the –presence.”  Ibid. Italics original.  
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 Derrida himself is quite critical of the Cartesian assurances of a/the self.  In the 
context of bringing together the Buddhist critique of the “no-self” in terms of emptiness with 
the Derridean critiques of the self (as a quasi-product that is superimposed upon/in a text as a 
false sense of presence), the similarities are notable.  Derridean différance displaces, sets 
aside, casts doubt upon a (present) self in the same way that Buddhist emptiness affirms the 
negation of the self in/through emptiness.  The definable ego, the “I” of the subject / object 
relationship, becomes a dialectical nil in terms of différance.
651
 Derrida’s uneasiness with an 
“I” appears throughout his work; one example appears in his essay, “The Attending 
Discourse:”  
But who is it that is addressing you?  Since it is not an “author,” a “narrator,” 
or a “deus ex machina,” it is an “I” that is both part of the spectacle and part of 
the audience; an “I” that, a bit like “you,” attends (undergoes) its own 
incessant, violent reinscription within the arithmetical machinery; an “I” that 
functioning as a pure passageway for operations of substitution, is not some 
singular and irreplaceable existence, some subject or “life,” but only, moving 




In a similar way, the ego, the “I,” the self, is undercut by the emptiness of all substances (or, 
in Buddhist terms, the teaching of anatman); indeed the path to emptiness is often described 
as the realization of the lack of an independent, substantial self.
653
  
This is no simple connection, though – if that is even possible.654  Rather, it might be 
more rigorous to call this a diacritical point of departure as Derridean différance allows for 
                                                             
651 Derrida’s commentary here is quite helpful to unpack this connection: “Nothing – no present and in-different 
being – thus precedes différance and spacing.  There is no subject who is agent, author, and master of différance, 
who eventually and empirically would be overtaken by différance.  Subjectivity – like objectivity – is an effect 
of différance, an effect inscribed in a system of différance.  This is why the a of différance also recalls that 
spacing is temporization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation 
– in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference o a present reality, to a being – are always deferred.”  
Derrida, Positions, 28-29.  Italics original.  
652 Derrida, Dissemination, 325.  
653 This theme is prevalent throughout Buddhist literature, both ancient and modern.  To establish extra-textual 
support for this position, the lack of an independent self can be found the Diamond Sutra, another ancient text of 
wisdom literature: “Futhermore, Subhuti, self-identical (sama) is that dharma, and nothing is therein at variance 
(vishama).  Therefore is it called ‘utmost, right (samyak) and perfect (sam-) enlightenment.’ Self-identical 
through the absence of a self, a being, a soul, or a person, the utmost, right, and perfect enlightenment is fully 
known as the totality of all the wholesome dharmas.” Conze, Buddhist Wisdom, 61-62. Italics original.  
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the voice of dissent for a self-present “I” in both Western metaphysical criticisms and 
Buddhist rejections of a self in the paradigm of emptiness.  The implications of this are more 
specific in terms of what this says about Buddhist emptiness within the (textual) confines of 
the Heart Sūtra.  Namely, how might the (re)inscription of “form is emptiness and the very 
emptiness is form” be understood of the (present) reader?  If there is no present self, are the 
words themselves not empty, devoid of inherent meaning, thoroughly “absent” as the 
inscription of meaning upon the text?  The logical conclusion of this might be something of 
textual nihilism, but even that would imply textual misreading of Derrida’s point; rather, the 
absent self who is (not) reading this text might have to square with the possibility of not only 
empty words (non-substance in language and meaning), but also the possibility of real form 
within the text.  Hence, the diacritical connection with Derrida: the impetus of conveying 
textual “meaning” through inscription upon this page betrays the emptiness of form and the 
form of emptiness.  The “effective violence of disseminating writing”655 must take seriously 
the possibility of writing emptiness,(dis)seminating negation, through the prism of Derridean 
différance.  
B. Negations of/in Language 
…in emptiness there is no form, nor feeling, nor perception, nor impulse, nor 
consciousness; No eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; No forms, sounds, 
smells, tastes, touchables or objects of mind; No sight-organ element, and so 
forth, until we come to: No mind-consciousness element; There is no 
ignorance, no extinction of ignorance, and so forth, until we come to: there is 
no decay and death, no extinction of decay and death.  There is no suffering, 





 This series of negations, each progressing from the basic (self) sense perceptions 
through the mind and thought, to the negation of the “path,” present something of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
654 The idea here is not to draw simple connections, for they would be on the surface only.  Rather, the point is 
to attempt to put together a paradigmatic nuance of similarity / dissimilarity that is informed by both emptiness 
and différance. 
655 Derrida, Positions, 85.  
656 Conze, Buddhist Wisdom, 97.  
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“comprehensive”657 negation of possible self-substantial elements.  At once (and quite 
paradoxically) destroying concepts of any type of unity, and yet negating to the point of some 
sort of (non)unity, these negations are not easily sorted out into separate entities.  Indeed, the 
text goes so far as to negate the possibility of attaining enlightenment because there is no 
“path.”  Does this mean that the path is no path?  Or, is there something else at play here?  
Should the path be better described as a (non)path?  
 Though the progression of negations follows its own logic, it is no simple negation of 
substantive things; rather, it pushes closer to a (non)transcendent language, a negation of self 
perceptions - internal stimuli - and a negation of external objects. Lopez explores the logic of 
the negations by citing the commentator Jñānamitra: “The extinction of ignorance up to and 
including the extinction of aging and death have the characteristic of purification, but because 
emptiness is without characteristic, it is not the extinction of ignorance up to and including 
the extinction of aging and death.”658  Furthermore, Lopez explains this as the fundamental 
point: “…[emptiness] is not any of the various categories of conventional phenomena 
because it lacks their defining characteristics.  Emptiness is thus seen as beyond definition 
and expression.”659  In this logic, the differences between subject and object become blurred, 
perhaps because those distinctions were never really “there.”660  In the same thread, 
differences between clinging to “things” and “non-things” (like a path, attainment, non-
attainment, etc.) seem to fall away.  What is left is, as alluded to above, a sort of negative 
                                                             
657 This is a loaded term with the intent to underscore the totality of the negations; Conze unpacks this: “Suffice 
it to say that the Emptiness which…contains all the manifold multiplicity of the world, is, as the One, as well 
empty of anything that has been counted as separate dharma, whether conditioned or unconditioned.” Ibid. 99. 
Lopez describes the negations as “twelve links of the chain of dependent arising [that] are often depicted as a 
circle, the beginning of which, ignorance, can only be discerned by a Buddha.” Lopez, The Heart Sūtra 
Explained, 98. 
658 Ibid.  
659 Ibid. 100.  Lopez explains further: “Emptiness is beyond names and designations and because form is 
emptiness, it is equally inexpressible.” Ibid. 101.  
660 Lopez draws out Vajrapāni’s commentary to explain the nuances between subject and object: “Because 
Buddhas have no object of meditation and sentient beings have no object of awareness, the stains of objects of 
knowledge do not exist and the non-conceptual wisdom does not exist.  Therefore, there is nothing to attain and 
nothing to be lost.”  Ibid. 106.    
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unity, a oneness that is at once transcendent and negative.  Lopez describes this with more 
specific language: “…by understanding the meaning of emptiness one’s mind is freed from 
all obstruction and all reasons for fear.”661  The question is whether or not this can be 
conveyed with any kind of authenticity or accuracy with language.  How does one describe a 
sort of negative transcendence, a pseudo-unity with negation, a realization of the path by the 
falling away of the path?  Is this possible with/through/in conventional language?  The 
premise here is that conventional language pre-supposes subject and object relationships – 
even if it claims quite the opposite – because grammar, syntax, and particular vocabulary are 
used to convey negativity through the negation of possible “clingings.”662 
 How might these negations be examined through a Derridean lens of différance? 
Derrida’s own contradistinction of différance helps sort through the various negations: 
On the one hand, it [the verb différer] indicates difference as distinction, 
inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses interposition of delay, 
the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until “later” what is 




The central negations in the Heart Sūtra are distinct “entities” (understood as a skillful 
means) because they negate sense, path, and attainment. Here emptiness might be understood 
as a form of limited skillful means, as it “…is another name for dependent co-arising and the 
middle path that emphasizes the impossibility of exhausting the multilevel causations which 
we call existence.”664 Through the negations in the text, differences between subject and 
                                                             
661 Ibid. 106-107.  
662 To that end, however, one must consider if that is exactly the point.  Perhaps the failure of the language is 
really a / the truth of the Heart Sūtra.  This would suggest that the tradition wants to impress upon its readers 
that emptiness, enlightenment, nirvana, et. al. are not conveyable through words, even with an impressive list of 
negations.  However, does this not also pre-suppose that there is a language beyond the language, that there is 
meaning behind or in front of the language used in the Sūtra?  This may coalesce well with a tradition that 
advocated using skillful means to convey a deeper meaning even at the expense of more simple expression.   
While this is certainly a possibility, the analysis here sets the reading of the text against the logical implications 
of negation.  It is beneficial to parse out other possible meanings of the text, though the intent is to examine it 
through the lens of Derridean deconstruction. 
663 Derrida, “Differance,”129. Italics original.  
664 Jin Y. Park, “General Introduction,” in Buddhisms and Deconstructions, ed. Jin Y. Park (Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2006), xiii.  
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object are highlighted where they are empty, i.e. there is no distinction. This, however, draws 
in the problem of textual meaning in relation to any real “power” or “effect” these negations 
might have.
665
 Rather, the negations might be closer to what Derrida describes as “…an effect 
of différance, as is the effect of language that impels language to represent itself as expressive 
re-presentation, a translation on the outside of what is constituted inside.”666 This might begin 
to highlight a fundamental difference between Derridean analysis and a Buddhist 
understanding of emptiness.  What is re-presented on the outside here?  A Buddhist might 
examine this text as a (non-)path of negations and he/she might say that the words themselves 
are empty of substance; while a Derridean analysis might not differ from that (calling 
attention to possible meaning(s) of words), the disconnect arises from potential “outcomes.”  
Whereas for the Buddhist text, what is re-presented is a series of negations that expose the 
emptiness of substantiality, the emptiness of causation, the emptiness of the path, in the 
Derridean analysis, what is re-presented is the trace, the endless deferral to other texts, the 
deference to other possible meaning(s).
667
 
C. Experience and/of Emptiness: Negation(s) 
 A concept of emptiness in the Buddhist tradition would take seriously 
phenomenological considerations, though the phrasing as such might be a bit different.
668
 As 
                                                             
665
 Derrida highlights such problems quite clearly: “In the extent to which what is called ‘meaning’ (to be 
‘expressed’) is already, and thoroughly, constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which there is 
already a text, a network of textual referrals to other texts, a textual transformation in which each allegedly 
‘simple term’ is marked by the trace of another term, the presumed interiority of meaning is already worked 
upon by its own exteriority.” Derrida, Positions, 33. Italics original. This takes the idea that the above passage in 
the Heart Sūtra does not stand by itself, but rather is part of an endless differing and deferring to other texts on 
emptiness; though negations inform the logic of the passage, a Derridean lens of différance casts doubt on 
whether or not these could have any effect in and of themselves.  The efficacious nature of the negations, then, 
may not be “measurable” in effect insofar as they are but a trace of other differences.   
666 Ibid.  
667 Caputo speaks of différance in almost apocalyptic terms: “But do not expect différance to settle…disputes; 
différance has not come to bring peace but the two-edged sword of undecidability.” Caputo, The Prayers and 
Tears of Jacques Derrida, 14. This begins to bridge the gap in examining Buddhist emptiness with différance 
insofar as the (only) factor of “undecidability” endlessly defers and shows differences in emptiness.  This also 
undercuts the meaning of negativity and how it figures into an examination of emptiness.   
668 While a Buddhist might not use the term “phenomenological” – a thoroughly Western word – the concept is 
still very much entrenched in Buddhist thought. At its root, as an examination of first-person consciousness, a 
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discussed above, a Buddhist conception of the self, or a no-self, would play into 
consideration of a Buddhist phenomenology, further consideration must be made with an 
understanding of emptiness.
669
 Perhaps, though, there is no clear way to conduct such an 
analysis, for is it possible to apply a Western philosophical concept upon Buddhist thinking?  
Further, the point of this section is to come to terms with negativity in Derrida, specifically as 
it might apply (however directly or indirectly) with Buddhist emptiness.  The real question 
here must be decided with the role of an experience of emptiness.  In Buddhism, emptiness is 
no-thing, a non-entity, a non-concept, etc.  Extant Buddhist literature, specifically with the 
Heart Sūtra, suggests that emptiness is best understood via experience.  Indeed, references to 
emptiness suggest nullifying or negating sensory illusions to calm the mind. And yet, it is not 
possible to describe emptiness solely in terms of experience because the implications of 
negation / negating might be lost.  So, to turn toward a phenomenological view of emptiness 
in Buddhism might mean to grapple with the relationship of negating and experience.   
 The question of experience persists: how might emptiness be “understood” any other 
way?  Is Buddhist emptiness fundamentally devoid of even that of the experiential realm; 
does the discussion naturally bend toward a phenomenological discussion of (un)awareness 
and the “experience” of emptiness? Here an examination of Derridean critiques is of valuable 
import.  Specifically, the Heart Sūtra suggests that emptiness cannot be comprehended, 
examined, experienced, so how does it (not) “exist” in the text? Is it, fundamentally, “…a 
desire to experience the impossible, to go where we cannot go…to cross these limits, to defy 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
phenomenological perspective in Buddhism might share some antecedents with Western concerns, but further 
analysis would suggest a fundamental difference in the concept of the self.  As Buddhism rejects a concept of 
the self, a phenomenological lens would differ greatly from its Western counterpoints.  
669 For an introduction in Buddhist phenomenology, see part one of Dan Lusthaus’ Buddhist Phenomenology: A 
Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2002), or Noa Ronkin’s Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).  
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the border patrol, to think the unthinkable”?670 Moreover, John Caputo says, “For Derrida, 
the experience of the impossible represents the least bad definition of deconstruction.”671 As 
Buddhist emptiness presents the unending, unyielding problem of expression, whether it be 
for experience, examination, etc., the connection
672
 with Derrida rests with his tool of 
différance in deconstruction as a lens to view the impossible: “For the impossible is indeed an 
‘aporia’ – which means ‘no way to go’ – but in deconstruction aporias are made to be broken, 
not to drive us off the road.”673 Thus, for comparative purposes, it might be analytically 
conducive to describe Buddhist emptiness as an aporia of sorts, especially with the problem 
of experience.   
 A more (un)natural fit to view a phenomenological view of emptiness, at least as the 
Western tradition is concerned, might be through Derrida (though Derrida would most likely 
resist this move himself).  Derrida is highly critical of phenomenological methods, though he 
expends much of his scholarly output and shaping of his own thinking in/on (especially) 
Husserlian phenomenology.
674
 However, an examination of Derrida’s criticisms of 
                                                             
670 John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, “Introduction,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. 
Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 3.  
671 Ibid.  
672 Wang begins to work this problem out: “It is not difficult to see that the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness 
was challenged by the same questions as those that Derrida has to answer…For instance, when Śāriputra hears 
about the prajñāpāramitā negation of the binary opposition between the signifier and signified, his immediate 
response is the question; how does the idea of the non-dual which is signless get beyond a personal level? By 
means of the non-existant, existant, or the combination of existent and non-existent dharmas? … if all dharmas 
are empty how can language, which is an instance of dharma, be employed to communicate this doctrine?” 
Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction, 216. Italics original.  
673 Caputo and Scanlon, “Introduction,” 3.   Italics original. Caputo and Scanlon continue to unpack this 
statement, which gives important analytical resonances: “They are broken not by a bit of academic cleverness 
and theoretical adroitness but by a dream, a desire, and a deed…To the aporia of the impossible, where the way 
of knowledge has been blocked, there corresponds the imperative of doing the truth, facere veritatem, which is 
what deconstruction is all about.” Ibid. Italics original.  Caputo and Scanlon do well to present a highly-nuanced 
working “definition” (loosely defined) of deconstruction, but even though they touch on different aspects of it, 
one is left wondering if they draw in their own desire for what deconstruction should be.  In other words, it is 
fair to question if Caputo and Scanlon remain faithful to the différantial aspect of deconstruction insofar as it 
defies (self-)definition. To that end, though, they do not commit an error upon Derrida’s voluminous 
“definitions” of deconstruction; they do, however, seek something of comprehensive meaning of deconstruction, 
something that Derrida himself might resist.   
674 A key text in the discussion of Derrida’s long-standing criticism of phenomenology is God, the Gift, and 
Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
Though this collection of essays also have Derrida’s response to particular charges and assertions, a primary text 
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phenomenology is not the intent here; rather, if Derrida is understood in his own context (i.e. 
the Western tradition), what might be said about his use of negativity in relation to his 
criticisms of phenomenology?  Perhaps one of Derrida’s most apt critiques using différance 
helps draw together the problem of expression of emptiness: 
Since absolute self-presence in con-sciousness is the infinite vocation of full 
presence, the achievement of absolute knowledge is the end of the infinite, 
which could only be the unity of the concept, logos, and consciousness in the 
voice without differance.  The history of metaphysics therefore can be 
expressed as the unfolding of the structure or schema of an absolute will-to-
hear-oneself-speak.  This history is closed when this infinite absolute appears 
to itself as its own death.  A voice without differance, a voice without writing, 




The problem here deals with the absoluteness of “presence” in regards to expression; this 
demonstrates how a particular problem of expression in Buddhist emptiness (is there a lack-
of-presence in the voidness of emptiness?) might be further elaborated with différance insofar 
as emptiness must be expressed with différance.
676
  Would something like emptiness be 
considered a metaphysical issue in Buddhist philosophy or phenomenology? Might the 
“nature” of its illusive description, unfixed meaning, and inability to be relayed with 
experience contribute to the thinking that it is a metaphysical “thing” along with other 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
containing Derrida’s criticism of phenomenology may be found in the collection referenced above: Speech and 
Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs.  As Derrida grappled squarely with Western 
thinking, much else can be said about his use of negativity as it applies to phenomenology.  Though that is not 
the point and purpose of this project, the highlighted connection between Derridean negativity and 
phenomenology might well be beneficial.   
675 Jacques Derrida, “The Supplement of Origin,” in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s 
Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 102. Long after the 
publication of this essay, Jean-Luc Marion made an interesting criticism of such surety in Derrida’s work: 
“…never, it seems to us, does Derrida himself explain exactly what can and should be understood by this phrase 
[the ‘metaphysics of presence’]…Is ‘metaphysics’ always identified as and by presence, or can it also include 
absence? Is presence exactly equal to onto-theo-logy, does it extend beyond, and does it even admit of being 
defined? Surely the indeterminacy of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ characterizes it essentially (as essentially 
without essence), indeed provides support for it.” Jean-Luc Marion, “In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of 
‘Negative Theology’” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 20-21.  Wang gives a more sympathetic view of Derrida’s 
criticisms: “Derrida is not the first philosopher in the West to have diagnosed the ills of the dominance of 
metaphysics.  His originality, as he sees it, lies in his prescription for an exit out of metaphysics from within 
metaphysics.” Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction, 207.  
676 Wang’s analysis is important here: he reminds that “…Derrida is still concerned with theorising about the 
production of meaning, albeit empty.  His deconstruction is motivated by an overwhelming desire to reach an 





  In western terms, it might be said that the metaphysics of Buddhist 
emptiness are grounded in presumed absence, but even this conveys a lack of presence, a 
nonpresence that is still grounded in definitions of what is/not present.  However, there is 
something else here; there is a point where emptiness is understood with différance but is not 
conditioned by it as such.  It transcends experience of emptiness because it is a foundational 
negativity, foundational because it informs other linguistic structures in Buddhism.  This 
negativity helps separate out différance in experiences of Buddhist emptiness.  
V. Conclusion: Negative Transcendence and Buddhist Emptiness 
 A foundational aspect of Buddhism, emptiness pre-figures heavily in the tradition’s 
literature, including the early Heart Sūtra.  However, there is something inaccessible, 
something still linguistically amiss in Buddhist emptiness.  Language seems to fail when 
describing emptiness, other than perhaps to call it an aporia.  Indeed, there is something 
“impossible” to describe when attempting to flesh out emptiness.  The experience of 
emptiness is one route, but even it is impossible to describe without one having experienced 
it; philosophically, emptiness is useful to flesh out other concepts; even now, there is still 
something fleeting, moving, and conceptually-shifting about emptiness.  The Buddhist 
description that emptiness exposes the non-substantiality of all things makes it a sort of meta-
thing, a metaphysics of presence that is only described in absence.  This is where Derridean 
deconstruction, specifically with différance, helps show how a foundational concept is not 
fixed, certain, and permanent.  It might be said that différance helps (re)inscribe emptiness in 
a way that is more true to an experiential / philosophical meaning of non-substantiality.  By 
                                                             
677 Naturally, the concern here, along with other places, might be the reading of Western concerns and 
philosophy upon Buddhist philosophy.  The problem of emptiness as a metaphysic, though, might be evident in 
how Buddhism treats the concept in its texts.  Specifically the concern is asserting emptiness as a meta-concept 
within Buddhism where that might not be “true” in the tradition.  It is not feasible to take a complex, historical 
tradition like Buddhism and argue for a meta-analysis vis-à-vis emptiness; rather, the implication here is to 
examine briefly the effect of emptiness upon the tradition through negativity.    
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demonstrating that emptiness is “subject” to différance, the linguistic model of non-
substantiality can be pushed closer to an aporia.    
 Buddhist emptiness does not stand on its own as a philosophical conceptualization, 
but rather always acts to show a quality of other things, the non-substantiality of things.  Like 
différance, emptiness is dependent on other-ness insofar as it shows a quality of something 
else, but “is” not “itself.”  This otherness is important to note because it shows how emptiness 
functions within the larger scope of Buddhism; it points to the nature of other things, the non-
substantiality of all things.  There is something transcendent to this otherness; but as 
différance, emptiness is a negation because it shows non-substantiality of other things.  In 
conclusion, Buddhist emptiness might be described as a negative transcendence because it 


















Christian Nothingness and Derridean Khōra 
 In the preceding chapter, Buddhist emptiness was examined through the 
deconstructive lens of Derridean différance.  This lent interpretations that began to 
contextualize Buddhist emptiness within the possible scope of Derridean negativity.  By 
establishing a specific context of Buddhist emptiness within the possibility of comparison 
with other traditions, this was set against the backdrop of Derridean negativity through 
différance.  The tension between an analysis of Derridean negativity and Buddhist emptiness 
opens new possibilities for comparison, analysis, and critical reflection. 
 This chapter continues in this strain of thought; namely, the intention is to further 
elaborate on the possibility of comparison through an examination of Christian nothingness 
within the scope of Derridean negativity.
678
  While the Derridean deconstructive force of 
différance was employed in the preceding chapter, Derridean negativity is explored here with 
his (non)concept of khôra.
679
   
 Further comparison of the Christian and Buddhist tradition will be examined in the 
following chapter, as a method of Derridean negativity, cast in the deconstruction of 
différance and khôra, opens new interpretations and paths of comparison.
680
   
I. Christianity and the Problem of Language: Considerations 
 As was an explicit problem with the analysis of Buddhist emptiness, the use of 
“sacred” scripture within the scope of a religious tradition is rife with problems.  Binary 
                                                             
678 One of the more fruitful tensions within this very specific analysis is the relationship between Derrida’s 
deconstruction and negativity (apophatic) theology.  This tension will be explored at length below, but it is 
worth highlighting from the outset the clear distinction between “negativity” in Derrida’s thought and Christian 
apophaticism; indeed, Derrida goes to great pains to distinguish his thought.   
679 It is important to note that deconstructive terms are not synonymous with God, emptiness, etc.  in that “La 
différence is not the God behind God, and deconstruction does not proceed by progressively denying inadequate 
predications of différence.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, xviii. Italics original.  
680 As noted above, Derrida is not specifically a religious thinker, but as Hart notes, “…we are not concerned 
with Derrida’s intentions and individual interests as with the mode of critique he practises and its import for 
discourse on God.” Ibid. 22-23.  
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oppositions of truth/falsity, the sacred/profane, orthodoxy/heterodoxy, et. al., are not easily 
wrapped up in the confines of linguistic explication.  Indeed, Gavin Flood argues 
convincingly for an analysis of religious traditions  “…which is questioned by postmodernity 
in which there is temporal rupture, resistance to closure, and an emphasis on ambivalence and 
hybridity, with things remaining obscure.”681 In his thesis, Flood offers a thoroughly 
Derridean interpretation (though he does not explicitly claim this) of the problem of 
language, difference, and the inability to pin down language to fixed meaning.
682
  For 
example, Flood goes on to argue for “…a dialogical model [that] must also emphasize 
difference, particularity, and the non-closure of research.  Such a model moves away from a 
postulated universalism and objectivism towards the sharpening of difference and 
clarification of discourse.”683 What Flood does argue is for an understanding of particular 
religious language within a particular tradition; he rightly argues throughout that “dialogical” 
discourse is needed to field the problem of particularity.  However, in the final analysis, some 
questions might be asked of Flood.  He concludes that “[r]eligions take place within 
narratives that are constructed and reconstructed from particular perspectives, from particular 
positions of power, which a critical religious studies can decode.”684 The problem here, at 
least as far as language is concerned, deals with the problem of figuring out what that 
“narrative” is within the tradition.  While there is validity to Flood’s conclusion, certainly 
with the push to move through phenomenology to a deeper understanding of the narratives 
                                                             
681 Gavin Flood, Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion (London: Cassell, 1999), 1.  Flood 
continues: “While not abandoning the importance of reason and clarity, the book does with to absorb into the 
academic study of religion ideas of indeterminism, the situated nature of inquiry and its dialogical nature, and 
the importance of reflexive or metatheoretical discourse about religious studies.”  Ibid. 2.  
682 Flood’s specific language dealing with this problem incorporates a thoroughly post-modern approach to 
metaphysical language: “The truth value of religious language that is metaphysical (and does not make 
empirical claims subjected to contradiction by strong counter-evidence) cannot be recognized by criteria of truth 
brought in from other discourse…Metaphysical truths proclaimed by a religious tradition are internal to the 
tradition and can be understood in terms of coherence within given frameworks and their significance within 
those frameworks.” Ibid. 171.  
683 Ibid. 8.  
684 Ibid. 235.  
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that drive religious traditions, the problem of language highlights the difficulty in access to a 
cornucopia of various competing narratives and voices within a religion. The “problem” with 
religious texts is the fundamental desire for totalization, for completeness, for finality.  
Furthermore, does language provide the means by which to sort through these voices?   
When deconstruction enters the picture, the possibilities become fruitful; an example 
of what this might look like (in terms of theology) is suggested by Hart:  
The deconstruction of ontotheology therefore consists in the deconstruction of 
this tradition of hermeneutics, which is achieved by showing that it is 
impossible to totalize écriture. If we take écriture to signify “scripture” what 
we have, in sum, is the view that scripture performs the deconstruction of the 




Hart’s thesis is interesting here, too, because he links the condition of humanity, with the 
original sin of the “desire for unmediated knowledge” with “the mutability of all signs.”686 
This means that all religious language structures are unsure, unsound, etc., for as Hart goes 
on argue, “If we picture God according to His attributes – as omnipotent, omniscient and 
omnipresent – we are plainly imaging Him as a plenitude of presence, both ontologically and 
epistemologically.  By dint of Adam’s sin, though, God is for us an absent presence…687  The 
question here might be whether or not Hart’s appropriation of deconstruction in theology is 
adequate; Hart’s focus is (onto)theological in much the same strain of Derrida’s criticism of 
theology.  However, Derrida’s deconstruction makes no differentiation between religious and 
non-religious texts, theological meaning (as such), or, more broadly, scripture and non-
scripture.  Deconstruction is present, even pre-“existent” within all language, no matter what 
type/genre/form.  While Hart is not incorrect, the narrowness of his critique (to theological 
language) may prevent the full force of deconstruction with(in) all literature, including 
religious literature.   
                                                             
685 Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 60. Italics original.  
686 Ibid. 3.  
687 Ibid. 7. Italics original.  
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 The problem remains: what is religious language?  Furthermore, and more specifically 
for this chapter, what is Christian language?
688
  Within the scope of this project, the 
difficulties of expression in apophatic language have been explored somewhat above, though 
the general question of meaning remains.  Framing this in a Derridean way, “…language is 
never able to be adequate to what it refers to beyond itself.”689 In the question of 
apophaticism, Derrida responds to the claim that his thinking is a type of negative 
(onto)theology in his essay, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials.”690  He goes on to 
differentiate his work from apophaticism insofar as he applies the critique of 
“hyperessentiality” to negative theology.691  This is addressed at length below, but it is worth 
noting at this point the internal tension between Derrida’s negativity in deconstruction and 
negative theology; the two are simply not compatible in any kind of direct comparative sense.  
Rather, the case must be made with the larger picture of how negative language functions in 
religious traditions.
692
  In this case, the examined texts below attempt to flesh out the concept 
of nothingness in Christian thought through Derridean negativity in khôra. 
 This project does not presuppose that nothingness will or can provide a clear 
explication into the problem of religious language in Christianity.  However, the thinking 
here is that nothingness can provide a lens by which negative language might contribute to 
the larger picture of religious comparisons, for “…positive theology requires a supplement of 
negative theology in order to check that our discourse about God is, in fact, about God and 
                                                             
688 Time and space limit the discussion here.  However, for a good introduction into the problems of religious 
language, see William P. Alston’s recent article “Religious Language,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Religion, ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 220-244. 
689 Merold Westphal, “Continental Philosophy of Religion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 489.  
690 This essay appears in a number of works, including Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and 
Toby Foshay, 73-142.  
691 Ibid. 79.  
692 A useful model of negativity is put forth by Hart; his careful distinction is important here: “We can therefore 
distinguish between two sorts of supplement and, accordingly, two sorts of negativity: the phenomenal, which 
works within a restricted economy and thus within metaphysics; and the transcendental, which defines a general 
economy and which questions metaphysics…[they] are mutually dependent, so restricted negativity will always 
involve general negativity, and vice versa.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 198. Italics original.  
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not just about human images of God.”693  What is explored is the possibility of negative 
language – negative in the sense of being prevented from the charge of hyperessentiality – 
and language in the sense that limitations of reference (i.e. sign and signification) are 
acknowledged and further developed.
694
  To this end, Derridean deconstruction provides a 
way forward through religious language, calling into question the firm foundations of sacred 
texts and orthodox voices.  Negativity is explored to provide the means by which language 
functions with(in) the tradition.
695
   
 The topic here is vast and difficult to manage within the argument.  While certain 
considerations are made for the functionality of language in the Christian tradition, examined 
specifically through Derrida’s khôra, the overall goal is explore language in a specific 
context.  Derridean analysis allows specific insight into the tradition from the outside; 
deconstruction has no specific religious goal in sight.  Rather, it applies to texts – all texts – 
but not religious texts specifically.
696
  Thus, the questions must be posed this way: does 
deconstruction allow for the examination of religious language without the error of bad faith?  
Does it allow for insight from an outside position?  Is there an inside/outside relationship to 
religious language?
697
   
                                                             
693 Ibid. 6.  
694
 Mark C. Taylor helps contextualize this: “Perhaps we are called by nothing, in the ‘name’ of a certain not, in 
order (if it is an order) not to speak and write ‘about’ nothing.” Mark C. Taylor, “nO nOt nO,” in Derrida and 
Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
167. 
695 Taylor makes a distinction that is useful here: “‘The not beyond of language’ must be read in at least two 
conflicting ways at once: the not that is the beyond of language, and the not that is not beyond language, that is, 
the not-beyond of language.” Ibid. 185-186.  Italics original.  
696 Hart clarifies this well by identifying “…the three fundamental tenets of Derrida’s case: all texts resist 
totalisation; no text is absolutely free from a context or a centre; and some texts seem to totalize other texts.” 
Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 42. Italics original.  
697 Harold Coward makes an interesting argument that helps contextualize this: “Derrida’s much-quoted phrase 
il n’ya a pas de hors-texte (there is nothing outside the text) would suggest that whatever revelation takes place 
via the process of negation much somehow take place within language.” In other words, Derrida makes a serious 
attempt to not comment outside of the text, thus if revelation is to have religious meaning, it must be within 
language, not from outside of linguistic parameters.  Harold Coward, “A Hindu Response to Derrida’s View of 
Negative Theology,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992), 206. Italics original.  
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 What is beneficial about Derridean deconstruction is the pushing of the limit to an 
aporia.  This is central to understanding the limits of religious language because they 
ultimately fail/succeed to point beyond itself; the aporia of religious language rests on this 
possibility.  While this explored further in the conclusion, the line of thought is important to 
bear in mind as Christian nothingness is explored below.   
II. A Beautiful Language: Khôral Negativity and Christian Apophaticism 
A. Khôra and Christian Apophaticism 
To briefly sum thus far, in order to draw together the various strands of thought 
above, it is necessary to discuss how Derridean negativity, understood in the context of 
khôra, lends itself to an analysis of how negative language informs Christian nothingness.  
Much time and space will be spent examining how Derridean khôra may contribute to a 
certain type of negativity.  While negativity in Christianity (in the general sense) cannot be 
rightly summed here, an analysis of an apophatic thinker might demonstrate how nothingness 
is further (in)formed by negativity. In this particular context, apophatic Christian thought is 
pulled together with the thought of Meister Eckhart (below), as Derridean khôra 
deconstructs/auto-deconstructs within Eckhart’s text.  The point to an analysis of these 
various strata within the analysis is not to show a clear-cut negativity within one tradition, but 
rather to demonstrate how negativity is, essentially, a fissure in Christian theology;
698
 further, 
this will allow for comparison with another religious tradition in the final analysis.   
 
                                                             
698 Taylor’s comments on khôra are useful here: “…Plato glimpses a different third that is resolutely 
nondialectical.  He associates this third with the strange space or spacing of the khora.”  Furthermore, Taylor’s 
analysis helps contextualize the point of examining khôra in light of Christian theology and Derridean 
negativity: “Neither being nor nonbeing, the khora involves a negativity that escapes both the positive and 
negative theological register.  As such, the khora is atheological.”  The undialectical neutrality is useful for 
means of a comparison because it allows for the splits and gaps to be authentically examined. It is also 
important to note that Taylor goes so far as to bring khôra together in a discussion of Derridean negativity and 
even draws in Eckhart as a specific reference, but he goes no further with it.  So, while Taylor’s analysis is 
useful, there is a certain limitation simply because he does not follow through in his comparison. Taylor, “nO 
nOt nO,” 187-188. Italics original.  
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B. Negative Theology 
 The connections between Derridean thought and Christian apophatic theology are 
well-known and extensively documented;
699
 therefore, time will not be spent here 
documenting such connections other than as means of brief summary. Derrida’s discussion of 
negative theology, variously defined in the general thought of thinkers like Pseudo-Dionysus, 
Eckhart, and others, also extends to what he “…designates [as] a certain form of language, 
with its mise en scène, its rhetorical, grammatical, and logical modes, its demonstrative 
procedures…”700 Derrida questions whether there can be “one negative theology, the negative 
theology?”701 Curiously, Derrida’s criticism of negative theology also turns into somewhat of 
a confession of why he “had to forbid [him]self to write in the register of ‘negative theology,’ 
because [he] was aware of this movement toward hyperessentiality, beyond Being.”702 Yet, 
Derrida must (as he does on other occasions) enter into the metaphysical argument (positing 
presence) to address his primary criticism of negative theology: hyperessentiality.  To briefly 
summarize his criticism, Derrida argues that Christian apophatic thinkers, while they are 
willing to negate everything including God himself, always come back to some sort of 
conception, albeit negative, of God – even if this God is beyond God. Caputo contextualizes 
this well: “Negative theologies are always just detours on the way to even higher, more 
                                                             
699 The texts that most conspicuously discuss negative theology and Derridean deconstruction are discussed at 
length in this project elsewhere.  For example, Kevin Hart’s The Trespass of the Sign is an excellent early 
exposition on negative theology and Derrida’s thought; John Caputo makes extensive studies of this, especially 
in his Prayers and Tears and in his Deconstruction in a Nutshell.  An entire collection of studies dedicated to 
this theme can be found in Coward and Foshay’s Derrida and Negative Theology.  With what might be 
considered a “formal” response to his thought in relation to negative theology, see Derrida’s article “How to 
Avoid Speaking: Denials” in the aforementioned collection.   
700 Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking,” 73. Italics original.  
701 Ibid. Italics original. It is important to note that Derrida is far more specific with his question in a footnote: 
“Who has ever assumed the project of the negative theology as such, reclaiming it in the singular under this 
name, without subjugating and subordinating it, without at least pluralizing it?”  Ibid. 131. Note 1. Italics 
original. Hart also poses a similar proposition in his reading of negative theology: “Just as there is more than 
one deconstruction, so too there is more than one species of negative theology.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 
xxi.  
702 Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking,” 79.  
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sublime affirmations.”703  For Derrida, this does not designate a truly negative language 
because the end “result” or conclusion is still God; rather, Derrida wants to go so far as to 
suggest that a negative theology must always be open, always “other,” and not a foregone 
conclusion from the outset.
704
  He goes about this with several methods, including erasure of 
being, whose conclusion might be “[t]he anguished experience of the Nothing discloses 
being.  Here, the dimension of Being discloses the experience of God, who is not or whose 
Being is either the essence nor the foundation.”705 Derrida’s conclusion to this particular 
method is interesting because he calls especial attention to it: “Understand me: this is an 
erasure that would above all have nothing negative about it!”706 The point to Derrida’s 
discussion about negative theology is that it cannot pre-suppose an internal negative method; 
it must not choose a specific conclusion, a/the God with which negation will ultimately lead 
to or away from, or a specific locus within kataphatic theology.
707
    
 Rather than try to frame the entire context of negative theology as it applies to 
Derridean thought, it is more productive to tease out one area (amongst many) where 
Derridean deconstruction acts with/in negativity.  This place, the no-place, of spacing “is” 
Derrida’s reading of Plato’s khôra.  This no(thing) of spacing, gaps, and desert serves as a 
context by which an examination of an apophatic thinker, Meister Eckhart, might be 
examined.   
 
                                                             
703 John D. Caputo, “Mysticism and Transgression: Derrida and Meister Eckhart” in Derrida and 
Deconstruction, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York: Routledge, 1989), 25. 
704 Morny Joy makes a careful argument that serves as a special caveat in how negative language is used in 
Derridean terms: “For [Derrida], behind the seeming disaffirmations of negative theology lurks an ontological 
telos, the ultimate deus ex machine who informs the whole undertaking.  This absolute Nonpresence is indeed 
an instance of an anathema to Derrida – for it has all the earmarks of an originary presence.” Morny Joy, 
“Conclusion: Divine Reservations,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 261. 
705 Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking,” 127.   
706 Ibid. 129.  
707 Hart makes a qualification that helps tease out the distinction here: “Just as ‘sign’ must be crossed out in the 
deconstruction of metaphysics, so too must ‘God’ in the deconstruction of positive theology…The negative 
theologian uses language under erasure…” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 202-203.  
205 
 
C. Neutrality and Derrida’s Khōra 
 Commentators on Derridean deconstruction often frame the intent with loaded 
phrasing; for example, John Caputo borrows phrasing from Kierkegaard in calling aspects of 
deconstruction “armed neutrality” insofar as “Deconstruction throws a scare into our 
discourse, questions the too tall prestige of the towers of reference, of the self-importance of 
‘meaning,’ but without simply destroying meaning and reference themselves.”708 This begs 
the question of whether or not ascribing neutrality, positivity, or negativity to deconstruction 
is a bit redundant; does this not assume that such “effects” upon the text are observable, 
quantifiable, and justifiable?  Caputo argues for neutrality because deconstruction is “even-
handedly antagonistic to all claims of existence or nonexistence” and it is “uniformly nasty 
about letting vocabularies establish their credentials and get set in place...”709  
 Due to the pre-originary effect of deconstruction with/in a text, it is simply not 
possible to assert neutrality in regards to deconstruction.  However, while deconstruction 
might not be positive, negative, or neutral, it “inhabits” a fourth “place” in what is left in the 
margins, in an ever-moving and shifting textual meaning that can be described in relation to 
other qualifiers.  This means that khôra is not neutral “itself,” but its relation to religion, 
religious claims, God, theology, etc. might well be neutral.  This is argued below because 
khôra provides insight into apophatic theology as it is a neutral qualifier upon religious 
meaning.  However, this is only in relation to religious studies because khôra cannot be 
described other than with “bastard logic.”   
 What is now needed is a detailed study of khôra, in its context in Platonic and 
Derridean thought.  As will be argued below, khôra provides key insights into reading 
Meister Eckhart because it opens a/the (no)place of God with (no)thing.   
                                                             
708 Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 14-15. Italics original.  
709 Ibid. 14.  Specifically, Caputo is here discussing deconstruction in terms of différance. However, it may be 
argued that such an argument may be applied to other aspects of Derridean deconstruction. For additional 
discussion of this particular issue, see Caputo, “Mysticism and Transgression,” 24ff.  
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III. Plato’s Timaeus: Khōra 
A. Description of Plato’s Khōra in the Timaeus 
 Plato’s Timaeus is a complex and nuanced work that demands careful attention.  Time 
and space do not permit a full discussion of the Timaeus; rather for purposes of analysis, the 
discussion will be limited to the very short section in the middle of the text (49a – 52d) where 
Plato discusses a “third” kind of existence, an uncreated “receptacle” that can only be grasped 
with “bastard reasoning.” Furthermore, while Plato’s khōra is examined here, the intent is to 
understand how the later interpreter, Jacques Derrida, makes use of his term as a 
deconstructive lens.   
In his cosmological account of existence, Plato’s khōra (χώρα – variously translated 
as “place, room, space, etc.”710) plays a pivotal role in the paradigm of “…the first 
thoroughgoing, exhaustive teleological analysis of all natural phenomena.”711 In contrast to 
the forms of earth and heavens, khōra remains indefinable, a “difficult and obscure kind of 
thing.”712 Plato’s cosmological account is articulate, precise, and exacting, especially 
considering the age of the text.
713
  This is why Plato’s elaboration on this “third” thing, 
“which exists for ever and is indestructible, and which acts as the arena for everything that  is 
subject to creation,” is unexpected, strange, and dialectically “form(s)”-less.714 Furthermore, 
as Thomas Rickert elaborates, “There is no direct equivalency between ideal and chōra, or 
chōra and world, which is also a way of saying that there is no proper place for these 
                                                             
710 Dana Miller, The Third Kind in Plato’s Timaeus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 20. 
711 Andrew Gregory, “Introduction,” in Plato’s Timaeus and Critias, trans. Robin Waterfield, introduction and 
notes Andrew Gregory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ix.   
712 Plato, Timeaus and Critias, trans. Robin Waterfield, introduction and notes Andrew Gregory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 40.  
713 Miller notes, “…Plato’s intuitions have leaped many centuries ahead of his time by collapsing the distinction 
between material and spatial extension, or by proposing a quasi-phenomenalist account of the physical world…” 
Miller, The Third Kind in Plato’s Timaeus, 9.  
714 Plato, Timaeus, 45.  
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concepts.”715  Plato is careful not to say too much about the void, nothingness, emptiness that 
“is” khōra, but rather points to the inadequacy of language in description, usage, and 
characterization.
716
  He does go so far as to call khōra a “receptacle” which bears particular 
usage it(her)self.  Plato uses descriptive language like “nurse” and “receptacle” to extrapolate 
how “…it only ever acts as the receptacle for everything, and it never comes to resemble in 
any way whatsoever any of the things that enter it.”717 Rather than go on about its 
fundamentally empty nature, Plato uses the paradoxical language of khōra to link to creation 
vis-à-vis as a “mother.”718 Khōra’s nature as a receptacle “of all kinds” means, for Plato, that 
“it must be altogether characterless.”719 Interestingly, Plato indicates that khōra must be 
“grasped by a kind of bastard reasoning, without the support of sensation, and is hardly 
credible.”720 Khōra is separate of creation, of the forms, and therefore can only be 
comprehended differently than other forms.   
IV. Derrida’s Khôra: The Other Otherness, or Reflections on a/the Third Kind 
A. Derrida’s (Re)Reading of Plato: (An) Introduction 
 In the span of Derrida’s critical output, he spends a good amount of time reading 
Plato.  Limiting remarks on Derrida’s reading and writing (up)on Plato, he is primarily 
concerned with Western metaphysics; Walter Brogan summarizes this well: “One reading of 
Plato that Derrida gives follows Plato’s suppression of writing and traces the effects of this 
                                                             
715 Thomas Rickert, “Toward the Chōra: Kristeva, Derrida, and Ulmer on Emplaced Invention,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric, vol. 40, no. 3 (2007): 258.   
716 Plato’s elaboration on the language used to describe or characterize khōra might not be a critique of language 
itself; Plato’s use of language conveys some reliance upon meaning, though it is nuanced enough to suggest that 
he did not assume fixed meaning.  Rather, his critique of language seems to stem from the inability to describe 
things that are unfixed themselves: “…we should never say ‘this’ water, but ‘something of this sort’, and the 
same goes for everything else that we indicate by means of expressions such as ‘that’ and ‘this’, under the 
impression that we’re designating some particular thing and that these things have the slightest stability.  The 
point is that they run away rather than face expressions such as ‘that’ and ‘this’ and ‘just so’, and every form of 
speech that makes them out to be stable entities.” Plato, Timaeus, 41.   
717 Ibid. 42. 
718 Ibid.  
719 Ibid. 43. Italics original. 
720 Ibid. 45.  
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decision which produces the Platonic system of metaphysical oppositions and the effacement 
of an ‘originary’ or arche-writing in Plato’s texts.”721 Of especial importance to Derrida’s 
treatment of Plato is this “third” kind that Plato describes as between the earth and the forms.  
What appeals to Derrida is this “provisional appearance” which “stems…from the constraints 
of rhetoric, even from some incapacity for naming.”722 Khôra is neither positive nor negative 
in itself; indeed it can scarcely be named and it must be understood with “bastard” logic.  
What interests Derrida is how khôra functions within language where “[i]t oscillates between 
two types of oscillation: the double exclusion (neither / nor) and the participation (both this 
and that).”723  This type of “oscillation” has importance in how it functions within the 
complexities of the text; indeed, there is a sort of negative movement going on here.
724
 This 
helps the draw out the larger paradigm of Derridean analysis insofar as “no text is fixed, 
stable, and completely circumscribed by its predetermined standpoint.”725 The function of 
khôra within a particular text – the “oscillation” of meaning – helps further illuminate the 
nature of Derridean textual deconstruction because “Writing, like the madness of eros, is 
dangerous, seductive, and ambivalent…”726 
John Caputo’s description helps frame the (con)text of khôra as “Like pure being, or 
pure nothingness; both and neither…[it] is just the sort of thing, or non-thing, to attract the 
interest of Derrida’s ‘exorbitant method.’”727 Indeed, Derrida is interested in how khôra 
                                                             
721 Walter  Brogan, “Plato’s Pharmakon: Between Two Repetitions,” in Derrida and Deconstruction, ed. Hugh 
J. Silverman (New York: Routledge, 1989), 7.  
722 Jacques Derrida, “Khōra” in On the Name, trans. Ian McLeod, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 89.  As a side note, this translation of Derrida places the macron above the “o” on 
khōra, where other texts place a circumflex above the “o.”  When quoting directly from this edition of On the 
Name, the macron is used, but elsewhere it appears with the circumflex because texts outside of On the Name 
use the circumflex.  
723 Ibid. 91.  Italics original.  
724 Caputo describes khôra as “…a good atheological word, as opposed to the theological name, the name of 
God, whose singularity comes of being marked by the unheard trace which calls us into language.” Caputo, The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 37.  Italics original.  
725 Brogan, “Plato’s Pharmakon,” 12.  
726 Ibid. 16. Italics original.  
727 Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 85. Caputo’s comment of Derrida’s “exorbitant method” is meant as a 
sharp criticism of Derrida’s critics.  The subject heading for that portion outlines why Derrida’s methodology of 
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functions in Plato’s text, how the shifting language of this “oscillation” “’is’ the anachrony 
within being, or better: the anachrony of being. It anachronizes being.”728 The interesting note 
here is the shift in the text – whether the text of Plato or the text of Derrida, the effect is the 
same – between space and time, since khôra has neither being nor non-being, but there is a 
type of negative play going on in the text.
729
   
 What Derrida finds to be compelling in the deconstruction of Plato’s khôra is the 
absolute resistance of firm description; he goes so far as to say that even though 
“interpretations” might be “inscribed ‘on’ her…she is not reducible to them.”730  This is 
interesting as it presents something of a comparison with other Derridean terms that defy 
definitive “(in/de)scription,” like différance, trace, pharmakon, etc.731 Putting the question of 
description aside, Derrida wants to situate khôra in the “schema” of Platonic cosmology.732 
This is where Derrida situates khôra in a textual paradigm that lends itself to further 
consideration where oppositions of text and interpretation might occur; Derrida’s questions 
are worth quoting at length: 
…won’t the discourse on khôra have opened, between the sensible and the 
intelligible, belonging neither to one nor to the other, hence neither to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
deconstruction is akin to very close reading, not some sort of textual or philosophical nihilism: 
“‘Deconstruction’ will consist in a fine-grained reading of the text, of the literality and textuality of the text, 
slowly, scrupulously, seriously, in releasing the still-stirring forces that ‘philosophy’ and logocentrism strive to 
contain.” Ibid. 83.    
728 Derrida, On the Name, 94.  
729
 In many places in his commentary on khôra, his writing has distinct resonances with Heidegger’s 
understanding of being. Robyn Horner carefully examines how Derrida’s distinction “…that while khôra is not 
anything (“not a being of or of the present”), it is also not the Heideggerian Nothing.” Robyn Horner, Rethinking 
God as Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 
236. Italics original. The concern here, however, appears to reside with “being” as it applies to textuality.  
Derrida explains this at length: “However, if khōra indeed presents certain attributes of the word as proper 
name, isn’t that only via its apparent reference to some uniqueness…the referent or this reference does not exist.  
It does not have characteristics of an existent, by which we mean an existent that would be receivable in the 
ontologic, that is, those of an intelligible or sensible existent.  There is khōra but the khōra does not exist.” Ibid. 
97. Italics original.  
730 Ibid. 99.   
731 Caputo takes this further than Derrida; he wants to subscribe a positive correlation between Derridean 
deconstruction(s) within the scope of certain terms.  This is addressed below in a short discussion of the possible 
correlation between khôra and différance. 
732 See Ibid. 102. He poses this question that guides the discussion thus far: “if khôra has no meaning or essence, 
if she is not a philosopheme and if, nevertheless, she is neither the object nor the form of a fable of a mythic 
type, where can she be situated in this schema?” 
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cosmos as sensible god nor to the intelligible god, an apparently empty space – 
even though it is not doubt not emptiness? Didn’t it name a gaping opening, an 
abyss or a chasm? … Let us not be too hasty about bringing this chasm named 




Here Derrida is mitigating the seemingly contradictory terms of “being nothing” (i.e. 
emptiness) and the truly otherness of khôra as an abyss of meaning. Dawne McCance 
interprets this negative maneuver as “…attempting to describe some supreme and unnamable 
entity.”734  Derrida’s situating within the “schema” of Plato’s cosmology is important to the 
inter-textual function of khôra because it is a stop-gap of meaning – and at the same time it is 
a receptacle of all meaning – but it defies “being.”735  It would appear that khôra functions 




 Derrida is careful in his situating of khôra to not overstep his own criticisms, 
especially with reference to making claims about how Plato’s textual khôra might relate to 
something outside of the text.
737
  To that end, Derrida goes to great pains to situate khôra in 
the middle of Plato’s text, as “a chasm in the middle of the book, a sort of abyss ‘in’ which 
there  is an attempt to think or say this abysmal chasm which would be khōra, the opening of 
a place ‘in’ which everything would, at the same time, come to take place and be 
                                                             
733 Ibid. 103.  Italics original.  
734
 McCance, Derrida on Religion, 29.   
735 In an interesting exchange between Derrida and his former student, Jean-Luc Marion, Marion proposes 
something of a criticism of trying to think through khôra because of its (lack of) being: “We all try to make 
sense out of those phenomena – the gift, the khora, the other, the flesh and others that we cannot describe either 
as an object or as being.  So, my hypothesis as a phenomenologist is that we should not try to constitute them, 
but accept them – in any sense of accept – as given and that is all.” Richard Kearney, moderator, “On the Gift: A 
Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. 
Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 71. Italics original.  
736 Derrida says that this “…would perhaps not only be the abyss between the sensible and the intelligible, 
between being and nothingness, between being and the lesser being, nor even perhaps being and the existent, 
nor yet between logos and muthos, but between all these couples and another which would not even be their 
other.” Derrida, On the Name, 104. Italics original.  
737 Christopher Norris makes some very useful and poignant comments regarding the thought behind writing and 
its necessary consequence. Here he is commenting specifically on Plato’s “dubious honour of preserving his 
teacher’s wisdom:”  “[Deconstructive reading] will involve a certain violence to the text, but a violence that 
comes not so much from ‘outside’ – from a reading bent upon its own perverse design – but rather from the text 
itself, in those strains and contortions of sense that characterize its language.” Norris, Derrida, 34-35.   
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reflected…”738 Derrida finds the most inter-textual play here because the abyss is both 
limited to and reflected in/on the text;
739
 the interplay is indicative of “…the place of 
inscription of all that is marked on the world.”740 While Derrida does not venture to comment 
outside of the text, he does go on to suggest a framework in which khôra can be understood 
to function within the text as “already be[ing] occupied, invested, even as a general place, and 
even when it is distinguished from everything that takes place in it.”741 This internal 
tension
742
 of placing continues on in Derrida’s inter-text(uality)743 of Plato as he grapples 
with the “myth within the myth, of an open abyss in the general myth.”744 It is not, however, 
until Derrida plays out these tensions of the function of myth within the text that he is able to 
separate out being and non-being, coming to some kind of pre-conclusion that khôra 
functions between them.
745
 This function, between being and non-being, prevents objectivity 
in the text, “…nothing but receptacles of narrative receptacles…”746  
                                                             
738 Derrida, On the Name, 104. Italics original. Here Derrida seems to avoid the wording of “reflecting,” 
although he doesn’t altogether neglect the language-play.  Rather, his emphasis seems to be elsewhere, perhaps 
outside of the text.  Caputo touches upon this: “For that khôra is an ‘abyss,’ a void of empty space; it is also an 
infinite play of reflections in which the paradigms produce their images, simply ‘reflecting’ sensible things like 
a mirror that is not altered by the images it reflects.” Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 86. Italics original.  
In a fair assessment, Derrida is standing on the limits of thought here, so his language of the “reflection” might 
be rightly understood as an inter-textual concern; however, the problem arises with how his language wants to 
contextualize the locus of khôra as thorough-going emptiness.   
739 Derrida calls this “A logic whose authority was imposed on Plato…this limit appears in the abyss itself: the 
being-programme of the programme, its structure of pre-inscription and of typographic prescriptions forms the 
explicit theme of the discourse en abyme on khōra.” Derrida, On the Name, 106.  Italics original.  
740 Ibid. Italics original.  
741 Ibid. 109.  It is hard to overestimate how careful Derrida is with the “placing” of khôra.  As he goes on to 
demonstrate with the example of Socrates, Derrida suggest that “Socrates is not khōra, but he would look a bit 
like it / her if it / she were someone or something.  In any case, he puts himself in its / her place, which is not 
just a place among others, but perhaps place itself, the irreplaceable place.” Ibid. 111. Italics original.  
742 McCance’s description fills out what is meant here: “…khôra figures the place of bifurcation or opening, an 
‘abyss’ between the sensible and the intelligible, between being and nothingness.” McCance, Derrida on 
Religion, 31. Italics original.  
743 Caputo rightly mitigates the tension between / in the text here: “The text is always a bastard.  This system or 
boxes inside boxes, containers containing containers – this “khôral” quality – is a feature of textuality itself.” 
Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 91. 
744 Derrida, On the Name, 113.  
745 Derrida does not explicitly say that, but he alludes to it: “…in giving to be thought that which belongs neither 
to sensory being nor to intelligible being, nothing to becoming nor to eternity, the discourse on khôra is no 
longer a discourse on being…” Ibid. Italics original.  
746 Ibid. 117.   
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This middle place, non-objectifiable, between being and non-being, presents a 
fascinating place in textual analysis: “the text is neutralized in it, numbered, self-destructed, 
or dissimulated: unequally, partially, provisionally.”747 From here, Derrida elaborates upon 
the “textual drift”748 at play, where khôra is “orphan[ed]…it is distinguished from the 
philosophical logos.”749 This distinguishing is very important because khôra is set apart from 
the finality, definability, and closed-nature of the logos;
750
 hence, khôra is completely other, 
completely “adrift,”751 and completely on its own.752 This is the very specific benefit of 
Derrida’s analysis of khôra: with a complete setting-apart of the definitive logos, “being” 
adrift in pre-creation, engendering nothing(ness), khôra(l) studies affect that which is both 
adrift in the text
753
 and that which escapes a fixed nature and meaning: “She/it eludes all 
anthropo-theological schemes, all history, all revelation, and all truth. Preoriginary, before 
and outside of all generation, she no longer has the meaning of a past, of a present that is 
past.” 754 Derrida firmly delineates how khôra is outside of the parameters of philosophy,755 
                                                             
747 Ibid. 121.  
748 Ibid. 123.  
749 Ibid. 124.  Italics original.  
750 Caputo elaborates carefully – and playfully – upon the meaning of khôra in relation to philosophy: “So much 
“khôral” play, so many “khôral”-ographies, so many stagings, enactments, imagings, and reflections of khôra in 
the text before it becomes a philosopheme.” Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 89.  
751 This terminology is borrowed from Caputo who references khôra in terms of “drifting” in multiple places. 
For example, see ibid, 94. 
752 Derrida uses many terms to demonstrate the relation between time and space affect the notion of khôra.  This 
is worth noting because “Khōra marks a place apart, the spacing which keeps a dissymmetrical relation to all 
that which, “in herself,” beside or in addition to herself, seems to make a couple with her.  In the couple outside 
of the couple, this strange mother who gives place without engendering can no longer be considered an origin.”  
Ibid. Italics original. Derrida is very forthright in his analysis to considered time and space and its (un)relation to 
khôra because he is establishing how khôra is definitively separate of the logos, of that which is confined to 
time and space.   
753 Caputo defines this very aspect as “a saving element in Derrida’s thought…precisely because it blocks the 
way to fixing or determining in some unrevisable way what is given.  Khora forces us to make our way by faith, 
construing shadowy figures which may turn out to be otherwise, beginning where we are in the midst of a web 
of institutions, structures, languages, and traditions.” John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible: On God and 
the Gift in Derrida and Marion,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. 
Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 217.  Italics original.  
754 Derrida, On the Name, 124-125.  Italics original. Derrida goes on to suggest further implications of this 
claim: “We must go back toward a preorigin which deprives us of this assurance and requires at the same time 
an impure philosophical discourse, threatened, bastard, hybrid.  These traits are not negative.  They do not 
discredit a discourse which would simply be interior to philosophy, for if it is admittedly not true, merely 
probable, it still tells what is necessary on the subject of necessity.” Ibid. 126.  
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of conventional thought, so that “in order to think khôra, it is necessary to go back to a 
beginning that is older than the beginning, namely, the birth of the cosmos…”756  
What emerges from a discussion of Derrida’s treatment of khôra is what Rickert calls 
“inventing the impossible.”757 Rickert goes on to draw the parallel: “Derrida’s chōra inhabits 
an impossible place, one that governs, in a manner nearly meta-metaphysical (in the sense 
that the chōra comments on the limits of metaphysics), the entire proceedings, to the extent 
the project remains unfulfilled.”758 Rickert’s analysis is correct here insofar as Derrida’s 
project, whether it is rightly or wrongly called “meta-metaphysical” criticism, reaches into 
the impossible; does that make Derrida an “inventor” of the impossible or an “inventor” 
within the process/projection of the (im)possible?   
B. Caputo’s Familial Construct of Différance and Khôra: Relatable?  
 John D. Caputo is an adept and long-standing commentator on the work of Derrida, 
especially in the realm of Derrida’s thought as it relates to religious studies and, more 
specifically, apophatic theology.  He makes a long and sustained argument for something of a 
synthesis, not necessarily by definition, but by concept, for a direct and special relationship 
between Derridean différance and khôra.  This relationship is elaborated throughout 
numerous places in Caputo’s work, with differing levels of intensity.  A careful parsing of 
this relationship, however, exposes where Caputo’s analysis falls short; while he is careful to 
avoid directly equating the two (non)concepts, he does not differentiate between the inherent 
tension in the text.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
755 John Caputo helps clarify this point: “For khôra exposes a certain ‘impurity’…and intractability at the very 
core of philosophical concepts, a certain retreat and recession from philosophy’s grasp, right there in Plato, who 
is the very paradigm of what we mean by philosophy, thus leading us up to the very limits of philosophy…” 
Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 75.  
756 Derrida, On the Name, 126.   
757 Rickert, “Toward the Chōra,” 266. It is important to note that Caputo, too, uses similar language when 
discussion Derrida’s project throughout his Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida.  
758 Ibid. Italics original.  
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 Caputo makes his case very explicitly in his response paper, “Apostles of the 
Impossible,” when says, “Khora, Derrida says elsewhere, is a kind of surname for différance, 
a kind of scriptorium for the inevitable inscriptions which constitute our institutions and 
structures, beliefs and practices, texts and deeds.”759 While Caputo cannot be faulted for 
reading this in/on to the text, Derrida does not make this connection explicitly.  Rather, 
Derrida says, “This necessity (khôra is its sur-name) seems so virginal that it does not even 
have the figure of a virgin any longer.”760 Elsewhere, Caputo is less explicit with this claim: 
“God is ineffable the way Plato’s agathon is ineffable, beyond being, whereas différance is 
like the atheological ineffability of Plato’s khôra, beneath being.”761 While the logic of this 
assertion may be defended as a connection, Derrida is simply more elusive than to bring 
together the two in definitive comparison.   
 Caputo makes the strongest case for this comparison when drawing the two together 
under the premise of negative theology:  
…to what extent does negative theology succeed in making itself safe from 
khôra, within which it, negative theology – any theology, any discourse – 
would be inscribed? For what is emerging (donner lieu) or taking place (avoir 
lieu) in khôra is the “spacing” or the “interval” within which things find their 
place, “the very spacing of de-construction,” which makes khôra sound like an 
apophatic name, a surname, for différance.  What else is the desert khôra for 
Derrida than a nameless name for the desert of différance, of the trace, which 




This is a strong case, indeed, but it does not find its absolute textual reference in Derrida’s 
work.  Caputo is more forthcoming with the logic that precedes this argument when he 
                                                             
759 Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible,” 217. Italics original. In this text, Caputo sites Derrida’s “Khôra” on 
page 95, and On the Name on page 126 as textual evidence for this connection.   
760 Derrida, On the Name, 126. To further contextualize this comment, Derrida defines “this necessity” as 
“…toward a necessity which is neither generative nor engendered and which carries philosophy, ‘precedes’ 
(prior to the time that passes or eternal time before history) and ‘receives’ the effect, here the image of 
oppositions (intelligible and sensibile): philosophy.” Ibid. Italics original.  So, while Derrida gives similar 
context here as he does to différance, why does he not simply use this terminology to explain the point?   
761 Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 10.  Italics original.  Again, in his citation of Derrida’s 
essay, Caputo cannot be faulted necessarily for reading this into the text, especially as Derrida deconstructs the 
binary oppositions possibly ascribed to khôra.   
762 Ibid. 39-40. Italics original.  
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explains, “Everything in deconstruction is inscribed with différance, woven from its 
elemental spacing, inscribed in a differential matrix, caught up in an inescapable condition 
that is older than time and wider than space.”763  Caputo makes the most sustained case for 
this relationship in his short text on deconstruction.
764
 Here Caputo argues vigorously for the 
idea that “…the story of khôra works like an ‘allegory’ of différance, each addressing a 
common, kindred non-essence, impropriety, and namelessness.”765 Caputo goes on to argue 
for this connection with a deeper and more nuanced understanding of how différance 
functions in Derridean texts.  For example, he says, “That is why Derrida will also speak of 
différance as an archi-writing, which is reflected here when he calls the khôra a ‘pre-
origin.’”766  
 What Derrida does with khôra is situate it firmly within deconstruction (arguing that 
deconstruction is already at play in Plato’s Timaeus) as spacing between nothingness and 
being.  This “situating” is difficult, mainly because it must be grasped with “bastard 
reasoning.”  Derrida’s situating of khôra firmly in a deconstructive matrix is, perhaps, why 
Caputo associates it so closely with différance.  Derrida does not mince words here: “The 
spacing of khora introduces a dissociation or a difference in the proper meaning that it 
renders possible, thereby compelling tropic detours which are no longer rhetorical figures.”767 
It is this textual difference which, perhaps, is why Caputo so explicitly brings together 
Derridean khôra and différance as (non)characteristically similar (so similar, in fact, that 
familial relationships are deployed).  It is possible to be sympathetic to this position, 
especially with the textual metaphor of describing khôra as absolute desert of meaning, and 
                                                             
763 Caputo, “Love Among the Deconstructibles,” 37-38.   
764 Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 96-105, “Différance: Khôra Is Its Surname.”  
765 Ibid. 97.  Italics original.  Caputo follows this with similar logic used in previous sources: “Différance, like 
khôra, is a great receptacle upon which every constituted trace or mark is imprinted, ‘older,’ prior, 
preoriginary.” Ibid. Italics original.  
766 Ibid. 102. Italics original.  
767 Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking,” 106.  
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thus achieving the same deconstruction perhaps through its own différantial re-inscription.  
However, it is more authentic to view this type of pre-originary concept as being in tension, 
not as “sur-names,” because this comparison, albeit familial relationships (“sur-names”) or 
mediated deconstructive (non)concepts, presupposes that Derridean deconstruction is 
possible with the various (non)concepts that define how binary oppositions fall apart in a text.   
 At numerous points, Derrida goes to great pains to demonstrate how deconstruction is 
already at work in a given text – any text – and how various deconstructive elements are 
already in/at play, including indeterminate spacing between nothingness and being, i.e. khôra, 
and oppositional (binary) meanings within a given text, i.e. différance.
768
  Caputo is 
absolutely right to bring khôra and différance together because they deconstruct, perhaps 
even auto-deconstruct (in the full force of Derrida’s meaning), a given text from within/out; 
he also rightly brings out the significance of “[d]ifférance…[as] the nameless name of this 
open-ended, uncontainable, generalizable play of traces.  And khôra is its surname.”769 
However, the error is to bring them into such close, familial relation (and an innocuously 
“positive” relationship) because there is an internal tension at play here, too.  Khôra and 
différance are not exclusive terms, definable and controllably deployable; rather, they are at 
the very best (non)contextualization(s) of deconstruction.  Deployable, perhaps, but not 
controllable; this sort of wild, free play within the text lends an excellent analytical tension 
within the framework of understanding khôra and différance as parasitic, in much the same 
way that deconstruction is parasitic.  Khôra and différance do not “exist” an any sort of sense 
within/out the text, and certainly not outside of the text (as Derrida warns extensively).  They 
must “exist” as parasites, showing the free play of meaning, contextualization, etc. within 
a/the particular situation of a text.  But they are in tension with one another, not in familial 
                                                             
768 It is readily acknowledged here that the “definitions” given here are approximations given for the purposes of 
contextualizing, but not strictly defining, khôra and différance.  Any kind of fixed meaning is rejected, but for 
purposes of comparing and contrasting, broad strokes are given in the above analysis.  
769 Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 105.  
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relation, for where différance shows this type of pre-originary play which can only be seen 
through a trace, or a trace of a trace, khôra exposes the groundlessness of meaning, the abyss 
(i.e. endless) of open-endedness.  The two (non)concepts almost play off and on each other in 
their parasitic forms, for they do not “speak” themselves, but in a paradoxically way, they 
allow a text to “speak” in its own pre-linguistic terms, namely under erasure.   
 It is this distinction that allows khôra and différance to “function” differently and with 
a situational abyss within the texts here.  This distinction, as both a relationship that Caputo 
describes in almost positive terms that, coupled with negative tension, allows deconstruction 
to be exposed within a given text.   
C. Khôral Negativity: (Re)Opening Religious Texts 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Plato’s khôra lends itself to a discussion of how 
negativity might affect texts in a general sense; to some extent this is explored above, 
specifically in the discussion on how Plato’s khôra stands as an abyss in the text, as free and 
uncontrollable play within the text.  However, what emerges from this is the possibility that 
khôra is not a “thing” that can be measured in tangible effect upon a text; in other words, 
khôra is not a conventional parasite that tears through a medium; rather, khôral play is 
already at stake in the text, as a (no)thing that is “pre-originary.” This means that a khôral 
effect is not some nihilistic, freeform criticism that strips bear meaning from a text.  Instead, 
what the above discussion of khôra suggests is a localized effect upon a text – any text – and 
how it “drifts” into the (non?)realm of the impossible.    
While it might be beneficial to go further in a general sense, for as Derrida argues, 
khôra is pre-originary and adrift in every text, the purpose here is to narrow the field 
somewhat to religious texts.  The context set herein has to do with Christian texts 
specifically, and even more narrow than that, apophatic texts.  So, several questions are at 
play here, simultaneously.  What is the effect of khôra upon negative theology?  Is khôra a 
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neutral “actress” in apophaticism, or is “she” at play in all negative theological texts?  How 
might khôra be appropriated to reading texts by a specific thinker, such as Meister Eckhart, 
who demonstrates an internal deconstruction already?  While these questions are general in 
nature, the purpose is to contextualize how an examination of negativity in Christian 
apophatic texts lends itself to internal khôral play.   
The idea that there might be something always “lost” and “adrift”770 in religious texts 
most likely would not sit well with adherents to a particular faith.  Indeed, the non-being at 
play here, khôra, has more or less “forced” her/itself between being and nothingness as “Plato 
[was]…forced by the things themselves to include khôra within his account – he cannot ‘not 
speak’ of it – yet he does not know how to ‘not speak’ of it, that is, to respect its 
negativity.”771 Indeed, commentators (notwithstanding Derrida) have struggled to write 
khôraly as there is something lost and adrift in commentaries as well.  However, the point can 
be taken that to write khôraly is to write with this “third thing” that defies meaning, that 
requires “bastard logic,” that is continually adrift.  Does this mean khôra is her/itself 
negative?  Not necessarily, though numerous commentators have taken this particular to task; 
the intention here is not to explore those possibilities explicitly, but rather to examine 
possible khôral readings of a text. Specifically, the analysis below takes a specific text of 
Meister Eckhart and examines it through the lens of deconstructive khôra; possibilities of 
negativity are worked out from there because the full “force” of what khôra might mean in 
terms of negativity are relative to particular locations within texts.    
Returning momentarily to a more general discussion of the possibility of a religious 
deconstruction of its own texts, the possibilities herein are fruitful and ripe for discussion.  
Derrida is not a religious thinker per se, but the nature of his work touches upon religious 
                                                             
770 These terms are borrowed from John Caputo.  See his section on khôra in Caputo, Deconstruction in a 
Nutshell, 92ff.   
771 Ibid. 95.  
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considerations, arguably, throughout the corpus of his work.  Derrida spends a relatively large 
amount of creative energy upon several religious topics, especially as they apply to textual 
analysis; one of the more relevant articles here is his “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials” 
where he squarely deals with the question of apophatic theology.
772
 Here too, John Caputo 
contextualizes the possibilities of Derridean thought for religious thought; specifically, he is 
addressing the idea of deconstruction in religious texts: 
…Derrida points out a similar thing about the construction of the Book of 
Revelation in the New Testament, which does emblematic service as an 
indicator of the heavily textualized nature of what we call the ‘sacred 
scriptures.’  That raises various problems for a theory of ‘revelation,’ and not 
only for fundamentalists, which cannot be a matter of taking dictation from a 
divine speaker.  The same thing is true of any text, ancient or modern, sacred 
or profane, which would always be structured, ‘constructed’ of layer upon 
layer, fold upon fold, ply upon ply, so that to read a ‘text’ is always to un-fold, 




What Caputo does here is set the stage for a de-construction of religious texts, but curiously 
he only goes as far as Derrida; indeed, as much as Caputo describes what this might look like 
(perhaps lending itself to the thoroughly Derridean concept of the impossible, what is to 
come…), he does not take the research in that direction.  The thinking here is not so much 
that a “fulfillment” of such a task is necessary, desirable, or even possible, but that it could 
lend itself to even more possibility (as always, to come).  This is not so much setting a stage 
as it is examining how “[s]o much ‘khôral’ play, so many ‘khôral’-ographies, so many 
stagings, enactments, imagings, and reflections of khôra in the text before it becomes a 
philosopheme” can take religious texts – herein an apophatic text of Eckhart – to show the 
possibility of play in a religious text.
774
 
 It is worth noting here the distinction between using “sacred” and other, perhaps 
better labeled “spiritual” texts.  The texts of Eckhart are not considered sacred in the 
                                                             
772 Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking,” 73-142. 
773 Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 88.  
774 Ibid. 89.  
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Christian church (indeed, quite the opposite in some cases, as his texts gathered official 
Church condemnation), but might be considered “spiritual” or of at least “religious” 
significance.  In the same way that Derrida himself considers khôra, at best, in tension with 
negative theology, the tension from this religious text opens for fruitful discussion, namely 
because all language is informed by khôra, even religious language.
775
  The implication here 
is that even if khôra cannot be domesticated by religion or a religious text, it still “occupies” 
a “place” that is pre-originary to the language of religions. This is different than 
deconstructing what would be considered a sacred text, like the Bible, but the theological 
significance can be gathered either way.  This means that while Eckhart’s text is not sacred 
within the religious tradition, the topics he covers have sacred significance.  Thus, while it is 
not proposed that a “sacred deconstruction” of sorts is taking place here, the spirit of such an 
analysis might be considered appropriate.  To that end, it is also possible to consider the 
overall effect of khôra upon a religious text. 
D. Khôra and Spacing: Comparisons with(in) a Text 
 In order for there to be (non?)lens of khôra to be analyzed in a given text, as appears 
below, a more specific “task” of deconstruction (understood loosely here as analysis of layers 
upon layers of texts) is necessary.  What appears to be one of the more relevant aspects of a 
khôral analysis is the possibility of spacing in/on a text.  From here, the context of religion 
might be better understood in negativity; specifically, here, the use of the word “without” 
between two “religious” terms spells out a type of negation (e.g. “faith without faith”).  
Caputo frames this well:  
The effect of deconstruction is not to undo a specifically religious faith but to 
resituate it with the trace and thereby to let faith be faith, not knowledge or 
triumphalism.  Deconstruction can have no brief against faith, because 
                                                             
775 McCance, Derrida on Religion, 30. 
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The use of the term “without” deserves careful parsing because it is pregnant with possibility.  
Here it functions as a type of negativity; it is immediately negating the preceding term in a 
way that contextualizes the second term.  Thus, when Caputo describes Derridean 
deconstruction a type of “faith without dogma” the khôral analysis must consider how the 
second term is reshaped by the “without.”  The immediate “effect” (if it can be described as 
such) is a type of freedom of the term, a re-shaping, resituating of both terms.  Here “without 
dogma” reshapes “faith” in a way that opens it (khôrally?) to new interpretations, new 
contexts, and a new “faith.”  This is why Caputo’s later reading of Derrida is so relevant:  
Such respect [of the “other”] would be religio as a respectful reserve before 
the tout autre, the religion of the an-khôra-ite, that would perhaps relieve the 
violence by which the concrete messianisms are consumed.  The return of this 
religion would spell the end of religion’s ever-recurring wars, of religion’s 




The possibilities here are important with respect to negativity within the context of emptiness 
because this outlines how Derridean deconstruction, through the endless drift of khôra, might 
show how “religion” can be re-contextualized: “For this desert, khôral religion does not 
necessarily involve God, and while it certainly involves faith, faith is not necessarily faith in 
the God of the great monotheisms.”778  While not suggesting a religion without religion as 
such, Caputo does read Derrida in such a way as to suggest a way forward, albeit khôrally. 
This is exactly the point: khôral analysis of a religious text, read with spaces, the abyss, 
endless drift, and the infirm ground of the trace, lends itself to going behind religion, a prior-
to religion, a pre-originary religious understanding.  This is no mere re-situating, but an 
                                                             
776 Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 57. Italics original.  
777 Ibid. 156.  Italics original.  Preceding this argument, Caputo provides the following interpretation: “Khôra is 
the stuff of new tolerance, not of familiar Christian or Enlightenment tolerance, which are disguised ways of 
keeping the ‘same’ in place, but of a tolerance that ‘would respect the distance of the infinite alterity of 
singularity.’” Ibid. Italics original.  
778 Ibid. 157.  
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“archaeology” of sorts (to read Derrida (up)on the text) because it digs deeper in the analysis 
of religion, in the pieces that open it to further and deeper meaning.   
 Part of this “opening” in a khôral way means that the “spacing” involved allows for 
room for comparison because, as Derrida explains, “…the meaning of the event on the 
groundless ground of what I call khôra, the groundless ground of a ‘there is,’ ‘it takes place,’ 
the place of taking place, which is prior to and totally indifferent to this anthropo-
theologization, this history of religions and of revelations.”779 The location-less location of 
khôra means that spacing has a type of potential for comparisons between concepts that 
otherwise may not have textual inferences.  Derrida’s analysis here is a play on Heideggerian 
concepts in that they are the “groundless ground.”  He goes on to explain this further:   
…without this totally indifferent space which does not give place to what takes 
place, there would not be this extraordinary movement or desire for giving, for 
receiving, for appropriating, for Ereignis as event and appropriation.  This is 
why religion is interesting to me.  I do not say anything against it, but I try to 
go back to a place or a taking place where the event as a process of 




While time and space prohibit a full a discussion of Derrida’s thinking on the gift, the 
important connection here (with khôra) is the idea that what is always to come is what draws 
together spacing and khôra.  Spacing within the text is what makes viewing khôra as a 
comparative tool tenable; Derrida saw the potentiality for this in analyzing religion: “I do not 
know if this structure [khôra] is really prior to what comes under the name of revealed 
religion or even of philosophy, or whether it is through philosophy or the revealed religions, 
the religions of the book, or any other experience of revelation, that retrospectively we think 
what I try to think.”781  
 To make the case that Derrida viewed the structure (khôra) of spacing within a text, 
even a religious text, as a comparative tool through the prospect of what is always to come in 
                                                             
779 Kearney, “On the Gift,” 67.  This quote is taken from a response by Derrida.   
780 Ibid. Italics original.  
781 Ibid. 73.   
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the future, is to make the case that khôral spacing will always cause splits and gaps in the 
text, an opening or fissure in absolute meaning, to breach the bridge of comparative 
possibility.  Hence, the argument can be made for khôral spacing within the text and its 
further use for comparative purposes. 
E. Derridean Khôral Spacing: The Name of Religion?  
 Derrida’s reading of khôral spacing in Plato has analytical value, but he also places 
some hesitation on “using” khôra for specific purposes. Thus, in order to relate khôra and any 
study of religion, further contextualization and nuance is needed.  Most obviously, khôra is 
not a thing (like a lens) by which other analytical data points might be drawn; rather, khôra is 
fundamentally a third thing, a (no)thing.  Thus, if khôra “is” a lens by which the prism of 
analytical value is determined, it must be negative because it cannot convey presence within 
the text. This can also be inferred because Derrida connects khôra with negative theology: 
“…the via negativa conjugates reference to God, the name of God, with the experience of 
place.  The desert is also a figure of the pure place.  But figuration in general results from this 
spatiality, from this locality of the word.”782 The spacing within the text does not constitute 
“being” for Derrida; instead, this spacing is a type of quasi-non-being that calls into question 
being.  The function of negation, in other words, cannot be expressed with simple negativity; 
khôra demonstrates, through its nonbeing-ness, how spacing may call into question its own 
“use” in texts where it is already “present” as this third thing.  The limits of such expression 
are why Derrida begins one essay with a barrage of questions: “How ‘to talk religion’? Of 
religion? Singularly of religion, today? How dare we speak of it in the singular without fear 
and trembling, this very day?”783 
                                                             
782 Jacques Derrida, “Sauf le nom,” in On the Name, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., ed. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), 56-57. Italics original. See also Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” 19ff.   
783 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” 1. Italics original. It is important to note that Derrida follows by calling into 
question the ability to delimit what religion “is:” “Here we are confronted by the overwhelming questions of the 
name and of everything ‘done in the name of’: questions of the name or noun ‘religion’, of the names of God, of 
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  Derrida makes a solid connection between khôra and religion that serves as the 
“spacing” between being and nothingness: “…in view of a third place that could well have 
been more than archi-originary, the most anarchic and anarchivable place possible, not the 
island nor the Promised Land, but a certain desert, that which makes possible, opens, 
hollows, or infinitizes the other.”784 Derrida here draws what comes before the past (“archi-
originary”) and what is (always) to come; for him, this is how religion is drawn in/onto the 
text.  Here, Derrida’s thought on how religion might be appropriated with khôra is the most 
potent, and that which is further examined below in the specific texts of Meister Eckhart:  
Whenever this foundation [the “secret” or “mystical” ] founds in foundering, 
whenever it steals away under the ground of what it founds, at the very instant 
when, losing itself thus in the desert, it loses the very trace of itself and the 
memory of a secret, ‘religion’ can only begin and begin again: quasi-




If there is analytical value to be found here, it is to read Derrida’s appropriation of khôra as 
negative.  This negativity is not a thing of value, of specific parameters, or even of assignable 
methodology; rather, the negativity of khôra is found in the text itself.  Derrida’s study of 
khôra makes several points, of which all pivot on khôra as negative.  As a pre-original 
(no)thing, khôra calls into question being itself, all while not “existing” as a thing.  Here 
Derrida works out the analogy of desert when describing khôra because “…while negating or 
effacing all, while proceeding to eradicate every predicate and claiming to inhabit the 
desert…Isn’t the desert a paradoxical figure of the aporia?”786 The key insight here is that in 
its pre-original state, khôra also operates at the end of language, on the abyss of 
(non)meaning; this does not pre-suppose linear thinking, nor does it pre-suppose the firm 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
whether the proper name belongs to the system of language or not, hence, of its untranslatability but also of its 
iterability…” Ibid. 6. Italics original.  
784 Ibid. 16. Italics original.  
785 Ibid. 19.  Italics original.  





 of pre-beginning and end; rather, khôra “functions” at the limits, both before the 
limit of creation and at the linguistic limit of expression.   
Applying this thinking to a/the text, khôra pre-exists as a gap, an abyss, a desert 
within the pre-suppositions of the text; applied to a religious text, this means that khôra has a 
pseudo-transcendent value because it pre-originates description, and perhaps experience of, 
transcendence: “The desert is also a figure of the pure place.”788  Furthermore, it calls into 
question the “place” of the religious text as a firm, authoritative voice (of God, the divine, 
enlightenment, etc.) that contextualizes everything else.  A khôral analysis suggests that the 
religious text contains the same abyss, gap, and desert as any other text.  At the limits of 
language, too, khôra also suggests in such an aporia, that there is always something to come, 
an indefinable future.  The splits and gaps and deserts of the religious text also call into 
question the authority of the closed text, the authoritative – finished! – text.789  This means 
that khôral negativity insists that the religious text is never complete because there is always 
something to come.   
By its peculiar and difficult (non)place in and at the limits of a text, khôra “functions” 
negatively because it takes away supposed authority of a religious text; in the same way, 
though, khôra means that a religious text can “breathe” anew, being permanently open to 
interpretation, re-readings, and “life” within it.790  By opening the religious text to the future, 
                                                             
787 Derrida describes this carefully: “For this location displaces and disorganizes all our onto-topological 
prejudices, in particular the objective science of space.  Khōra is over there but more ‘here’ than any ‘here’…” 
Ibid. 56. Italics original.  
788 Ibid. 57.  
789 Gary Gutting supports this specific claim with a more general summary: “There will always be textual 
ambivalences that remain unresolvable and prevent us from understanding fully ‘what the author really means.’” 
Gary Cutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
292. Furthermore, without delving too deeply in the meaning of author / reader paradigms, it calls into question 
authorial privilege. Whether religious texts are written by humans or the divine, authorial privilege, totalizing 
and closing the text, is assumed; Derrida calls this firmly into question.   
790 It is acknowledged that such statements are general; they are done so purposely.  They are in a similar strain 
as the thesis of Kevin Hart’s early work on Derrida and deconstruction (the theological implications thereof).  
Specifically, Hart argues that “[a]ll attempts to arrive at a determinate meaning – that is, all attempts to totalize a 
text – are held to be theological insofar as they assume, at one level or another, that the sign is ultimately 
grounded in pure self-presence.”  Thus, when he states that “…the sign trespasses over its assigned limits, 
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khôra not only functions negatively within the text, but it suggests a natural “push” to the 
aporia of limitations.  
V. Apophatic Theology and Meister Eckhart: Khôral Spacing and Detachment 
A. The Problem of Metaphysics 
Khôra provides (a) key insight into reading Meister Eckhart because it “operates” in 
this third place, within/out spacing, as pre-originary to the text (and perhaps to God).  It is not 
created, as such, and it is no-thing; it immediately calls into question if there is any “thing” 
that pre-originates God.  This is not the direction this study takes, though, because time and 
space preclude a full discussion on “being” and God.  Rather, the direction taken is with(in) 
Eckhart’s textual references to detachment.  The spacing issue, to remain on this point for a 
moment, is of vital importance, though; whether or not it is pre-originary to even God himself 
is simply unknowable because what remains is but a trace.  Instead, the issue of spacing, 
framed contextually with Derrida’s understanding of khôra, helps bring out the nuances of 
Eckhart’s concept of detachment.  In turn, this opens wide the possibilities for comparison. 
The immediate problem that stems from examining negativity in Eckhart’s thought in 
terms of a Derridean khôral framework concerns metaphysics.  Whereas Eckhart’s 
theological program, framed in the context of the via negativa, might be arguably described 
as thoroughly metaphysical in tone, texture, and textual concern, Derrida’s program might be 
summed as a critique of metaphysics from within metaphysics.
791
  Certainly philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
thereby blurring any qualitative distinction between the concept and the sign” he is arguing for an “opening” of 
sorts within the text, within fixed and assumed meaning.  Furthermore, Hart goes on to tie this with Derrida’s 
project of critiquing “presence” insofar as “…there is not a fall from full presence but, as it were, a fall within 
presence, an inability of ‘presence’ to fulfill its promise of being able to form a ground.” This argument helps 
fill out the meaning of a ground-less theology, a theology that is open to re-interpretation from a religious text 
that is opened, fissured, and split with deconstruction.  See Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 35;14.  Italics 
original.  
791 Coward helps summarize this point: “Derrida’s deconstruction attempts to negate the whole system of 
metaphysical opposition that has characterized Western philosophy and theology.  He criticizes not only the 
logocentric view but any philosophy that privileges one opposite or extreme over the other.  Derrida establishes 
his critique by deconstructing the viewpoint that has dominated Western metaphysics; namely, that a separate 
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considerations might be made for their particular loci in the history of thought, but certain 
interesting questions emerge when probed more deeply.  For example, one of Derrida’s most 
articulate and sustained arguments differentiating his own thought from that of negative 
theology centers around the critique of hyperessentiality.  Amongst those differentiations, 
however, emerges some common ground that is also fodder for inquiry.  In general terms, 
Derrida stresses the importance of what is to come, of a wide open future, of a welcoming of 
the unknown, the impossible, and the infinite; perhaps in a similar attitude, Eckhart seems to 
push his own thought to that of aporia in his assertions of a fundamentally unknowable, 
utterly transcendent God.  So, while differences are notable, the dialogue that can emerge 
from such an analysis (considering both points of difference and similarity between Derrida 
and Eckhart) has value.   
The concern here, however, is not primarily with a comparison between these two 
thinkers; rather, what is considered below is an examination of Eckhart’s language, 
specifically that of detachment, in terms of Derridean khôra.  The driving methodological 
question concerns Derrida’s sweeping criticism of hyperessentiality in negative theology; 
more specifically, it should be questioned whether or not this applies to Eckhart’s concept of 
detachment.
792
  Derrida’s charge of hyperessentiality pertained to the notion that no matter 
what is negated, one still seeks a God beyond God; so, this is posed as a thoroughly 
metaphysical critique: “The God who is ‘beyond being’ turns out, [Derrida] thinks, to enjoy a 
higher kind of being, a supreme mode of self-presence, a superessentiality.”793  This criticism 
takes seriously the prospect that God (as presence) is found through negation; this might be 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Being or Presence is immediately reflected in speech and then given secondary representation in writing.” 
Coward, “A Hindu Response to Derrida’s View of Negative Theology,” 214.  
792 Hart’s argument follows similar lines, though his analysis is more of a parsing of detachment: “The central 
point which most mystics make is that one must be detached from the things of the world.  The mystic does not 
deny reason, memory or the will; he or she situates them with respect to a far wider configuration…the 
complicating feature of most mystical discourse is the insistence upon a double movement of revealing and 
concealing.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 267.  Italics original.  
793 Ibid. 278.  
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tentatively called negative transcendence.  Is Eckhart’s thought guilty of negative 
transcendence in his assertion of the Godhead beyond being?  Perhaps, but an analysis is still 
needed to address this question.  In that way, the main idea is that Eckhartian language, 
described with his understanding of detachment, might be further elucidated with Derridean 
khôra; the background question driving this main idea concerns that of Derrida’s critique of 
hyperessentiality.   
B. Eckhartian Language and Aporias: Khôral Considerations 
 Though it has been discussed at length, it is important to bear in mind the particular 
type of negative theology that is being discussed here.  Denys Turner makes an interesting 
argument “…that there really is no such thing as ‘apophatic’ language at all.  For the 
‘apophatic’ is what is achieved…when language breaks down.  The apophatic is the 
recognition of how this ‘silence’ lies, as it were, all around the perimeter of language…”794 
While the logic of such a position may be defended, the larger purpose here is see how 
Eckhart does this within a particular context; as Turner continues, “…[Eckhart] knows 
perfectly well that the unsayable cannot be placed within the grasp of speech.  Yet he will use 
speech, necessarily broken, contradictory, absurd, paradoxical, conceptually hyperbolic 
speech, to bring to insight the ineffability of God.”795 From the outset, it might be established 
that Eckhart is working on the fringes of language, on the abyss of language, perhaps even 
in/on the khôral desert of language.  This is why Turner insists there is not an apophatic 
language as such, but this seems to beg the question of whether negation of assumedly 
cataphatic language means that negativity cannot “exist” within its own (non)space of 
expression.  Turner addresses this in a critical discussion of Bernard McGinn’s distinction 
that the apophatic is “precisely the importance it attaches to the experience of the absence of 
                                                             
794 Turner, The Darkness of God, 150.  Italics original.  
795 Ibid. 151.  
229 
 
God.”796 Even here, though, Turner does well to show that McGinn is skeptical of the value 
of experience as it is applied to apophaticism.
797
 Thus, if experience cannot “define” 
(however loosely) apophaticism, nor the absence of God, nor perhaps the negation of 
cataphatic language, what might be an internal pivot of negative theology? It is here that 
Derridean khôra might well address such an issue, though this is addressed below after a few 
more distinctions.   
 To carry such a discussion to its final logical conclusion, Turner ventures into the 
territory of the negation of negation: “But the final, apophatic, negations negate difference 
itself, and so negate the negation between sameness and difference, the eadem scientia which 
unites opposites.”798 This is a key idea in negative theology because it shows how the realms 
of createdness and divinity are bridged insofar as difference between them is negated; indeed, 
this is a theme that Eckhart carries through his various sermons and expositions.  Whereas 
here the negation of difference itself can be applied to theological categories, Derridean 
khôra operates on a decidedly non-theological level whereby it pre-originates difference 
itself.  This, too, allows for discussion because if khôra pre-originates difference (in this 
instance between createdness and divinity), does apophaticism provide for a means by which 
the discussion might return to khôral inquiry, all while remaining open to a “future” (of sorts) 
of non-difference?   
 It is important to turn here to Eckhart specifically, for the richness of his language 
helps elucidate how the above ideas might address something deeper in the discussion.  Many 
of the passages discussed below appear from his German sermons; they are selected with the 
idea that his vernacular sermons would show a more pastoral Eckhart, an Eckhart who is 
struggling to convey meaning at the limits of language not just for academic sake, but for 
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798 Ibid. 271.  Italics original.   
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parishioners.  For example, in Ego elegi vos de mundo, Eckhart operates on a perimeter of 
metaphysics when he starts to tease out the meaning of nothingness: “In created things, as I 
have often said before, there is no truth.  But there is something which is above the created 
being of the soul and which is untouched by any createdness, by any nothingness.”799 Here 
Eckhart is holding together the concept of a metaphysics of presence, a something beyond, 
“above,” which is firmly out of the grasp of the created and the possibility of a higher, 
unaffected being-ness and nothingness.  The importance of this transcendent “reality” cannot 
be overstated; indeed, Eckhart takes this transcendence to the point of where humanity can be 
identified as God’s Son:  
When God sees that we are his only begotten Son, then God presses so 
urgently upon us and hastens us towards us and acts as if his divine being were 
about to collapse and become nothing in itself so that he can reveal to us the 




The (non)reality of nothingness finds a completion of sorts in the “abyss of his Godhead,” a 
“place” where “[a]ll created things are nothingness, but this is remote from and alien to all 
createdness.”801 Interestingly, prior to this assertion, Eckhart discusses the unity of creatures 
and God, found in nothingness, whereby the creature forsakes “God for the sake of God.”802 
There is more than a hint of Neoplatonist metaphysics here, but it seems to go further than 
that, mainly for the reason that unity with the “one” is more theologically centered on the 
God beyond God, the God beyond being, the Godhead that stands utterly alone.  This may be 
attributed to pastoral flare, perhaps, but it seems to stem differently.   
 Derrida’s khôra may help to unpack this somewhat; Eckhart’s historical and 
philosophical position would certainly lend itself to Neoplatonic interpretation, but as 
mentioned briefly, this does not seem to fully tease out Eckhart’s meaning.  Eckhart seems to 
                                                             
799 Meister Eckhart, Ego elegi vos de mundo (John 15:16); DW 28; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 121.  
800 Meister Eckhart, Qui audit me non confundetur (Ecclus. 24:30); DW 12; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 
176.  
801 Ibid. 177.  
802 Ibid.  
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be describing a space, but a non-space, where the Godhead and creatures are one, where they 
“know” unicity.  Eckhart will not go so far as to elucidate this (non)space because it is 
encapsulated by the abyss of the Godhead; a khôral interpretation takes seriously a non-
space, pre-originary to all things, where a type of paradoxical unicity might be possible.  This 
might be called the khôral space of the Godhead as it is nothingness within the createdness of 
being.  This would further substantiate a khôral (non)spacing within the creature where God 
“lives” in His abyss of the Godhead.  This is what Oliver Davies calls “a timeless and eternal 
state beyond particularity.”803 Furthermore, Davies rightly spells out how Eckhart is trying to 
go beyond particularity in his language: “Something of this same ‘de-concretization’ is 
achieved through Eckhart’s abundant use of negative forms.  Indeed, this is one of the 
principal areas in which he shows his astonishing ability to make language register the very 
transcendence which he is striving to communicate.”804 The question here is whether or not 
Eckhart is successful in doing so; does he squarely communicate the transcendence of non-
existence in(to) the unicity of God/head?  Again, Derrida’s khôra helps bridge the gap 
because the pre-originary difficulty of expressing unicity is further pushed to aporia through 
the “space” that is God’s alone.  This (non)space is rather counter-negative in the sense that it 
is understood through the prism of unicity, but not in particularity (in the realm of difference) 
of createdness.  Thus, khôra may help contribute a sort of (non)lens whereby the unicity of 
(the) God/head is viewed from within/out the metaphysics of presence.   
 In order to flesh this out a bit more, though, a further discussion of negativity is 
needed; an internal logic of negation is needed to see how khôra might contribute to a reading 
of Eckhart’s most difficult concepts.  In Unus deus et pater omnium, Eckhart methodically 
addresses the logic of negativity, specifically with the idea of the negation of negation.
805
  
                                                             
803 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 191.  
804 Ibid. 190-191.  
805 Meister Eckhart, Unus deus et pater omnium (Eph. 4:6); DW 21; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 180-184. 
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Again, his linking of the negation of negation with unicity clearly has Neoplatonist 
undertones, though his fleshing out the concept takes on decidedly different theological 
directions.  Eckhart’s discussion in this sermon contributes to his goal of differentiating 
between the creature and God in a way that moves toward unicity: 
If I say that God is good, then I am adding something to him.  Oneness on the 
other hand is a negation of negation and a denial of denial…The soul takes the 
Godhead where it is purified in itself, where nothing has been added to it, 
where nothing has been thought.  One is the negation of negation.  All 
creatures contain a negation within themselves: one creature denies that it is 
another…But with God there is a negation of negation: he is one and negates 




This helps fill out the further problem of the logic of negativity as it applies to unicity; 
further, it conveys the “infinity of God:” “[t]o define the nature of something created is at the 
same time to say what it is not, while in defining the nature of God, the uncreated, we negate 
the principle of negation itself.  The negation of negation thus becomes ‘the purest form of 
affirmation as applied to God.’”807 Within the internal logic of this negation, an apophatic 
logic that affirms through negation, “God” begins to disappear into the completely 
“otherness” of the Godhead; again a khôral interpretation might stress the “other” which 
remains completely apart from thing-ness in a way that preserves the absolute “otherness” of 
God; does this get closer to Eckhart’s assertion that God is no-thing?   
 In this same strain, Eckhart goes to great lengths to parse out his language of 
“otherness,” to the point where his apophaticism seems to be a response to an ever-constant 
threat of idolatry.  His language takes this into serious consideration: “The eternal Word is 
both the medium and the image itself, which exists without mediation and without image so 
that the soul can comprehend God in the eternal Word, knowing him directly without an 
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807 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 109.  
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image.”808 Here Eckhart’s apophaticism makes a careful distinction of the language of 
description and how it is fundamentally “other” as it is completely separate from the 
createdness of images.  In a khôral interpretation, it might be said that Eckhart’s parsing of 
such language means that there is an internal nothingness, a desert of meaning, that protects 
the “otherness” of (the) God/head.  Knowing the Word of God without an image would be a 
khôral image because it is outside fixed meaning; it is thoroughly this “third” thing beyond 
forms and God/head.
809
 This khôral image, a way of describing that is thoroughly “other” in 
God’s own “self” – a “self” that is fundamentally unicity – helps elucidate further Davies’ 
assertion of “…a journey, a pilgrimage, through an ever changing conceptual landscape into a 
deepening awareness of the utter transcendence and unknowability of God.”810  There is a 
direct and paradoxical relationship between the khôral “otherness” and the “unknowability of 
God” here; it helps frame the context of Eckhart’s apophatic negativity because there is a 
sharp contrast between God and Godhead. It calls into question the ability to even 
know/assert the “name” of God,811 in very much the same strain of thought as Derrida’s 
struggle in Sauf le nom.
812
 The pattern by which the text names God and differentiates God 
from God/head is seemingly lost amongst the apophatic clarifications; however, khôra shows 
an otherness, a radical desert-ification with/in the “name” of God because it stands both 
in/outside of God/head.  This demonstrates the larger point: Eckhart’s language is khôrically 
                                                             
808 Meister Eckhart, Modicum et iam non videbitis me (John 16:16); DW 69; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 
211.  
809 The idea here is to show, under erasure, how “to trace and circumscribe the metaphysics within 
theology…[because deconstruction’s] strategy of using language ‘under erasure’ illuminates particular moves 
and attitudes in mystical texts.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, xxxv.  Furthermore, this is necessary (in a larger 
scale) for “crossing over from the phenomenal to the transcendent involves a provisional crossing out of a 
word’s metaphysical commitment.” Ibid. 136. Italics original.  
810 Davies, God Within, 47.  
811 For a helpful discussion of this point, see Davies’ God Within, 50ff.   
812 Derrida’s struggle in “Sauf le nom” might be best illustrated with “[t]his coming to being starting from 
nothing and as nothing, as God and as Nothing, as the Nothing itself, this birth that carries itself without 
premise, this becoming-self as becoming-God – or Nothing – that is what appears impossible, more than 
impossible, the most impossible possible, more impossible than the impossible if the impossible is the simple 
negative modality of the possible.” Derrida, “Sauf le nom,” 43. Italics original.  
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pre-originary because it “contains” the otherness of the desert/nothingness within the 
Godhead.   
 To quickly sum this section, Eckhart’s language is pushed to aporia, to absolute 
limits, in its stress upon the otherness of God.  This helps set up the context of khôra within 
Eckhart’s language because the metaphysics of presence seemingly breaks down.  If the pre-
originary status of the language of desert applies to otherness of (the) God/head, then khôral 
interpretation shows how Eckhart’s logic (negation of negation, etc.) might, too, stand outside 
the realm of metaphysics.  Like Derrida, Eckhart must enter into a metaphysical discussion of 
the desert, of the presence of God as unicity, but the thrust of his argument, namely the 
negation of negation, shows how the desert of God, fundamentally a khôra, defies a definable 
presence / absence paradigm.  This sets up the logical question of how humanity, in its 
createdness, is part of that unicity, the unicity of (the) God/head that is khôrically linked in 
what Eckhart calls “detachment.”  
C. Detachment and (the) Language of Khôra 
 For Eckhart, the metaphysical questions of God’s presence are developed in his 
concept of detachment.  God “exists” in his own radical freedom, a “place” completely and 
utter separate of createdness, perhaps a khôral place, where God remains completely other.
813
  
Detachment is the way/path/means by which humanity uncovers or reveals God within the 
self.  In other words, detachment is the way to unicity.  This is not taken lightly, though, for 
as Caputo has argued, “…if we press Eckhart about his Neoplatonic henology, his 
metaphysics of the one, he has to give that up, too, as much idolatry, so much onto-theo-
                                                             
813 Turner describes this well: “It is a light, moreover, which is a ‘nothing’, an ‘emptiness’, a ‘desert’, it is 
formless and featureless and it is all these things with the nothingness, the emptiness and the desert-like 
formlessness and featurelessness of the Godhead.  They cannot be distinguished, for ‘with this power 
(intellect)’, Eckhart says, ‘the soul works in nonbeing and so follows God who works in nonbeing.’” Turner, 
The Darkness of God, 159.  
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logic.”814 Rather, Eckhart is pushing toward a khôral state, a non-place of pre-originary 
“existence” in which the detached self is completely and utterly no-thing; paradoxically, this 
is not a condition in which one strives for some sort of perfection.  Instead, detachment is this 
khôral place, this pre-originary state of unicity; Turner helps bring this out: “This 
‘detachment’ is not the breakthrough into the ground of God where I stand in my ground as 
an uncreated nothingness.  True detachment, on the contrary, is my becoming in desire what I 
am in myself: nothing, an unum indistinctum.”815 There is a connection between this unicity 
and detachment, found in the khôral desert of nothingness, “[f]or our entire being is founded 
purely on a process of becoming nothingness.”816 
 The question remains, though: what does it mean to “become nothingness”?  How 
does Eckhart’s notion of detachment, found in the khôral desert our own (non)being, 
“become” the nothingness that is unicity with God?  Eckhart makes an interesting textual 
connection here, stating in Qui audit me non confundetur, “For if we are to hear God’s word, 
we must be wholly detached.  The hearer is the same as the heard in the eternal Word.”817 
Eckhart’s appeal to language, even if he is operating on the limits of language, is still rooted 
in the understanding that the transcendence of (the) God/head is communicated in/through/by 
a text.  The khôral desert of our non-being is found by means of this text, but the 
communicative nature of the language employed by Eckhart pushes meaning to the limits of 
transcendence.  This is why Eckhart implores his hearers to “renounce God for the sake of 
God and to be free of God for God’s sake.”818 Eckhart squarely deals with the problem of 
“presence” in his concept of the detached soul because he struggles to describe how the 
detached soul is in a “place” – a khôral place of otherness – whereby “…when we were 
                                                             
814 Caputo, “Mysticism and Transgression,” 38.  
815 Turner, The Darkness of God, 181. Italics original.   
816 Meister Eckhart, The Talks of Instruction, On Inner and Outer Works; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 46.  
817 Meister Eckhart, Qui audit me non confundetur (Ecclus. 24:30); DW 12; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 
175-176.  
818 Meister Eckhart, The Book of Divine Consolation; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings,, 64.  
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contained in the eternal essence of God, there was nothing other than God in us, but what was 
in us was ourselves.”819 The issue of presence is, for Eckhart, wrapped up in this pre-
originary state with/in (the) God/head.  Eckhart’s struggle within metaphysics to overcome 
his own understanding of presence is formidable; for example, he tries to relate these 
concepts in description: “Therefore we ask God to free us from ‘God’ so that we may be able 
to grasp and eternally enjoy truth where the highest angels, the fly and the human soul are all 
one – in that place where I desired what I was and was what I desired.”820 
 A common theme in Eckhart’s discussion of detachment centers around losing the 
self; paradoxically, this is where “true” presence is found, khôral presence that is neither 
defined as such nor negated:  
The soul must exist in a free nothingness.  That we should forsake God is 
altogether what God intends, for as long as the soul has God, knows God and 
is aware of God, she is far from God.  This then is God’s desire – that God 





The implications of presence are immense because, as Davies writes, “[w]e must leave the 
dimensions of time and place, which determine our specific being and which are foreign to 
God in his transcendence.”822 This is no simple negation of time and place, though, for as 
Davies goes on, “Detachment, for Eckhart, is the kind of living in the world which results 
from the birth of God in the soul and the actualization of the God-like essence within us.”823 
The analysis here must go further, though, because detachment, understood as a “place” of 
khôral otherness, means that God’s “actualization of the God-like essence within us” is more 
akin to absence, albeit khôral absence.  This means that the desert within the soul, the 
                                                             
819 Meister Eckhart, Beati pauperes spiritu, quoniam ipsorum est regnum caelorum (Matt. 5:3); DW 52; Oliver 
Davies, Selected Writings, 205.  
820 Ibid.  
821 Meister Eckhart, [no title, German sermon]; J 82; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 244.  
822 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 165.  Davies goes on to argue that Eckhart’s detachment is to be understood in a 
fundamentally moral dimension. This is also taken up by Denys Turner; see his Darkness, 172ff. The moral 
dimension as such is not specifically addressed here because the main thrust of this section deals with the place, 
albeit khôral place of detachment.  
823 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 174.  
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absolute void of presence and of absence, is the “place” of God-meeting-the-soul, the khôral 
no-place in which God’s absence/presence is (no)place itself.  Turner describes no-place as 
exactly the place where Eckhart locates the union of the soul with God: “Detachment is 
complete self-emptying: it is the digging out of a void, an abyss within the self, a vacuum 
into which God is inevitably drawn.  God cannot resist the detached soul…”824 The khôral 
presence/absence of God is the (no)place and the (no)thing with which the soul reaches utter 
unity: “Detachment is the way of achieving that nameless, featureless depth within the self 
which is identical with the Godhead and which is, also, in another way, my own identity.”825 
This “depth” is that khôral (no)place in which God disappears into the Godhead, a place 
where unicity is both no-thing and absolute.  The faculties of reason are no longer applicable 
in this “void and the desert of detachment” in which the soul “live[s] without an explanation, 
without rationale, namelessly one with the nameless God.”826  
 The point of the above analysis is not to whittle away reason and rationality with 
apophaticism to reach some point of absurdity, nor does it presuppose the ability to operate 
on the limits of language.
827
  Rather, the point is to get to something that Eckhart struggles 
with throughout his texts: pressing away for the freedom with which to show “…there is 
something which is above the created being of the soul…which is untouched by any 
createdness, by any nothingness.”828 This is a radical freedom, a freedom that is determined 
                                                             
824 Turner, The Darkness of God, 172. Turner continues: “Detachment, moreover, makes a person free not only 
‘from all created things’, but from anything less than the uncreated silence, unity and emptiness of the Godhead, 
even from God-the-Creator.” Ibid. 172-173.  
825 Ibid. 173.  
826 Ibid. 184.  
827 Part of this concerns bringing out textual nuances as they reflect the attitude of Eckhart insofar as 
“Deconstruction can illuminate how mysticism and negative theology work as discourses: certain concepts and 
textual manoeuvres developed by Derrida can be used to analyze the mystical theologian’s use of language and 
his or her attitude to it.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 174. This follows a pattern with which Derrida notes in 
his Grammatology: “We are disturbed by that which, in the concept of the sign – which has never existed or 
functioned outside the history of (the) philosophy (of presence) – remains systematically and genealogically 
determined by that history.  It is there that the concept and above all the work of deconstruction, its ‘style,’ 
remain by nature exposed to misunderstanding and nonrecognition.” Derrida, Of Grammatology, 14.  
828 Meister Eckhart, Ego elegi vos de mundo (John 15:16); DW 28; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 121. 
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by emptiness and khôral no-place, a freedom that “is free of all names and is devoid of all 
forms, quite empty and free as God is empty and free in himself.”829 To be free of “all names 
and…devoid of all forms” means a khôral freedom with which God enters the soul and 
transforms it within the context of unicity.  Turner’s analysis of this transformation is worth 
quoting at length: 
…for Eckhart it is detachment which is the strategy of the uncovering and 
revealing of the spark of the soul, so it is by detachment that we discover our 
true selves.  Eckhart’s detachment is not the mechanism whereby space is 
made for God to occupy; it is rather, the process whereby space is recovered 
from the infilling of attachments.  Eckhart’s detachment, we might say, is 




The important part of Turner’s analysis focuses on the “archaeological” aspect of 
detachment, namely because it is the space, the khôral space with which God can “recover” 
the soul.   The salvific connection with khôra cannot be denied here; it is how (the) God/head 
frees the soul, returning it to its pre/originary state, a state of complete and utter freedom. 
VI. Conclusion 
 From the outset, it might seem a bit strange to examine Derrida’s deconstruction of 
Plato’s khôra in order to further examine Eckhart’s concept of detachment.  However, as 
demonstrated above, it can be a fruitful conversation because the (no)space and (no)time and 
the (no)thing of khôra lends itself to filling out Eckhart’s “place” of the soul in the 
nothingness of God and in the unicity of the one.  Furthermore, because Derrida works from 
within the parameters of metaphysics, albeit in a way to show the limitations and, ultimately, 
illusion of metaphysics,
831
 the comparison is possible because Eckhart’s thought is 
                                                             
829 Meister Eckhart, Intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum et mulier quaedam, Martha nomine, excepit illum in 
domum suam (Luke 10:38); DW 2; Oliver Davies, Selected Writings, 163.  
830 Turner, The Darkness of God, 176.  
831 Hart describes this as a “fall within presence, an inability of ‘presence’ to fulfill its promise of being able to 
form a ground.”  He is making the careful distinction from a “fall from full presence,” from “a fall within 
presence.” This is important to note because “[f]ull presence, for Derrida, is not a prelapsarian ideal for an 
eschatological hope, but an illusory goal - the illusion being that there is in fact something outside the sign 
system which can escape its determinations.” Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 14. Italics original.  
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thoroughly grounded in metaphysics.  The methodological question here, though, has been 
whether or not Eckhart has really been working in the hyperessentiality that Derrida criticizes 
him (and other apophatic thinkers) of many years later.  Granted, an analysis of Eckhart’s 
thought can quickly point out that he is striving for a/the God “beyond” God, which at first 
glance may seem squarely metaphysical; even Eckhart’s term for this, the Godhead, seems to 
betray a certain amount of confidence in the stripping away of layers of assumed presence 
and absence to get at the nothingness of God.
832
   
 To examine this more fully, the full criticism of Derrida is needed: 
…in every discourse that seems to return to a regular and insistent manner to 
this rhetoric of negative determination, endlessly multiplying the defenses and 
the apophatic warnings: this, which is called X (for example, text, writing, the 
trace, differance, the hymen, the supplement, the pharmakon, the parergon, 
etc.) “is” neither this nor that, neither sensible nor intelligible, neither positive 
nor negative, neither inside nor outside, neither superior nor inferior, neither 
active nor passive, neither present nor absent, not even neutral, not even 
subject to a dialectic with a third moment, without any possible sublation 
(“Aufhebung”).  Despite appearances, then, this X is neither a concept nor 
even a name; it does lend itself to a series of names, but calls for another 
syntax, and exceeds even the order and structure of predicative discourse. It 
“is” not and does say what “is.” It is written completely otherwise.833 
 
This criticism of a/the negative theology is apt because it seeks to tear away the basic 
assumptions of apophaticism; the question here is if Eckhart falls within this same category.  
In many cases he does; the “otherness” to his language seems to presuppose a supplement 
with which there is a “core” understanding to which apophaticism may approach, 
eventually.
834
  In Eckhart’s appropriation of Neoplatonic philosophy, he calls this Godhead, 
                                                             
832 Caputo argues that Eckhart “wanted to establish the Being of god in so pure a region that the affirmation of 
His Being had to be continually purified by a denial of Being.” While this is certainly indicative of a 
conventional reading of Eckhart, Caputo does not go far enough here.  Eckhart does operate on a type of ever-
negating platform, as it were, but the intent seems to go beyond “the purity of Being” insofar as he pushes 
negative language to its aporia.  Rather than a strictly “non-ontic function,” Eckhart seems to go beyond even 
these qualifications into a sense of nothingness that is even beyond language, however negatively conceived and 
affirmed.  Caputo, “Mysticism and Transgression,” 27.  
833 Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking,” 74.  
834 Here Hart highlights these points with a contrast of Derrida and Eckhart’s thought: “What worries [Derrida] 





 But Eckhart seems to go further than that, and perhaps further than Derrida’s 
capable criticism.   
 There is another core, if that is even possible, to Eckhart’s thought, which defies the 
language with which he tries to employee; it is buried deep within/out his linguistic 
limitations, for it is a type of negative transcendence.  It is not a transcendence directly 
from/by/with (the) God/head, but a sort of negative-transcendence which stands ready to 
negate “itself” in the face of transcendence.  It does not slip through the cracks of 
supplementation, but rather stands in a completely “other,” in much the same way that 
Derrida strives for in his own thought.
836
  It is a negative-transcendence that stands at the 
ready for the other, for tomorrow, for what is to come, a viens oui oui ad infinitum, or as 
Caputo puts it, “[t]he fragility of our structures, the desert emptiness of our signifiers, are 
such stuff (hyperstasis) as faith is made of, our faith in what is to come, and this very 
desertification is the condition of keeping faith and hope and desire alive.”837  While Derrida 
certainly criticizes his own position, and much of the success or failure of his thought is 
predicated on his ability to deconstruct even his own analysis, Eckhart does the same thing: 
his thought is rooted in the groundless “other,” a negative-transcendence that goes beyond – 
and in front of – hyperessentiality.   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
destination; it promises to lead one beyond being to the immediacy of a presence, to God.” Hart, The Trespass 
of the Sign, 284.  
835 Caputo, in the final analysis, separates out Eckhart from Neoplatonic thought: “What Eckhart taught had little 
to do with a Neoplatonic One or a super-essential presence.  Rather he taught with irrepressible exuberance the 
joyful wisdom of a life graced by God and the in the process shattered with loving joy the most prized graven 
images of the onto-theo-logic.”  Caputo, “Mysticism and Transgression,” 39.  While Eckhart’s writing 
demonstrates this attitude, even to the point of urgency, this is not how he overcomes Neoplatonic thought 
because, arguably, Neoplatonic thinkers exhibited similar “exuberance.”  Rather, it is not so much that Eckhart 
overcame Neoplatonic thought, but he surpassed it.  His descriptions seem to go into a negative transcendence 
that is not present in Neoplatonic thought; while time and space limit the ability to demonstrate this fully, 
Eckhart seems willing to negate the forms and divinity that inform Neoplatonism, even at the expense of the 
One that is central to this school of thought.  For Eckhart, the One seems to be written under erasure as well.   
836 Coward describes this well (from Derrida’s point-of-view): “While there is no direct intuition for Derrida, 
there is silence that is not a void or a nihilism but that is filled with the insistent stirrings of god.  Thus even in 
the ultimate silence there is the experience of difference for Derrida.” Coward, “A Hindu Response to Derrida’s 
View of Negative Theology,” 209.  




I. Summing Up: A Typology of Negativity 
 As means to sum up so far, it is necessary to return to the typology of negativity set 
forth in the introductory chapter.  Negativity understood dynamically as multiple parts of 
speech, capable of expressing negation at multiple levels simultaneously, serves as the 
backdrop to the entire argument.  Negation is not employed arbitrarily within the internal 
logic, but rather as something of an ongoing theme that shapes the structure of this 
comparative analysis.  The typology set forth in the introduction acts as a meta-analysis of the 
argument presented, though it is not alluded to specifically; the strategic purpose in that is to 
allow for the analysis to drill down through the various layers of negativity, specifically with 
emptiness in Buddhism, apophaticism in Christianity, and then further with special reference 
to Derridean deconstruction.   
 One of the main features of the established typology is the insistence upon developing 
the certain types of negativity within Buddhist and Christian thought as separate constructs.  
This makes for a complex comparison where any direct comparison occurs within the 
typology (namely, below), but not necessarily within the developing chapters.  This 
intentional separation is meant to actively tease out the parts that may be of comparative 
value, but only with the independent voices of the two religious traditions.   
 From a prima facie analysis, Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism share 
quite little save that of tantalizing inference in what “emptiness” and “apophaticism” might 
mean.  Once an analysis is performed on both traditions, as was conducted in Chapters Two 
and Three, the complexities seem to pit the concepts even further apart.  How is a comparison 
even possible, or even tenable?  To go back further prior to this question, what is the value in 
comparing Christianity and Buddhism?  As was set forth in the introduction, the primary goal 
of inter-religious dialogue drives the methodology here, namely from the standpoint of 
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informed discussion; this means understanding a finer point of the analysis.  In this case, 
emptiness and apophaticism were selected because of a more nuanced connection in 
negativity; the methodology employed a typology of negativity to drill down further in what 
“emptiness” and “apophaticism” mean in the respective tradition.  To return to the question 
of how a comparison is possible, or even tenable, the answer now lies in how negativity is 
appropriated separately in the traditions.   
 If the key piece to an inter-religious dialogue is found in the insistence, and indeed 
performance, of separate analyses whereby the unique voice is found within the tradition, 
then comparison might be possible at this point. This does not, however, get at the further 
point of how the language of emptiness and apophaticism may contribute to a comparison; in 
other words, the groundwork of analysis in Chapters Two and Three, while necessary to the 
overall context, cannot themselves serve as the root basis of comparison.  More simply, the 
analysis is an exploration of Buddhist emptiness through specific lenses and the exploration 
of Christian apophaticism is also through specific lenses, but the limitations here are 
apparent: the analysis alone does not lend any common ground between the two traditions.  
Indeed, after the second and third chapters, it might be said that Buddhist emptiness and 
Christian apophaticism could not be further apart.  By preserving the necessity of a unique 
voice, the possibility of an internal bridge between the two does not emerge.  This might be 
described as a central missing element in most comparative analyses: by trying to formulate 
an internal bridge, one or both elements suffer a loss of unique religious identity.  Thus, the 
product is, prima facie, a comparison, but the depth and meaning of that comparison is 
limited.   
 In order to overcome this methodological problem, a third party is needed to align the 
unique voices that might not even be using the same vocabulary.  This third party should 
have no specific interest in promoting one voice over the other, but instead has the capacity to 
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engage the religious tradition in a meaningful and challenging way.  For this project, the 
deconstruction of Jacques Derrida is the selected third party, the bridge between Buddhist 
emptiness and Christian apophaticism.  Derridean deconstruction is a neutral “voice” that can 
align the unique voices of Christianity and Buddhism.  For while Derrida himself was aware 
of Buddhism, there is very little textual evidence of a sustained interest; conversely, Derrida’s 
deconstruction was identified early on as having roots in apophatic theology.  However, 
Derrida took many years to respond to this directly, and when he did, it was tenuous and 
certainly not a direct appropriation of apophatic thought.  In short, Derrida is not a religious 
thinker; while much of his thought has religious intersections, the primary “goal” (if it can be 
called that for sake of the argument) is engagement and critique of Western metaphysics.  So, 
while he addresses the possibilities of his work serving apophatic purposes, it is not directly 
(or even indirectly) correlative to Christian apophaticism.  To that end, the latent measure of 
deconstruction, herein argued as différance, allows for deeper introspection into the 
possibilities of Buddhist emptiness in Chapter Four.  It is that same latent measure of 
deconstruction, this time found in his understanding of khôra that allows for similar 
engagement with Christian apophaticism.   
 The curious aspect of applying Derridean différance to Buddhist emptiness and 
Derridean khôra to Christian apophaticism is that they both independently come to what is 
described here as “negative transcendence,” though at this point the term has not yet been 
fully worked out.  This penultimate conclusion for both emerged independently from 
Derridean deconstruction; though the same method was applied to both traditions, the 
deconstructed (un)form seemed to take on a something “other” that transcends the religious 
tradition, its texts, and even its voice.  However, this “other” is not a quality of some slippery 
meaning, shifting paradigm, or authoritative voice, but is dynamically negative in its 
appropriation of whatever transcendence might be “there.”  Even this, it might be objected, 
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still requires language structures, specifically religious language structures, to convey, even if 
the meaning is a thoroughgoing negativity.  This is addressed specifically in how the 
typology of negativity conveys meaning that seeks some sort of connection between Chapters 
Two through Five.   
 What must be worked out at this point is how the typology of negativity, informed by 
the dynamic commonality of “negative transcendence,” can (re)form a comparison of 
Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism.  
II. An Outworking of the Typology: Negative Transcendence and the Possibility of the 
“Other” 
 
 As highlighted throughout the introduction and the summation above, a comparison of 
entire religious traditions is rife with difficulty and compromise; in order to attempt any sort 
of authentic comparison, specific contexts must be established.  The attempt herein to 
develop a meaningful comparison is undertaken only after lengthy effort to contextualize 
each tradition with its own, unique voice.  The contextualization of Buddhist emptiness and 
Christian apophaticism with Derridean deconstruction leads independently to a penultimate 
conclusion of what has been termed here, “negative transcendence.”  This is the key by which 
a comparison of Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism may “occur.”  
 Describing what negative transcendence “is” or “is not” runs the risk of belittling 
possibility, a radical “otherness” that is not constrained by definition;838 rather elucidation 
must “occur” in this time and space as means of Buddhist-Christian comparison.  Any 
attempt below to work out what negative transcendence “is” is an attempt within a very 
specific context of Buddhist-Christian comparison.  It is a working out of what Derrida calls 
the “impossible,” while understanding the aporias of religious language as just that: a 
                                                             
838 The indeterminate and rather vague language here is purposeful because “…it is no business of 
deconstruction – indeed it goes against the grain of deconstruction – to specify some determinable faith, to 
specify what faith is faith in, to calm the storm or arrest the play in which faith takes shape by proposing a 




possibility, an “other” that is not yet worked out. Negative transcendence also takes into 
consideration Derrida’s criticism of the transcendental signified, but reframes how it might 
apply to religious questions.
839
  As means of clarification, the starting point of negative 
transcendence might be found in Kevin Hart’s conclusion to his “Appendix to the 2000 
Edition” of his Trespass of the Sign: 
What Derrida helps bring into focus is that the possible and the impossible are 
not to be resolved dialectically or logically: they arrange and rearrange 
themselves in the negative form of an aporia.  Religious experience pulls a 
person in different directions at the same time, demanding we attend both to 
the possible and the impossible; and in negotiating this aporia one’s 
conscience is never satisfied.  This experience of desire, dissatisfaction, 




Hart’s conclusion is fodder for so much more analysis, namely in that realm deemed the 
“impossible,” the “other” of religious language.  Indeed, Derrida does show that these things, 
including a comparison of Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism, cannot be worked 
out “dialectically or logically.”  Negative transcendence is that by which religious language 
must enter into “a new concept of writing” whereby “[t]he play of differences supposes, in 
effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple 
element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself.”841 Negative transcendence is the 
play of différances/differences coupled with the “otherness” of khôral time and space 
whereby comparison of two different religions is possible.  
 Perhaps the most paradoxical “trait” of negative transcendence is the resistance to 
a/the unicity, a oneness that finds expression in both Christian apophaticism and Buddhist 
emptiness.  Contra to the philosophical backdrop of Eckhart’s God beyond God, negative 
transcendence is oneness with erasure, oneness, transcendence that is neither one nor 
                                                             
839 Here, Caputo provides a bit of context insofar as he responds to those who criticize Derrida’s position: “They 
would saturate Derrida’s horizons with secularism and insist that deconstruction’s rejection of the transcendental 
signified means the death of God, as if a little a in différance spells the end of religion, God, and faith.” Caputo, 
The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 18. Italics original.  
840 Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, 296.  
841 Derrida, Positions, 26.  
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multiplicity because it stands at the ready for the other.  Likewise, negative transcendence 
means the non-substantiality of Buddhism, argued as a type of critique to oneness with 
emptiness, almost comes to the fore as a type of negative oneness.  Again, this is oneness 
under erasure because emptiness resists substantiality, even of itself; negative transcendence 
goes further, though, because it is neither one nor multiplicity.  Otherness means that neither 
oneness nor multiplicity nor utter emptiness are possibilities as such because to stand ready 
for the impossible, the truly other, means the inability to “know” what is coming through 
(negative) transcendence.  
 This working-out of negative transcendence is at once trapped in aporia and 
ultimately free to break down the normal bounds of language; it takes seriously the claim by 
Derrida that “[t]here are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces” because it is not 
informed by metaphysics or some sort of claim upon presence or being.
842
 Conventional 
definitions of transcendence fail to convey what might be analyzed through the erasure of 
transcendence, a negation that serves both a positive and negative function of expression.  
Negative transcendence is positive because it asserts the validity of an aporia, supports the 
pushing beyond the natural limitations of the “other,” and welcomes the impossible because it 
is ready to negate all expressions, including “itself.”  Nevertheless, there is a negative 
function as well: it is impossible to assert the impossible except under constraints of erasure.  
The negative function must negate ad infinitum with no hope of reaching a starting point, (a) 
causation, or any form of unicity.    
 Throughout the text, the parasitical nature of deconstruction has been alluded to in 
order to contextualize what is happening in the internal structures/meanings/significations of 
religious language.  Furthermore, negativity expressed with Buddhist emptiness and Christian 
apophaticism shows a certain parasitic function on religious language: even the meaning of 
                                                             
842 Ibid.  
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non-substantiality in Buddhist emptiness is called into question as too fixed just like the 
metaphysical nature of the God beyond God in Christian apophaticism is called into question 
as hyperessentiality.  At some point, the parasitical nature of deconstruction helps analyze 
religious language in a way that is both co-equal in effect and stripped of fixed meaning; 
more directly applied, this means that religious language in Buddhist emptiness and Christian 
apophaticism can begin to dialogue.
843
   
 Religious language, as it functions to bind together belief systems of people in 
multiple societies, historical times, and geographical locations, assumes an interior logic of 
authority and power.  The assumed and accepted authority of religious language helps 
develop what are termed “sacred” texts whereby a/the God or some over-arching belief 
system conveys truth, sacredness, or a code of ethics.  What Derridean deconstruction does, 
then, in effect, is call into question this authority not so much as anti-authority, but as an 
assumed or accepted, fixed and permanent meaning.  Derridean deconstruction (not religious 
expression as such but applicable to all language forms) calls assumed authority into question 
because it asserts otherness and difference/différance.
844
  This is contrary to a prima facie 
reading of religious texts that attempt to demonstrate definitive narratives for the purpose of 
binding together belief systems; rather by showing otherness and difference/différance 
through competing voices, contexts, and other narratives, the assumed authority of religious 
language is called into question because “[t]here is no stable center that itself gives meaning 
to expression.  Play alone remains, where play is the interpretive activity freed of the 
                                                             
843 This ties back with Gavin Flood’s charge, “There is comparatively little work done on the paradigms 
operative within the study of religions, an unquestioning use of methods developed long ago and, although with 
notable exceptions, a suspicion of any metatheoretical perspective…Metatheory provides a rigour at the level of 
discourse, interfaces with other disciplines and so integrates religious studies into the wider academy, and the 
only way a discipline can develop is through reflexive critique.”  Flood, Beyond Phenomenology, 4-5.  
844 It is important to note that it may be questioned if deconstruction is, itself, a type of authority which simply 
asserts itself over other claims of authority.  This is a fair question, but the immediate response is that 
deconstruction is also a self/auto –deconstruction insofar as it does not allow itself be an authoritative vision 
over all others.  Rather, as Derrida stresses throughout the corpus of his texts, deconstruction is a fissure, an 
opening, an analysis of the hidden voices within a text.  This is why deconstruction is a powerful “tool” of sorts 
for religious inquiry.   
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constriction that arises from a belief in the controlling presence of Being.”845 In this project, 
the typology of negativity functions as a type of deconstruction by which to call into question 
assumed authority of emptiness in Buddhism (demonstrated through non-substantiality of all 
things) and apophaticism in Christian apophaticism (demonstrated through detachment and 
responding to the charge of hyperessentiality).  Yet, various “other” voices creep through the 
typology; this is exactly the point of deconstruction as it applies to religious inquiry: the other 
voices, competing narratives, and multiple interpretations open religious language to the 
other, to tomorrow, to comparison with(in) the context of deconstruction.  Caputo’s 
comments help frame this: 
Deconstruction is a way to let faith function more ad-ventfully, with an 
enhanced sense of advent and event, gladdened by the good news of alterity by 
which we are always and already summoned.  Beyond that, deconstruction is 
itself a form of faith, a faith in the viens, a hope in what is coming, one which 




 From here, a comparison of Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism is 
possible with negative transcendence because the other is broken open into the realm of 
possibility; this is close to what Derrida calls “representation in the abyss of presence,” for 
negative transcendence is an “indefinitely multiplied structure…the indefinite process of 
supplementarity [that] has already infiltrated presence, always already inscribed there the 
space of repetition and the splitting of the self.”847  Negative transcendence is a relation 
between loss and absence but without the metaphysical baggage of filling-in; thus it remains 
open to the other permanently.  This openness is exactly how a comparison between 
Christianity and Buddhism is possible. 
 
 
                                                             
845 William Dean, “Deconstruction and Process Theology,” The Journal of Religion, vol. 64, no. 1 (January 
1984): 3-4.  
846 Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 18. Italics original.  
847 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 163.  
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III. Buddhist Emptiness and Christian Nothingness: A Comparison 
 What is left here? How can all of the splits and fissures of this project be brought 
together for some kind of comparison between Buddhist emptiness and Christian 
apophaticism?  Is it sufficient to say that there is no connection, or is it more honest to say 
that the two traditions function in completely different ways? Negative transcendence, 
informed through/by/in deconstruction, shows that negativity plays a key role in bridging 
Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism; so the assertion that there is no connection is 
untenable.  There is some-“thing” here, expressed in no-“thing,” that informs both traditions, 
that serves the function of both religions dialoguing in terms of emptiness and apophaticism.  
In his recent collection of essays, David Loy proposes some ideas that approach this 
comparison:  “…the infinite set of differential traces that constitutes each of us is nothing less 
than the whole universe…We want to meet God face-to-face, or gain enlightenment, but the 
fact that everything is shunya means we can never attain that.  We can, however, realize what 
we have always been – and never been.”848 Here Loy wrestles with the possibility of unicity, 
though a negative unicity, in terms that are indicative of a Christian or Buddhist perspective.  
Though he approaches a comparison, Loy seems to indicate that emptiness is what prevents a 
comparison, not what supports it.   
 The search for a comparison is, at its root, what Derrida might call a “passion of the 
origin…the writing that retraces the origin, tracking down the signs of its disappearance, the 
lost writing of the origin.”849 Thus, this comparison runs the risk of committing the falsity 
that Derrida describes as “…a trace which replaces presence which has never been present, an 
origin by means of which nothing has begun.”850 Does a comparison assume that there is a 
                                                             
848 David R. Loy, Awareness Bound and Unbound: Buddhist Essays (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2009), 49. Italics removed from original.   
849 Derrida, “Ellipsis,” 295.  
850 Ibid. Arguably, much of Derrida’s Of Grammatology deals with the problem of origin(s) in writing.  This 
problem “creates” something of a framework of thought here because it informs how previous comparisons 
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common root, an origin, by which a bridge may be made?  Simply put, a comparison by 
conventional language fails the intentions here; what is sought is not an origin, for it is 
acknowledged that all writing (including religious writing) is a trace of a trace, but a moving, 
unfixed bridge by which common conversation between Christianity and Buddhism might 
occur.  As Youxuan Wang sums, “In spite of Derrida’s impatience with the metaphysical 
obsession with presence, in spite of his warning against an essentialist reading of his own 
text, his primary concern is still with the ‘origin’…His deconstruction is motivated by an 
overwhelming desire to reach an origin of sorts.”851 Thus, the comparative locus, a non-locus, 
is found in openness to the other, a deconstruction of both traditions’ assumed authority over 
its language and meaning. Christian apophaticism and Buddhist emptiness have an interior 
negative language that informs how each one “functions;” through Derridean différance and 
khôra, this study has shown how each might be “broken-up,” disseminated, and allowed the 
voices of difference and otherness to inform the dialogue.
852
  Thus, the focus of this 
comparison is not on tracing some origin back to find commonalities, but rather to highlight 
the commonalities found in difference and otherness. The commonalities include the rejection 
of a master-concept that informs all other components of the religious language, negativity as 
method by which to examine religious language, and the openness to the “other” by which 
some-“thing” is always to come.   
A. A Rejection of Master-Concepts and Religious Language(s) 
 The assumed authority of religious language as it pertains to emptiness in Buddhism 
and apophaticism in Christianity breaks down as master-concepts because as it fails to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
commit the same fallacy of assuming a common beginning place, or an “origin of presence.”  As Derrida argues, 
“Where and how does it begin…? A question of origin.  But a meditation upon the trace should undoubtedly 
teach us that there is no origin, that is to say simple origin; that the questions of origin carry with them a 
metaphysics of presence.” Derrida, Of Grammatology, 74.  Italics original.  
851 Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction, 199. 
852 This is similar to Forte’s argument for “…a space to open up with assertions of truth. The meaning of any 
truth claim is therefore never closed off or terminated in a hegemonic fashion, but always remains open for the 
other to emerge.” Forte, “The Ethics of Attainment,” 191. Italics original.  
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describe the operative function of how the conceptualization informs the religion.  While it 
has been the analytical constraints of this study, emptiness and apophaticism cannot 
“themselves” be master-concepts because they resist substantiality through negation.  That 
said, there is a freedom to compare the two religions because of the resistance of master-
concept status: could all master-concepts in the two religions be called into question?  Could 
terms like nirvana, salvation, oneness, samsara, grace, suffering, and forgiveness break down 
insofar as further dialogue with the terminology is needed?  Furthermore, the deconstructive 
mode of religious language, as a resistance to master-concepts, would call into question 
binary oppositions as they apply to religious language: enlightenment/ignorance, heaven/hell 
might be further examined to include how enlightenment might be a (negative) transcendence 
because unity/emptiness is “experienced” in the same way that (negative) transcendence 
might bring a person closer to God with unity/no-thing-ness.   
 Once master-concept “status” has been eliminated from assumed religious authority, 
the bridges of comparison are possible in this space and time.  The experience of emptiness in 
Buddhism might be comparable to the experience of unicity with God because a 
fullness/emptiness of the adherent transcends the self in space and time.  But, is this possible 
as long as master-concepts dominate assumed religious language?  Perhaps, but does it go 
beyond superficial description and compromise (namely, by that of the originator of the 
dialogue and his/her personal affinities)?  The repulsion of master-concept status allows 
religious dialogue to occur as totalities and absolutes are purposely suspended.   
 The binary opposition of emptiness/fullness and apophaticism/kataphaticism bring 
together an interesting matrix of experience and internal religious logic.  It illustrates 
something “other” in the experiential components in the religion insofar as the Buddhist who 
“experiences” emptiness “experiences” the loss of self, the awakening to the non-
substantiality of all things, and the possibility of enlightenment as the Christian “experiences” 
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the loss of self, the awakening to the substantiality of God-as-such, and the possibility of 
unicity with God.  There is a real comparison to be made here, in this space and time, in that 
the binary opposition of emptiness/fullness and apophaticism/kataphaticism because, as 
master-concept status is suspended (if even temporarily), then dialogue might occur because 
the emptiness and apophaticism of both oppositions play a vital role in both religions’ 
internal logic.  Emptiness shows the non-substantiality of all things, the illusion of the self, 
and the possibility of enlightenment of all sentient beings in a similar way that apophaticism 
not only highlights the idolatry of assigning characteristics to God, but also contributes to the 
conversation of what unicity with a God who remains hidden amongst God’s-own self-
revelation means.   
 Master-concepts probably cannot be relinquished in any kind of permanent way, but 
the temporary suspension of them helps show a place where comparison might occur, beyond 
the dogmatic and confining language of religious traditions.   
B. Negativity: Methods of Examining Religious Language 
 This project has been an attempt to look at how negativity affects religious language, 
how it can inform internal structures and logic to that language, and how deconstruction can 
bring about new interpretations.  Negativity is a powerful tool because it takes aim at idolatry 
and illusion, affirms the non-substantiality of things, and provides a method by which layers 
of meaning can be stripped away.  The risk is, of course, that negativity provides another 
affirmation, a counter to what might be affirmed, and a hyperessentiality to something latent 
or hidden.  This risk is mitigated by the possibility of stripping away those layers, of 
affirming a method by which something or no-thing can be 
discovered/disseminated/recovered/covered in religious language.  Additionally, though 
deconstruction might be akin to analysis, specifically the deep (non)structures within 
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language, negativity provides a specific lens by which the fissure, splits, and gaps might be 
analyzed.   
 The conclusions of the Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna, namely the emptiness of 
emptiness, are striking where they convey a type of hyperessentiality, a “thingness” that goes 
beyond emptiness, but that which can only be apprehended with emptiness; the same charge 
can be leveled against the Christian thinker Eckhart who asserted an apophatic logic to 
describe the God beyond God. However, negativity pushes the paradigm here: both 
Nāgārjuna and Eckhart create a complex argument, nuanced by negativity that continues to 
pull away the curtain of illusion, to assert that the “somethingness” beyond what they are 
asserting would still be negative.  Negativity stripped away does not necessarily lead to 
positivity; rather, negativity pushes the paradigm to otherness, infinity, a (negative) 
transcendence that almost seems closed behind a wall of mystical otherness.  For thinkers like 
Nāgārjuna and Eckhart, negativity seems to be a linguistic structure by which that mystical 
wall breaks down, a method by which the “otherness” of the emptiness of empt iness and the 
God beyond God somehow transcend normal religious-language barriers.   
 The real comparison here is with the function of negativity in religious language.  The 
illusion of positivity creates false structures for Buddhist and Christian thinkers; particular 
over-arching constructs like suffering/enlightenment and sin/salvation are framed in positivist 
ways by which the adherent might religiously experience transcendence.  However, 
negativity helps frame the possible false illusion of this without superimposing another false 
construct; instead, negativity helps peel back the layers of illusion in a way that the religious 
language might be opened up to the other.  
 Thus, a rejection of master-concepts and a method of negativity both point toward 
otherness in both Buddhism and Christianity. As discussed above in the penultimate 
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conclusion of negative transcendence, otherness informs how emptiness and apophaticism 
might be framed in a comparative analysis of Buddhism and Christianity. 
C. Otherness and the Language of Tomorrow: Religious Comparisons  
 Throughout this study, the suggestion that a look toward the future, toward tomorrow, 
is necessary for any kind of meaningful religious comparison, has shaped the internal logic.  
This means that while a search of origins, albeit linguistic, philosophical, or anthropological 
is useful, the assertion of the existence of a comparison at the origins is not historically, 
theologically, or philosophically demonstrable.  Thus, a religious comparison must take on a 
different trajectory, one in which the future is open to dialogue and comparison.
853
  This is 
not to say that there is a lack of possible meaningful connections between the two 
traditions,
854
 but that a comparison of Buddhism and Christianity might find the apex of 
comparison in the openness to the future, to a language of tomorrow, of what is to come.
855
   
 More specifically, this means that Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism 
might find common expression in the common mode of negation, of the search for the 
nothing that is beyond the something, in the transcendent, in the negativity sublime.  This 
also means that Christianity and Buddhism would be fundamentally open to the other, not 
                                                             
853 Caputo frames this quite well within a particular context: “Not the relative and foreseeable, programmable 
and plannable future – the future of ‘strategic planning’ – but the absolute future, the welcome extended on to an 
other whom I cannot, in principle, anticipate, the tout autre whose alterity disturbs the complacent circles of the 
same.” Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 156.  
854
 David Loy suggests that Buddhism’s “…no mythical pure point of historical origin to which Buddhists yearn 
to return” in contrast to Christianity’s creation story might create a critical inability for comparison.  Loy 
suggests that deconstruction helps bridge this gap, but he does not take the analysis far enough to explain how. 
Loy, “The Clôture of Deconstruction,” 62. Magliola gets closer a point of comparison, but then stops short of 
explaining how it might come together: “For the deconstructor, this is recondite allegory for what he calls ‘mise-
en-abyme’: the infinite regression of a picture within a picture; and the plunge down through successive 
‘bottoms’ which ogrify and collapse, each in turn, so that one plummets downward forever and ever and ever.  
In other words, when one pursues a metaphysics of Origin, each attempt to reintegrate Being, to reestablish a 
Ground, must inevitably result in yet another collapse.  And the collapse of Origin means the collapse of all 
dependent holistic systems.  I have argued of course that ‘mise-en-abyme’ need not be collapse into terror, but 
the ‘free fall’ into śūnyatā.” Magliola, Derrida on the Mend, 185. Italics original.  
855 This is re-occurring theme in Caputo’s engagement with Derrida’s thought. He grounds it in the idea that 
“[t]he Bible does not think of time in terms of the enduring permanence of ousia but in terms of fidelity to the 
promise of something that is to come, even something a little impossible…[Derrida] is repeating religion with a 
difference, miming religious time nondogmatically, for this is a messianic time sans a Messiah, an apocalypse 




only for mutual dialogue, but also for philosophical and theological junctures which might 
challenge claims to exclusivity, authoritative dominance, and religious power.   
 What might be most paradoxical here is the juncture of two world religious traditions 
with the claim that they might be open to an unknown future, but also that they preserve their 
distinctive, unique voices.  If a comparison of origins is undertaken, there is some sort of 
compromise made, something lost in exposing and silencing some voices from the past; 
however, if a comparison is made with an expressed vision of otherness and openness, the 
distinctive voices of Buddhism and Christianity might be preserved.
856
  Hence, what is lost 
here is a sense of authority over one particular vision of religious truth, but what is gained is 
the possibility of a multitude of voices, open and free to dialogue; as Gavin Flood 
illuminates,  
…the important point is that religious studies’ future lies in its developing into 
a critical endeavor that is in dialogical relationship with its object, the most 
important boundary here being language, or rather utterance in the social 





 Does this mean that a comparison of Buddhist emptiness and Christian apophaticism 
is firmly rooted in the future, in the possibility of dialogue?
858
  Yes, to a certain extent, but 
that is not the full force of the argument.  The function of negativity in language today, in the 
historical, philosophical, theological inquiries made in this space and time, is necessary for 
the openness to future dialogue.  However, that is also to say that there might be something 
learned by examining the negative function of language, as is hopefully illuminated above.   
 
                                                             
856 It is important to note that commentators like Gavin Flood support this type of thinking, the preservation of 
religious traditions in their own uniqueness, though with different terminology.  For his part, Flood calls this a 
“[p]ost-colonial theory [that] celebrates difference, hybridity and polyvalence.” Flood, Beyond Phenomenology, 
235.  
857 Ibid. 223.  
858 The point here is to question the “use” of deconstruction as it applies to religious, especially comparative, 
inquiry.  Caputo writes passionately about the potentiality: “Deconstruction is nourished by a dream of the 
invention of the other, of something to come, something absolutely unique and idiomatic, the invention, the in-
coming, of an absolute surprise.” Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 70.  
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IV. Future Work: Comparisons and Religious Texts 
 Establishing a methodology whereby religious traditions are fundamentally open to 
the future means not being able to clearly and definitively articulate a methodology for future 
work.  However, there are working notes by which a methodology of comparison might be 
possible.  The intent here is to show where future work might draw upon this project. 
Throughout the text of this project, the deconstruction of religious texts is discussed 
within specific contexts, namely in emptiness in Buddhism and apophaticism in Christianity. 
There is much room left for analysis here, though, because the voluminous nature of religious 
literature lends itself to deep analysis, whereby the silenced voices might speak again, claims 
to authority might be challenged, and worldviews might be shaped and altered.  This begs the 
question of what deconstruction to/in/for religious texts might mean; this is pure speculation, 
but it might mean that religious epistemology might be changed indefinitely.  Religious 
knowledge, because it is shaped by texts, might undergo an ebb and flow of analysis that 
could well challenge long-held opinions, interpretations, and worldviews.   
In another sense, this might be more akin to what Derrida calls a search for the 
impossible.  There is something innately impossible about religious knowledge, whether that 
is defined as a search for God, Truth, or meaning.  Religious knowledge is a search for the 
impossible, for what cannot be grasped by human intuition, so to that end, it is an appropriate 
“fit” for comparative studies.   
What does this mean for the future of religious studies?  With the dissemination of 
information occurring at incredible speeds thanks to technological advances, it might be 
stated that what is advocated for here is a turn back into the very texts that religions claim are 
“holy” or “sacred.”  Deconstruction is not a tearing apart of these texts, but a deep analysis 
where multiple interpretations, divisions, meanings, and voices might emerge as free from 
authoritative claims of power: “Deconstruction is a blessing for religion, its positive 
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salvation, keeping it open to constant reinvention, encouraging religion to reread ancient texts 
in new ways, to reinvent ancient traditions in new contexts.”859  For, as this study has 
hopefully illuminated with a search of negativity in religious language, namely in Buddhist 
emptiness and Christian apophaticism, the possibility of comparison exists for the other, in a 
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